Senator KIM CARR (Victoria) (09:31): Labor supports the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2015, which amends legislation enacted when we were in office. That legislation sought to meet Australia's international obligations as a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The act also gave legislative effect to the treaty between Australia and the United States on defence trade cooperation. The act restricted the non-physical export of military technology and technology that has potential military application. That can happen through the publishing of information, whether it be in print or electronically, and through so-called 'brokering'—that is, an Australian entity acting outside of Australian jurisdiction.

This export control system is an antiproliferation measure. It is intended to stop goods and technology that can be used in chemical, biological or nuclear weapons—or in other military applications—from being supplied to individuals, states or groups that may be of security concern. The act regulates the supply of information through a system of permits and ministerial permissions. The legislation applies to industry generally, not only to firms or institutions directly involved in defence work. It applies to universities and the research sector as well.

For some of the affected institutions, particularly universities, the act imposes a regulatory regime that has raised questions about whether the level of oversight is compatible with the freedom to conduct research. It is fair to say that the original act raised serious concerns for several universities in relation to the publication, and especially to the verbal supply, of information about civilian technologies that may have military application. These civilian technologies range from engineering products to biological information about diseases. A strengthened export control steering group, ably led by the Chief Scientist, was established to work through the universities' concerns about the legislation. The present bill, which is the result of wide consultation with stakeholders, is a response to the concerns that have been raised. The existing act provides for a transition period before its offence provisions take effect. That period ceases on 16 May this year, but this bill seeks to delay the application of the offence provisions for 12 months—so this is a very urgent piece of legislation. It does require immediate attention. For the universities, the delay by 12 months of the application of the offence provisions is extremely important. It gives those involved in the publication and the verbal supply of control technologies time to adjust to the regulatory regime. Organisations at the project level will be able to obtain broad permits to continue their work, valid for five years.

The existing act sets out a Defence and Strategic Goods List for items subject to export control. This bill, the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill, contains exemptions to the offence created by the act of supplying information. It exempts the oral supply of information about items on the Defence and Strategic Goods List where the supply of information does not provide access to Defence and Strategic Goods List technology and is not for use in a Weapons of Mass Destruction program or for any other military use. The bill also allows for applicants to obtain supply and brokering permits on behalf of projects, and for permits to be issued to project participants. It narrows the act's publication offence to publications of military DGSL technologies where no application approval has been given, or where the publication contravenes a condition of the approval. So the bill allows the minister to prohibit the publication of information about military technologies, or civilian technologies of potential military application, where that publication could prejudice the defence security or the international relations of Australia. It allows the Secretary of the defence department to issue interim publication notices where the Secretary considers the minister may have grounds to introduce a prohibition notice.

Further, the bill more precisely defines 'brokering', and stipulates that the broker must receive money or a non-cash benefit. The bill provides an exemption from the brokering offence if the broker is 'from or acting within' one of the four export controls regimes mentioned earlier—that is, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Employees of ASIO and ASIS will also be exempt from the brokering offence. The bill also allows the minister to direct a person to seek a permit for the brokering of civilian technology with potential military application, so that such products can be regularised. In these circumstances, the minister, the Secretary of the department, or a delegate of the minister will be required to consider criteria prescribed in regulations, and to have regard to other appropriate matters, before deciding that an activity would prejudice Australia's security or international relations. The export control regime introduced by the act and amended by this bill is of vital importance to Australia.

The bill also provides for the continued review of the operations of the act; initially after two years and subsequently at intervals of not more than five years. I think that is a particularly important provision. The minister will be required to table copies of the review report in both houses of parliament. We must continue to support international regimes that counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must continue to work collaboratively with other nations to ensure that those sorts of technologies are not misused, and that they do not create a heightened threat to the international community. The passage of this bill and the maintenance of the export control regime will enhance our reputation as a nation.

Senator LUDLAM (Western Australia) (09:39): I rise to speak on this bill, the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2015—I listened to Senator Carr's contribution with interest, because there is an element of deja vu in debating this bill.

Firstly, I should say at the outset that the Greens support passage of this bill for reasons that would be fairly obvious to anybody who read or heard the things we said in October 2012 during the original debate of this bill. Senator Fierravanti-Wells, who is representing the government this morning, would be well aware. You were sitting on the opposition benches at that time, and Senator Carr was in government. Effectively, what we are doing today is cleaning up the messes that were well and truly understood on the day the bill was passed back in 2012 and all of the things that Senator Johnston, who was the shadow defence spokesperson at the time, mentioned in an entirely articulate critique of the bill at the time. And yet the opposition voted for the bill. Now we come back today. Here we are in March 2015, 2½ years later, to fix the mess that everybody understood we were making at the time.

There is obviously cross-party support for this important bill, so I do not propose to tie the chamber up for long. The idea that this chamber would have passed legislation with its eyes wide open that could criminalise and see researchers being thrown in jail for doing entirely legitimate work just because somebody in the defence community thought that eventually somebody could turn that into a weapon is absolutely absurd, and the safeguards that we are building back in today to prevent that from happening were entirely understood by, I think, all sides of this parliament back in 2012.

Before the bill passes I do want to take a couple of minutes to reflect on how we got here in the first place. The initial Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011 was really introduced for one purpose, and that was to give effect to the Australia United States Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, which was signed by the Bush administration and the Howard government way back in 2007. That treaty was viewed with relief by some Australian defence industries and weapons manufacturers because it allowed them to evade a fairly restrictive export control scheme which they had previously critiqued pretty heavily. It was viewed with some suspicion by the Greens and other groups who are focused on peace and non-proliferation of weapons because it openly facilitated the weapons trade and it should never be made easier for armaments to be traded for the simple fact that there are always unintended consequences. We are seeing some of the aftereffects of that play out in Iraq at the moment.

So the concern that was expressed by many was the impact that the bill would have on Australia's research community, who were looking on somewhat aghast at the time as they were told by legislators that they faced the prospect of being thrown in jail simply for conducting research and publishing results on what had previously not been seen as hugely controversial subjects. One example which is particularly close to my heart is that of encryption. The United States government defence community and the technical community went through this hugely divisive debate in the US in the 1990s in the so-called Crypto Wars, when the United States government decided to classify strong cryptography—that is, encryption of privacy for communications between, for example, financial institutions, diplomats or anybody who has the need for strongly protected communications—as a weapon for the purposes of exports. So weak and degraded crypto protocols were exported to other countries around the world, which has later come back to bite the United States government because they end up as security vulnerabilities placed there deliberately in order to be able to be broken and accessed that then effectively compromised, for example, the global financial system, the banking system and the diplomatic community. It was exactly these kinds of things.

When the defence community sees things that could potentially be used as weapons—and that is just one example—and therefore classifies them as defence exports, you can inadvertently introduce vulnerabilities, weaknesses or cripple research. You would have to say that is an unintended consequence. That is not something we want to see a repeat of.

As I said, these issues were very well understood when they were examined by the foreign affairs, defence and trade committee back in 2012. That committee inquiry resulted in probably two of the strongest worded reports that I have ever seen published by that committee. In short, the committee sent the bill back to Defence and asked it to fix the errors that had been introduced and to actually talk to the Australian research community before the bill would be debated in parliament. What became really apparent at the time—this is something Senator Carr managed to avoid mentioning in his speech—was that the timing of the debate of the bill in the Senate was basically designed to make sure the government of the day had some kind of announceable to put up, because the then US secretaries of state and defence were scheduled to arrive in Australia for fairly high level talks. This point is acknowledged by Senator Johnston in his contribution at the time. What the hell was the rush? As it turned out, it was a photo opportunity: we were passing legislation the parliament knew to be flawed so that a press opportunity could be taken advantage of. So two and a half years later here we are, fixing the problems which were absolutely well understood at the time, and everything is again happening at the last minute. We are told if the bill does not pass during this sitting period, researchers will face very real consequences. I happen to believe that is not an idle threat. We do need to pass legislation quickly, but we also need to make sure we get it right.

An exposure draft of the current bill was only released a week or so before Christmas and I believe the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee only signed off its final report into this bill about 40 minutes ago. Again, you would not say that was legislative best practice. Under the previous government we saw an abuse of parliamentary process which put researchers at significant risk, but I am pleased to say there are amendments, and I want to pay credit to the current government for recognising that the system could not stay as it was; that it was completely unconscionable. It is a shame that it has taken two and a half years to fix, but I give acknowledgement where it is due to the Labor Party and the government. They have brought forward amendments; they do not go 100 per cent of the way to assuaging the concerns that were raised at the time but nonetheless the most serious problems that were introduced into the bill—with eyes open, by a parliament that knew exactly what it was doing at the time—will finally be fixed when this bill passes into law. I am happy to commend the bill to the chamber.

Senator FAWCETT (South Australia—Deputy Government Whip in the Senate) (09:46): I too rise to make some comments on the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill of 2015. I would like to talk little bit about the bill itself—some of the background, some of the issues and some of the future actions that are going to be required.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill will amend the Defence Trade Controls Act of 2012 which received royal assent in November 2012. As previous speakers have indicated, it includes measures to strengthen Australia's export controls to meet our obligations such as the Wassenaar arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As has been noted, it gives effect to the Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, known as 'the treaty'. Those treaty provisions commenced operations in June 2013 and the treaty itself will not be amended in any substantive way by this bill. The act of 2012 introduced new export controls on the intangible supply of technology listed in the Defence and Strategic Goods List, the DSGL, and the prohibition of the publication of DSGL technology and regulation-brokering activities.

Broadly, this bill makes a number of amendments. There is quite a list; but one of the key ones that is important is that it provides an additional 12-month implementation period before the offence provisions and the record-keeping requirements commence operation. This has been one of the significant outcomes of the consultation process of the steering group and the pilots that have been in place over the last two years. It provides two new exceptions to the supply offence in the existing section 10 of the act, being firstly for the oral supply of DSGL technology where that supply is not the provision of access to DSGL technology and is not for use in a weapons of mass destruction program or for a military end use; secondly, for the supply of dual use or part 2 DSGL technology where the supply is preparatory to the publication of a part 2 technology. It also extends the exception to the offence of supplying DSGL technology, without permit, to or from certain members of the government, security and law-enforcement organisations; and, importantly, it provides for the reviewing of the operation of the act, except for part 3 and 4—which are the supply offence provisions—initiated by the minister two years after the commencement of section 10, and subsequent infills of no more than five years.

The background to this is important. In November 2011, the government introduced the Defence Trade Controls Bill into the parliament. The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee received this bill which was referred to us for report by April 2012. That reporting date was extended out to August 2012 because of the number of issues the committee found. I had the privilege of being a member of that committee—

I still do—as we looked at this bill.

One of the things the committee found was that the consultations undertaken by the Department of Defence in this case were inadequate, and that would be understating the extent of the consultations. As someone who served for over 23 years in Defence, I am ashamed to have to tell this chamber that the consultation was inadequate. This lack shows that many in Defence are put into roles—they might be working with an industry sector or an academic sector that they have never been a part of—and sometimes their concept of what will have an impact is not informed by their own life experience; and that is why consultation is so important. Consultation is important not only to transmit information but also to provide real opportunities to listen and understand what the practical impact of measures that the parliament legislates may have on industry or on academia.

Essentially the issue was handed back to Defence, which was told to go away to do more consultation, but in the meantime other measures, such as the steering group, the pilot programs and other things, were put in place. The committee strongly recommended the 24-month transition period, during which the offence provisions would be suspended and further consultation would occur. While in theory we could forward a bill and in theory we could talk about what it might look like, until the stakeholders had the opportunity, with the active support of Defence, to see how the provisions would work in practice, it was clear that a transition period was needed to put in place systems and processes. A couple of pilot studies in the academic space were particularly useful in achieving this. I am glad to see that the amendments support a transition period beyond the introduction of this particular amendment bill. The transition period was accompanied by a six-monthly examination of progress; the steering group had to report on progress to the committee, but at the same time the committee had the opportunity to engage with stakeholders, both in academia and industry, to understand their experience of the process—to ascertain whether they were happy with the progress, whether their concerns were listened to and to determine whether we were on track to meet our international obligations, our national security requirements and, importantly, whether we had embarked on something that did not diminish the ability of Australian industry and academia to research, develop IP, innovate and ideally to export.

These considerations have led a range of amendments, but other issues still exist and these need to be addressed today to make sure that we do not lapse back into passing inappropriate legislation and regulations that do not engage in a proactive way with stakeholders who will be affected by this legislation. There was a tight time frame for these amendments, and that has been acknowledged by each of the people who submitted to the committee's latest inquiry. Generally speaking, most of the 30 written submissions to DECO and the submissions to the committee were happy with the style and level of consultation—they felt it was appropriate. A number of people indicated that they were comfortable with the amendments in that they strike the right balance between protecting Australia's national security interests and allowing scientists to go about their work with other scientists and industry around the world, as UNSW commented. The University of Sydney made similar comments that these measures would significantly reduce the compliance burden for universities and their research support staff and deliver a regulatory framework that is much better targeted at activities which present real risks to national security. The resulting regulatory regime will be of greater overall benefit and more cost effective for government, industry and the public sector research community.

Those are positive things, and they demonstrate that the work of this Senate and its committees can deliver an outcome or a process that when followed gets better outcomes. But there are still a number of people who submitted that they had concerns—for example, in the areas around clarity of definitions in both the Defence and Strategic Goods List itself and the act—which, they put forward, could lead to some difficulty for researchers and industry knowing the scope of coverage of the permit regime and determining whether the activities were controlled or not.

There is also the issue of consistency with other jurisdictions. There was a concern expressed by people that the offences in the amended act would still be more restrictive than those in equivalent legislations in the UK and the US. I note that the majority of people who raised concerns in this area of definition still support the passage of the bill but have highlighted that it is not perfect and there are still concerns. The burden of implementation was another concern.

But what all these lead to is that, just as at the start of this process—when we found that the only way we could approve this bill and move forward was to have a transition process that was accompanied by meaningful engagement and consultation with a willingness to amend and improve regulations so that the impact on stakeholders was academically, intellectually and economically affordable—the implementation of these amendments means that we still need to have those ongoing consultations.

So, in the future, we have this 12-month implementation period—I think the offence provisions do need to be suspended for that period while people work through it. But importantly I want to note that we also had very strong and rigorous representation from the academic sector—Universities Australia and a number of individual universities have been very strong in engaging with the Chief Scientist and the steering group—and that has been welcome.

We have had submissions from a number of large industry groups. But I know, through my own experience, that a lot of the innovation and work done in Australia's defence sector is through SMEs, and it concerns me that the level of representation in consultations from the SME sector was so low, despite the fact that the committee specifically issued invitations and requests for information from a broad range of stakeholders. What that says to me is that a number of the smaller players in Australia's defence industry manufacturing sector are not necessarily fully across the scope and the implications of what this whole act and the amendments may mean. To my mind that makes it even more important that not only do we have this transition period where the offence provisions do not take effect but that the consultation needs to reach out in a very focused way, and not just to the academic sector, who have been very robustly engaged. It also needs to have a really targeted focus on the SMEs and a willingness, where problems are identified with the implementation, for the government—and I encourage the opposition to support this—to say: 'How do we need to make further amendments, if required, so that we embed this, meeting our obligations internationally and meeting out national security requirements, but in a way that still enables research and innovation in our technology sector to not only survive but to thrive in Australia?' There needs to be that willingness, so that we can create not only the technology we need for our defence sector but also the jobs, the research and the opportunities for young people to contribute to this important and growing sector within Australia.

So I do support these amendments to the act. Clearly, the government is putting forward this bill, and I support it. But I just want to make very clear that the implementation process, the consultation and the willingness to iteratively revisit this and make change must not stop now that this amendment bill has come forward, but it must be carried forward with a particular focus on SMEs. I support the amendments.

Senator FIERRAVANTI-WELLS (New South Wales—Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services) (09:59): Can I start by thanking those who have made a contribution to this bill. The bill will enable Defence to focus its regulatory attention on higher risk activities with respect to the non-physical supply and transfer of Defence controlled goods while dealing more efficiently with lower risk activities.

The original act established a two-year transition period during which stakeholders had an opportunity to work with Defence to address concerns and provide feedback through the Strengthened Export Controls Steering Group. The work of the steering group has been critical to the development of these amendments and the government will seek to extend the steering group's appointments to cover the extended implemented period detailed in this bill. I thank those opposite for their support of this important legislation and I commend the bill to the Senate.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Sterle ) (10:00): As no amendments to the bill have been circulated, I shall call the minister to move the third reading unless any senator requires that the bill be considered in Committee of the Whole.

Senator FIERRAVANTI-WELLS (New South Wales—Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services) (10:00): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a third time.

Senator FIERRAVANTI-WELLS (New South Wales—Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services) (10:01): I move:

That these bills may proceed without formalities, may be taken together and be now read a first time.

Question agreed to.

Bills read a first time.

Senator FIERRAVANTI-WELLS (New South Wales—Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services) (10:01): I move:

That these bills be now read a second time.

I seek leave to have the second reading speeches incorporated in Hansard.

Leave granted.

The speeches read as follows—

CUSTOMS AMENDMENT (ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES) BILL (No. 1) 2015

I am pleased to present the Customs Amendment (Anti-Dumping Measures) Bill (No. 1) 2015, representing part of the Government's reforms to strengthen and improve Australia's anti‑dumping system.

This is a Government that strongly supports genuine free and fair trade and an open and dynamic market economy. However the importation of dumped and subsidised goods, which injure Australian manufacturers and producers, undermines the viability of efficient, innovative and hard-working Australian businesses.

This is why we support Australia having an effective trade remedies regime. It represents an integral part of a robust international trading system and we want to ensure that Australian industries are competing on a level playing field. It is also critical to our broader plan to boost the competitiveness of Australian manufacturing.

Australia's current regime for combatting injurious dumping and subsidisation is transparent and complies with our obligations under World Trade Organization agreements. But there is clearly room to strengthen, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system – and that is what we plan to do.

Our reforms included in this Bill introduce a number of measures to strengthen Australia's anti‑dumping system. The improvements included in this Bill will:

improve the current merits review arrangements;

improve the flexibility of stakeholder consultations;

modernise the way information about anti-dumping investigations and other inquiries is published; and

simplify, clarify and better align our anti-dumping legislation with international law and practice.

The improvements that I am introducing today are designed to address stakeholder concerns about the effectiveness of Australia's anti-dumping system, in a manner that is consistent with our trade obligations, including those under World Trade Organization Agreements.

We are introducing more stringent deadlines for submissions to investigations in order to assist businesses to get more timely access to remedies. This amendment aligns our legislation with the quickest timeframes permissible and sends a message to businesses intending to export dumped and subsidised goods at injurious prices to Australia that we are serious about taking a tougher approach to combatting unfair trade.

We are also modernising the provisions which govern how key information about anti‑dumping investigations, and other inquiries, is made public. Under current arrangements, many types of key notices are required to be published physically in newspapers.. This arrangement is outdated and does not fully recognise the high level of transparency of Australia's anti-dumping system or the excellent Electronic Public Record managed by the Anti-Dumping Commission. By standardising electronic publication throughout the anti-dumping system, we will be providing stakeholders with the certainty that they can access all notices in one place, free of charge, and at the same time.

This Bill will also increase business certainty in anti-dumping decisions by improving the current merits review process, which is administered by the Anti‑Dumping Review Panel. Specifically, the Anti-Dumping Commission will be able to participate in reviews, either by attending a conference called by the Review Panel or making submissions during the review. This complements the ability of the Review Panel to request reinvestigations by the Commission and provides the Review Panel even greater access to the Commission's expertise. These improvements ensure the Review Panel members have access to the information necessary to make informed judgements, whilst maintaining their independence from our anti-dumping investigators.

In addition, this Bill will also raise the legal and procedural threshold for applying for a review and allow the charging of a fee for lodging an application. Although these measures may deter some parties from seeking a review, this will allow the Review Panel to focus on only the most serious and review-worthy issues that businesses truly believe need to be challenged. We have also considered the impact of the fee on smaller businesses, with small and medium sized businesses applicable for a reduced fee when seeking review.

We want to ensure that businesses have greater certainty in decisions made during anti-dumping and countervailing investigations and that these matters are resolved in a timely, robust and efficient manner. This Bill will not affect stakeholder rights to also seek judicial review of anti‑dumping decisions.

Finally, this Bill also reduces red-tape by removing the legislative establishment of the International Trade Remedies Forum, which is the Government's anti‑dumping advisory body. The Forum, as it is currently legislated, binds the Government to a rigid and restricted method for consulting stakeholders. This Government believes that a more flexible arrangement will allow a wider range of stakeholders to be consulted on the operation and reform of Australia's anti-dumping system.

Instead, the Government is committed to ensuring a broad range of stakeholders are able to bring their views on the administration and reform of the anti-dumping system to the Government. Flexible consultation ensures important issues can be raised in a timely manner and stakeholders are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the Government.

The reforms in this Bill will be complemented by the improvements contained in the Customs Tariff (Anti‑Dumping) Amendment Bill 2015. In addition to the improvements included in these Bills, we are introducing a range of further reforms that improve access to the anti-dumping system, particularly for small and medium sized businesses, and strengthen the incentives for businesses to cooperate with anti-dumping investigations.

Although these reforms address concerns raised by stakeholders, I will continue to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of Australia's anti-dumping system and consider whether further improvements are required.

We are committed to ensuring that Australian industry is able to compete on a level playing field. Our reforms will ensure that Australian industries have access to a strong anti-dumping system that delivers efficient and effective remedies for Australian businesses injured by dumping and subsidisation.

CUSTOMS TARIFF (ANTI-DUMPING) AMENDMENT BILL 2015

I am pleased to present the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Amendment Bill 2015, representing part of the Government's reforms to strengthen and improve Australia's anti‑dumping system.

This is a Government that strongly supports genuine free and fair trade and an open and dynamic market economy. However the importation of dumped and subsidised goods, which injure Australian manufacturers and producers, undermines support for trade by reducing the fairness of the playing field for Australian businesses.

This is why we support Australia having an effective trade remedies regime. It represents an integral part of a robust international trading system and we want to ensure that Australian industries are competing on a level playing field. It is also critical to our broader plan to boost the competitiveness of Australian manufacturing.

Australia's current regime for combatting injurious dumping and subsidisation is transparent and complies with our obligations under World Trade Organization agreements. But there is clearly room to strengthen, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system – and that is what we plan to do.

Our reforms included in this bill introduce a number of measures to strengthen Australia's anti‑dumping system. The improvements will:

clarify the ability to grant exemptions retrospectively to the date of the application for exemption;

modernise the way information about anti-dumping investigations and other inquiries is published; and

clarify our anti-dumping legislation.

The improvements that I am introducing in this bill today are designed to provide certainty for stakeholders. These reforms will complement the improvements contained in the Customs Amendment (Anti‑Dumping Measures) Bill (No.1) 2015.

We are committed to ensuring that Australian industry is able to compete on a level playing field. Our reforms will ensure that Australian industries have access to a strong anti-dumping system that delivers efficient and effective remedies for Australian businesses injured by dumping and subsidisation.

Senator KIM CARR (Victoria) (10:02): The Customs Amendment (Anti-Dumping Measures) Bill 2015 and the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Bill 2015 make a number of relatively minor technical amendments to Australia's antidumping laws. However, there are two matters these bills raise that the Labor Party does have some serious concerns about. I understand that there will be a second reading amendment moved to refer these bills to a committee—so there will be an opportunity to canvass those questions.

Part 15 of the Customs Amendment (Anti-Dumping Measures) Bill amends the Customs Act to abolish the International Trade Remedies Forum. That forum was a reform introduced by the Labor government as part of a package aimed at improving and streamlining Australia's antidumping system. The forum is a formal advisory group comprised of key users of the antidumping system and is charged with providing expert advice to the government on the effectiveness of the antidumping system. Its membership is drawn from manufacturers, from producers, from importers, from unions and from industry associations, as well as including representatives from government agencies. The purpose of the forum is to provide high-level strategic advice and feedback to government on the implementation and monitoring of our antidumping system.

The abolition of this group is in line with a pattern of behaviour from this government which, one would have to suggest, is about limiting opportunities for industry and the community to provide independent advice to the public service and to the government itself. What we have seen is that the government has been abolishing, one after another, committees such as this throughout the industry portfolio and those agencies related to the industry portfolio. This is a shockingly retrograde step.

Just a few months ago, in the December MYEFO, the Liberal government announced that they were reducing the number of government bodies as part of what they call the 'Smaller Government initiative'. A number of groups in the industry portfolio were abolished under this so-called initiative, including expert advisory groups on research and development, on venture capital, on commercialisation programs, on workplace productivity and on intellectual property. And that is just the tip of the iceberg. This is a government that is absolutely terrified of independent advice! It is absolutely terrified of talking to people who actually know something about the regulations that affect them. So the dismantling of these advisory groups—often, as I said, comprising external experts from business and industry, and often at incredibly low expense to the government—is an extraordinarily stupid and short-sighted approach. In taking these acts, the minister is effectively shooting himself in the foot.

It is the Labor Party's view that getting rid of independent advice is actually counterproductive. I know it is very popular in the public service, because what you want to do in the public service is to confine advice—to make sure that the channels of communication to the minister are limited. The real risk is in losing people who are actually directly affected, who can provide you with expert opinion and direct experience, and who can save you huge sums of money—not to mention the grief that comes as a result of regulations being implemented which have all sorts of adverse consequences, often quite unintended. It is actually a smart thing to do to engage people in the processes of government.

Now, the members of these advisory groups are, as a rule, respected leaders in their fields of expertise. They actually want to contribute; they want to help out. It costs them time and effort. It is part of what they regard as their civic duty. But this is a government that chooses to turn its back on these people. Of course, these groups are perceived to be in some way uncontrollable, and this is a government that is quite averse to any genuine industry consultation. The idea of independent advice is anathema to them.

So, what is all this about? It is not about budget savings, because most of these people do not even get paid. The December MYEFO flagged some of the amendments to the antidumping system which we are debating today, including the abolition of the International Trade Remedies Forum. MYEFO documents state:

The existing International Trade Remedies Forum will be replaced with a streamlined Anti-Dumping Industry Board.

Right. However, there is no reference at all to the antidumping industry board in this bill that we are debating today. There was no reference to the replacement body when the Parliamentary Secretary for Industry, Mr Bob Baldwin, wrote to members of the International Trade Remedies Forum in December last year. Mr Baldwin wrote to senior industry leaders, informing them that the forum would be discontinued. He said, 'The government will consult with stakeholders by convening smaller committees to provide industry feedback on the operation and the reform of the Australian antidumping system.'

Well, I may be a little cynical after a few years in this place, but I am not inclined to take this government's word when it purports to commit to an engagement with industry, or manufacturers or, particularly, with trade union representatives. We have not seen any evidence that there is genuine dialogue in the 18 months that this government has been in office.

I note that the International Trade Remedies Forum has not met since March 2013, despite there being a requirement in the Customs Act to meet at least twice a year. Perhaps if the Liberals had bothered to call a meeting of the forum, which they are required to do by law, they would have found it to be a little more effective. You can hardly argue, 'It's not effective because we don't call any meetings', with the decisions that are taken by government itself to actually wind down these bodies. The International Trade Remedies Forum was established to ensure that there was a proper legislative protection for this valuable dialogue with industry, and, despite that fact and despite the contribution that these industry leaders have actually made to the work of our antidumping regime, this government has turned its back on them. Now the coalition did not oppose the International Trade Remedies Forum when the legislation to establish it was passed—in fact, at the time it claimed to support it—and nor did it say before the election that it would be seeking to abolish this advisory group, so it is disappointing that this government is now backing away from a measure that previously enjoyed bipartisan support.

The other matter the Labor Party is concerned about is the fee for review. Part 12 of the Customs amendment antidumping bill amends the act so that the Anti-Dumping Review Panel will be able to charge fees for review. These fees will be determined by a legislative instrument, which may prescribe different fees for different kinds of applications and applicants. As I understand it, the government's intention here is that the introduction of fees will probably lead to fewer applications for review. While this might benefit some producers when the original decision was to impose duties, it also makes it expensive for Australian producers seeking reviews of decisions which did not impose duties. The government says small businesses may be eligible for a reduced fee or that there may be a provision for a refund or a waiver of the fee; however, without further detail and without actually seeing the instrument in question, it is very difficult for Labor to make a sound judgement on the effect of this measure on Australian industry. Therefore, while Labor does not oppose the fee in principle, it must reserve its final position until it has actually seen the fee scales.

I note that the coalition's election policy document stated:

The current anti-dumping laws are cumbersome, slow and prohibitively expensive for many Australian businesses to utilise.

Well isn't it incredible, when you have been in government for a short while, how all of the things you said before are found to be so easily disposed of in such a short period after the election. If the Liberals—

Senator O'Sullivan interjecting—

Senator KIM CARR: I can remember Sophie Mirabella—remember the famous Sophie Mirabella, the disgraced former member for Indi, ranting and raving, 'We're going to toughen up the antidumping regime; we're going to get rid of'—what did they say?—'this cumbersome, slow and prohibitively expensive way of actually undertaking under antidumping measures.' What do we have now? Capitulation by this government.

If the Liberals are concerned that our current antidumping system is 'prohibitively expensive', then it would be interesting to hear the parliamentary secretary's explanation of how a fee for review by the Anti-Dumping Review Panel is consistent with that pre-election commitment. When the bill was before the House of Representatives, the member for Makin moved an amendment to remove the abolition of the International Trade Remedies Forum from the bill. I will be moving a similar amendment in this chamber. Labor will also support Senator Xenophon's motion to refer this bill to a committee. We want to see what the detail actually is. Australia's antidumping regime is hugely important to the maintenance of fair trade for domestic producers. Labor are proud of their record in building that regime, including measures such as the International Trade Remedies Forum, and we will not allow this government, the Abbott government, to dismantle the regime for no better reason than an ideological hostility to industry policy. I urge Senator Xenophon to move his motion, and I look forward to it being voted on in the chamber.

Senator XENOPHON (South Australia) (10:14): At the outset I would like to make it clear that I am reserving my position on these bills at this stage. It is very important, as Senator Carr pointed out, that we get this right. This is a very important issue because we really have been mugs when it comes to the issues of dumping in the past. I acknowledge the work that Brendan O'Connor and then Jason Clare did as ministers for home affairs in this field. I put up a bill several years ago to strengthen our antidumping regime. Parts of that bill were picked up by the former government, which I think led to an improvement. I hope to have the same cooperative approach with this government in relation to antidumping measures because we have been left behind. Australian industry, Australian jobs have suffered because we have not fought for our jobs by having a clear application of WTO rules. I am not suggesting we get rid of the WTO rules; what I am suggesting is that we fight for them.

Why is it that Tindo Solar, the last remaining solar panel manufacturer in this country, is now facing a huge fight against dumped panels from China which are causing a significant impact? Those are below-cost dumped panels. I indicate that Tindo Solar in Adelaide makes a fantastic product in terms of its quality, reliability and longevity. But they are now in a position where they are having to fight an antidumping case—with some assistance, and in Senate estimates it was made very clear that there were some real issues about the level of assistance they were getting, but I think that has been rectified, which is a good thing. But why is it that in Europe and the United States of America action was taken many months ago—in fact some two years ago—on dumped solar panels from China whereas here we are still getting around to it? That shows some flaws in the system. That is why an inquiry into this very important area of public policy relating to the jobs of Australians needs to be looked at properly.

So antidumping legislation is hugely complex. Australia's system has come a long way in the last few years, but we need to go further. We heed to look at why the coalition dropped its reverse onus of proof approach to dumping. There may be good reasons for that, but it is an issue that Senator Madigan and I have long campaigned for because we need to use every method we can consistent with WTO rules to fight for Australian jobs and Australian industry. That is why I move the second reading amendment standing in my name:

At the end of the motion, add :

   and that these bills be referred to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 5 May 2015.

The government may say that is going to delay things by a couple of months. Let's get this right because we are not going to have another opportunity to do this for quite some time. I urge my crossbench colleagues the Australian Greens, Senator Madigan, Senator Muir, my other crossbench colleagues—all of them—to get this right in terms of what we need to do with regard to dumping.

We do not want to breach international law or jeopardise our trade relationships, but we also need to stand up for Australian jobs. We need to take the same approach to dumping that the European Union, the United States of America and a whole host of other countries have. It was very telling to me when Michael O'Connor from the CFMEU was at a conference on forestry in Scandinavia a few years ago. He told them where he was from. He said, 'I'm from Australia,' and the people laughed at him and said, 'Australia; you're the land of the free trade Taliban' because we take such a literal, fundamentalist approach to free trade that no other country does and in the process poke Australian industry in the eye and destroy jobs.

I believe in fair trade. I believe in having a robust network of trade negotiations and of WTO rules, but let's make sure we enforce them. We need to have more consultation on this bill. We need to hear from the people who will be impacted directly on how they feel the system is working and where there can be improvements. That is why I have moved the second reading amendment in my name. I am very grateful for the support of Senator Carr and the Australian Labor Party in relation to this. It will be a brief inquiry reporting in early May, but it will allow us to examine these bills in greater detail and for industry and small businesses to have their say. I want to thank the government for the information they have provided to me on these bills and look forward to discussing them in more detail during an inquiry process should that be set up.

Ultimately, our antidumping system needs to be improved further on the improvements we have seen in the last few years and on the improvements in this bill, but for goodness sake let's get this right. This is too important to be rammed through the parliament now. Let us get this right because tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Australian jobs are at stake—particularly with the stress we have seen in the manufacturing sector, with the demise of original equipment manufacturers in the auto sector and the impact that will have on the auto supply chain. Potentially 100,000 jobs or more will be at risk, and of course if we see a collapse in our shipbuilding industry, if the subs are not built in South Australia, there will be huge implications for the Williamstown shipyards in Victoria and Newcastle in New South Wales. We may well lose that critical mass of shipbuilding and I do not want that to happen. That is why dumping laws are also important in the context of ensuring we have a strong manufacturing base in our nation.

Senator FIERRAVANTI-WELLS (New South Wales—Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services) (10:20): I indicate that we will not be opposing Senator Xenophon's amendment. In relation to this antidumping legislation, Australian manufacturers and primary producers are being injured by unfair competition from foreign companies. The Australian industry can only compete against foreign imports if there is a level playing field, and our antidumping systems deliver just that. Our manufacturers and farmers are competing with foreign goods that are dumped into Australia at prices lower than they are sold in their home markets. Put simply, dumped goods hurt our businesses and our economy, and they cost Australian jobs.

We made election promises to strengthen the antidumping system, and these proposals deliver on those commitments. There is also a range of extra reform measures. The reform measures will place a greater onus on overseas businesses to cooperate with investigations and crack down on companies that do not cooperate with investigations; provide better assistance for Australian businesses throughout the antidumping processes; make improvements to the merits review process to give stakeholders greater certainty around decisions; impose more stringent and rigorous enforcement of deadlines for submissions; and reduce red tape in the system. Specific examples are: establishing the Anti-Dumping Information Service and increasing the numbers of international trade remedies advisers to better support businesses engaging with the system; directing the Anti-Dumping Commissioner to impose provisional duties at day 60 of an investigation where relevant conditions are met; and less tolerance for uncooperative exporters, so if companies do not respond to requests for information the Anti-Dumping Commission will proceed with their investigations on the basis of available information, which could be from the application brought forward by the Australian industry.

Our government has strong and historic support for genuinely free and fair trade and for Australia to operate as an open and dynamic market economy. All of our reforms are consistent with our World Trade Organization obligations. Despite these significant reforms, the government is continuing to engage with stakeholders to determine if more can be done to strengthen our antidumping system and address specific concerns around companies' circumvention of Australian measures, as well as foreign subsidies. Some of this work is currently underway with the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture and Industry's inquiry into circumvention, due to report soon.

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Sterle ): The question is that Senator Xenophon's amendment be agreed to.

Question agreed to.

Original question, as amended, agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Senator CAMERON (New South Wales) (10:27): The Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills implement the reform of our biosecurity regime. As such, this is important legislation. We need to get it right. These bills represent the first root-and-branch overhaul of our quarantine and biosecurity framework in nearly a century. These bills began their life under the former Labor government and we are proud to have shared in their development. On that basis, this legislation is deserving of bipartisan support.

Agriculture is important. Agriculture is so important to our future—and it is complex and involves long-term planning horizons—that we must strive to take a bipartisan approach to agriculture policy. Biosecurity is of paramount importance, yet, as the Beale inquiry—a seminal inquiry into our biosecurity system—noted, biosecurity usually only rates a mention when something goes wrong rather than regularly rating a mention when things are going right, as they almost always do.

The Biosecurity Bill, like the Beale review and other reviews that went before it, was a Labor government initiative. It was an initiative of a Labor government and it was progressed and developed by a Labor government. The Labor government was ready to implement the reform when it lost office 18 months ago.

This bill had its origins with the member for Watson in the other place when he was the minister, and was progressed right through the tenure of Senator Ludwig. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws, and it was a Labor government that first introduced the bill in 2012. In February 2008, the then Minister for Agriculture, the member for Watson in the other place, announced a comprehensive, independent review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity arrangements to be undertaken by an independent panel of experts and chaired by Roger Beale AO.

The bill now before the Senate is essentially identical to Labor's bill save for a few minor adjustments, which we do not have any great difficulty with, except for a very big departure in the absence of any guarantee that the Inspector-General of Biosecurity will continue to play a role. I will return to this very important point.

These bills are about modernising the now 107-year-old Quarantine Act. As Mr Beale pointed out in his seminal report, the very name change from Quarantine Act to Biosecurity Act in itself reflects changing challenges, aspirations, emphasis and of course methods. The Beale report concluded that we have a very good biosecurity system. Its overwhelming success is testament to that. We have had, by any measure, a very successful approach to keeping disease and pests out of our food chain. Mr Beale also found that the system is not perfect; that is fairly obvious. Sadly and tragically, we have seen examples of failures in recent years including during the equine influenza outbreak and the recent contamination of imported frozen berries with the hepatitis A virus. Mr Beale also reinforced, very importantly, the view that a zero-risk approach to quarantine is not a feasible approach, not one that is likely to lead to success, and certainly not one we can afford to pay for. Rather he reinforced the need for a risk based approach to our quarantine system.

The opposition will be supporting the bill, but I want to express very great concern about the key departure I made mention of,—the decision to deny the very important initiative in Labor's bill—the establishment and ongoing existence of an independent, statutory officer known as the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Labor will be moving amendments and requests in the committee stage to establish an independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity.

It appears that, as the bill is currently framed, rather than having an independent statutory officer reviewing the performances of our biosecurity system, we will have no less than the minister overseeing these processes—that is, Minister Joyce overseeing biosecurity in this country. It is not something that fills me with great confidence or enthusiasm, I must say.

Senator O'Sullivan: It does us.

Senator CAMERON: I will take that interjection. Senator O'Sullivan said, 'It does us.' Well, if Mr Joyce cannot even get support from his own colleagues, then it would be a bad day. I must say, having the support of Senator O'Sullivan and the National Party is not a substitute for good oversight in this bill. I just think that the oversight issue should not be played down, and it should not be treated as a joke. I certainly do not believe that the former Senator Joyce, now Minister Joyce, has the capacity to oversee this properly. We want an independent oversight. Given the performance of Minister Joyce recently in the changes to Hansard, how could we expect Minister Joyce to actually provide proper oversight of an independent manner when he is caught up in 'Hansardgate', and when we see his secretary being removed from his job—a competent, effective public servant being thrown on the scrapheap because he wanted to be honest. So, Mr Joyce having oversight of anything fills me full of real concern for his capacity to do it independently and properly. I would welcome more interjections from the senator on this issue.

The Labor government already had in place the Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity. We have proposed also to further strengthen confidence and to build sustainability in the live cattle trade by putting in place an inspector-general for live animal welfare and live animal exports. Sadly, that commitment did not survive the transition to the new government, much to the great concern of those who are focused on animal welfare, particularly animal welfare in the live animal export market. The minister, as far as we can see on this side, without any advice has unilaterally made the decision that this statutory officer is not needed. The inspector-general that Labor had in mind would report independently of the minister's view and, indeed, the view of the department.

Again, I come back to this issue where we have seen Minister Joyce go through a process, recently, which is nothing more than the intimidation of the public service by having his secretary sacked because the secretary wanted to be honest. How can you for one minute say that Minister Joyce is the proper person to oversee biosecurity in this country? It is a mistake to not establish this position on a permanent basis. The position will play an important role in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the biosecurity import risk analysis process.

Not only does the inspector-general ensure transparency and integrity in the biosecurity system more broadly, the amendments will also establish a number of powers to ensure transparency in the way the role is carried out. The position of Inspector-General of Biosecurity is a position that was recommended in numerous reviews over the course of the last 17 years, and yet the minister has apparently unilaterally decided that we do not need it. By having a dedicated office to review the performance of functions and the exercise of powers by the director of Biosecurity Australia, all Australians can expect an efficient, modern and robust biosecurity framework.

The minister appears, on the surface, to remain supportive of the Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity and the continuation of that position for the time being. But if this bill were to pass unamended, it is Labor's understanding that the Interim Inspector-General will cease to exist on 1 July this year. It appears that, while feigning support and being complimentary of the work of the Inspector-General thus far, the minister has, without any fanfare, without any good reason and certainly without evidence just decided to let this position expire on 1 July this year. Why, as we strive, I hope on a bipartisan basis in this place, to capitalise on the growing global food demand and take advantage of our clean, green, safe image and our high-quality food would we now undermine that in any way by taking away a position which, for the last couple of years, has been very effective, as acknowledged by the minister himself? This is the same. We must have full confidence in our biosecurity system. We must be able to allow the citizens of this country to see that there is a statutory officer there acting independently and protecting that system. As I mentioned earlier, and as Mr Beale pointed out, it cannot be perfect, but the independent Inspector-General is a key component in making sure that our biosecurity system is the best it possibly can be.

There has also been a bit of debate recently about the way that investors in the future, typically those who manage big superannuation funds, for example, will be discerning in their investment decisions, taking into account the ethical standards used in particular sectors. There should be no doubt that in the future the growing middle classes of Asia will be looking for food from sources where all those ethical standards have been maintained. One of those measures will be the way in which we manage our natural resources—and the way in which we manage our water and our soils are two key examples. This is why it is so disappointing that this government has still not produced a strategic plan for agriculture in this country but laid down terms of reference for a white paper—now months late—that excluded any consideration of natural resource management and sustainability. The biggest challenge in agriculture for Australia in the future will be the growing challenge of resource sustainability, particularly the challenges posed by climate change. You cannot have a strategic plan for agriculture without having, as part of that strategic plan, an idea about how you are going to tackle those natural resource sustainability issues, particularly climate change.

While we have had 18 months of policy inertia—in other words, 18 months without an agriculture policy in this country—our competitors are on the march. They are already working in Asia with their plans; they are already taking advantage of their natural competitive edge. In the meantime, under the Abbott government and under Minister Joyce, we are simply marking time. It is disappointing when I see what were very good Labor initiatives, like the one before us today, being undermined by a decision like that going to the position of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, without any real effort to explain the decision, without any real effort to highlight that decision before this place and certainly without any effort whatsoever to justify why the Inspector-General of Biosecurity should be replaced with a minister having the final call. Why replace an independent body with a ministerial decision-making process?

I will invite the minister to highlight that point, to provide the sources of advice for the decision and to share with us what the government sees as the benefits of that decision. I do not think the minister will be able to do that, but I will welcome any attempt to do so. The very fact that the minister has not done so confirms in my mind that this is a very, very bad decision. The fact that the minister has not done so also confirms that the National Party do not seem to have their eye on the key issues in the agricultural portfolio, that they are prepared to put ministerial discretion before independence and that they are prepared to have an independent approach on biosecurity subsumed into ministerial discretion. That is not the way to go in this country.

I finish where I began: this bill and our biosecurity system are as important as anything else we discuss in this place. It does go to our food security and, beyond that, it goes to how wealthy we are likely to be as a country in the coming decades. We cannot grasp that wealth and we cannot make the most of those opportunities without the best biosecurity system in the world. Therefore, a biosecurity without any independent oversight is an inferior biosecurity system. It does not pick up on those recommendations made over the last 17 years, and for some bizarre reason we are told that we should trust Minister Joyce! We are told that Minister Joyce can do the job. In my view, that is something that anyone with any experience of the former Senator Joyce in this place would have absolutely no confidence in. The secretariat under this minister is in chaos. We have now had two secretaries of the department under this minister. This is a minister whom you could not trust to keep biosecurity issues at the forefront if it is simply based on ministerial discretion.

I believe sincerely that all those who participated in the panel of review would say that the bill Labor had before the parliament provided the very best biosecurity system that we could possibly have. I am not convinced that the bill before us now, simply because of the exclusion of an ongoing role for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, is a bill that provides us with the very best biosecurity regime we could possibly have. There is plenty of time for the minister to reflect on that, there is plenty of time for the government to reflect on that and there is plenty of time for the Prime Minister to reflect on that as he contemplates some of his necessary changes in the coming weeks and months—if he lasts that long. There is an opportunity here for the government either to explain and justify their position or to reinstate Labor's very important initiative. The Inspector-General of Biosecurity might cost some money, but on any cost-benefit analysis it is hard to see how what would be very small savings in the context of a billion-dollar budget is justified, given the risks that would be posed by not ensuring that this bill is as strong as it possibly can be and not ensuring that we have the strongest quarantine and biosecurity systems that this country can possibly have.

So, we have given qualified support. Other than for the inspector-general issue, we support the bill. We must have an independent inspector-general. Biosecurity is so important for the health, the welfare and the economic future of this country. I would not rely on Minister Joyce and his independent discretion to replace an independent biosecurity approach as contemplated by Labor. In my view, the minister must come to the table and must agree to the independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity that we had in our bill. The public must have confidence in biosecurity. In my view, if the public believe that Minister Joyce has the final say on biosecurity, that confidence will be shattered. It will be shattered because this is not only a government of incompetence but a government of chaos, and we need independent biosecurity analysis by the inspector-general in this bill. That is the challenge for the coalition.

Senator SIEWERT (Western Australia—Australian Greens Whip) (10:47): I rise to contribute to the debate on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills. This bill has been a long time coming, and fixes to our biosecurity system have been a long time coming. Our biosecurity system has held up well in Australia and has, by and large, protected our agriculture and our environment. I say 'by and large' because there have been some well-known problems, and I will come to those in a minute. This system has held up as our agriculture and international trade expands, but as more people, produce and animals travel both within and into Australia, this system is well overdue for modernisation and consolidation of arrangements. The system really has grown over the last hundred years through the existing legislation—that is, it has been a hundred-year process—and a modernising of the system is well overdue.

Having said that, the Greens are concerned that the Biosecurity Bill 2014, while a significant improvement on our current system, does not sufficiently safeguard our environment, industry, agriculture and community from biosecurity risks into the future. This is where we have our eye clearly focused. This legislation is not just about today's system; it is about our agriculture and our environment into the future. We believe that it does not provide a rigorous enough framework for ensuring that scientific risk-based assessments are not undermined by other considerations such as international trade agreements.

Australian agriculture, in particular, is dependent on high quality biosecurity arrangements. After climate change, the introduction of pests and diseases is one of the biggest threats to our agriculture, and it needs to be addressed. In fact, as climate change continues to change our environment, the risk of pests and diseases spreading to Australia increases. We saw this just a couple of years ago in my home state of Western Australia, where Chinese green mussels were able to travel into WA ports as our waters warmed.

Our reputation as clean and green is a key part of our farmers' ability to get good prices in overseas markets and at home. But it does not take much to undermine this: one lapse is all it takes. I note that Panama 4 disease is back in the media and at least one farm will never grow commercial bananas again. Other growers in Far North Queensland are taking incredible measures to stop this from wiping them out too. Panama 4 completely undermined some farms, and it is only because there has been a quick response in Queensland that others may escape this same fate. We are yet to find out what caused this outbreak, but it is a timely reminder that biosecurity requires vigilance and that a quick response to a crisis is only part of the story.

There is so much we can do to keep Australia safe and to stop disease and pests from gaining a foothold in the first place. We only have to look at the Asian honey bee and the way that came in. Many of us believe we did not take a quick enough response to that, and we are still dealing with the consequences. Myrtle rust is an example of lapses in environmental biosecurity. I will come back to the issues around biosecurity, because we are deeply concerned that this legislation is not adequately addressing the issues around environmental biosecurity. Australia has a unique environment. It is essential that we make sure we have sufficient biosecurity regulations in place to protect that. It is obviously important that our agriculture be protected. We all know that there are many diseases that we do not have here in Australia, and we need to keep them out of our country—some of them would devastate our agriculture.

The 2014 bill builds on the 2012 bill of the previous government, and we welcome the improvements that come with the 2014 version. However, there are some substantial issues that still have not been addressed. Some of the key concerns identified during the 2012 inquiry process that have not been addressed in the 2014 bill include the failure of the bill to take account adequately of regional differences; the lack of legislative arrangements that ensure that the Eminent Scientists Group and other independent industry and scientific advisory channels are always included in biosecurity processes; the failure to guarantee the independence of the inspector-general from the Director of Biosecurity; and the failure to provide a right of appeal against the Director of Biosecurity's decisions.

Unfortunately the architecture of this bill falls short of the highly regarded Beale review and fails to fully capitalise on the broad support that the review generated. From the perspective of the Australian Greens, the key recommendation that has not been implemented is the creation of a separate biosecurity agency. Ms Mellor, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, told the committee:

It is government's decision to not pursue the recommendation of Beale to establish a separate biosecurity authority and commission, but to maintain the management of biosecurity under this act in the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry in concert with the Department of Health and Ageing.

That was before Ageing was split off from Health. The consequence of this decision is a significant conflict of interest, for both the Director of Biosecurity and the minister. For the minister especially, there is a significant tension in being directly responsible for both the Director of Biosecurity and the inspector-general. Our biosecurity response should be an arms-length process and not exposed to politicised decisions. I must say that we, the Greens, are not just focused on what the current government may or may not do. This act is to protect our environment and our agriculture for long into the future, so it is about any governments, be they Liberal, Labor or, one day, Green. We need that independence.

The legislation also leaves too much of the biosecurity review process at the discretion of the director and the inspector-general, and in doing so fails to bring transparency into the BIRA process or to encourage industry or community confidence. In the words of Mr Prince, the CEO of Nursery and Garden Industry Australia:

It was a key conclusion that the Beale review came up with—having someone who was independent from the influence of either the trade or the department of agriculture. This legislation is huge, when you are looking at animals, humans, plants and environments. It is a very over-encompassing piece of legislation. For it to sit, or be charged, under the department of agriculture, which is very focused on primary industry, was one of the issues that was raised in Beale. You had Biosecurity Australian and AQIS—two different bodies—almost at loggerheads with each other or having different processes. So an independent body that has feedback from those other three ministers would certainly make sense and strengthen the whole process.

The Australian Greens support recommendations 1 through 5 in the majority committee report of the inquiry into this bill, which outline ways in which transparency and rights to appeal can be integrated into the legislation. But we would much prefer to have actually established a separate biosecurity agency, with a director that is not also the head of Agriculture.

While the legislation has been revised to clarify that the Director of Biosecurity must have regard to the objectives of the act, it is impossible to understand how this will work in practice. As stated by Mr Andrew Cox, President of the Invasive Species Council:

An average person would think, 'How could they possibly not take into account the other things that are a part of their responsibilities?' It is one person making a decision, who holds multiple roles. It is a simple conflict.

One of the ways that this conflict manifests is through the impact of international trade agreements on our biosecurity arrangements. While the Australian Greens support the desire of the Department of Agriculture to maximise trade between countries, we remain concerned that this responsibility has an undue influence on the biosecurity arrangements. Dr Booth, policy officer at the Invasive Species Council, noted:

I think the industry bodies come up with many examples of where they think there has been an influence of trade on decisions. We have to—and Bill emphasised this—reduce the risk of that happening. That should be for whoever is running biosecurity. So independence does that. It takes it out of a department that has a strong trade focus, so perceived and real conflicts of interest are avoided in that sense.

Furthermore, negotiations such as those taking place around the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement have been shrouded in secrecy and do not inspire confidence.

Similarly, it is our preference that the inspector-general be a statutory position. The decision to not create a statutory inspector-general position is the most significant change between the 2012 and 2014 versions of the bill. Dropping the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill proposed in 2012 is very disappointing and, in our opinion, a grave mistake. The 2014 bill instead provides powers to the Minister of Agriculture to review biosecurity performance. Ms Langford, from the Department of Agriculture, explained:

The intention is to delegate those to the Inspector-General of Biosecurity to allow a review of the system to happen.

However, even if the powers are delegated, this is a backward step from the arrangements proposed in the bill of 2012. The Invasive Species Council submission outlines why it is not suitable for the minister to have this level of control over the process:

The Minister for Agriculture has a clear conflict of interest as both Minister administering biosecurity legislation and person responsible for reviewing biosecurity performance. The areas subject to review are likely to be influenced by political considerations, and matters that could embarrass the government of the day are likely to be avoided. The risk of this would be substantially reduced and the public would have greater trust in the reviews if they were initiated and conducted by an independent statutory officer.

The majority committee report calls for the findings conducted by the inspector-general, or any other person delegated this authority, to be made public. This does go some way to addressing the problem, but it does not prevent the role from being substantially reshaped in the future without parliamentary oversight. It is not good enough for a rigorous biosecurity system.

The Australian Greens recommended enshrining the independence of the inspector-general in legislation by reintroducing the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill 2012. I move, as a second reading amendment:

At the end of the motion, add:

but the Senate calls on the Government to enshrine the independence of the Inspector General in legislation by reintroducing the Inspector General of Biosecurity Bill 2012.

There are many other issues with this bill, which I will go through briefly now, and which we outlined in our additional comments to the majority report of the inquiry into this bill. A large area we are concerned about is environmental biosecurity. We are deeply concerned that not enough emphasis is placed on environmental biosecurity. I mentioned the issue around myrtle rust earlier, which is a classic example of what happens if we do not have adequate biosecurity measures in place to protect our environment.

One of the areas we think needs to be addressed is to establish and resource an entity that can act as a key body for environmental health, in the same manner as Plant Health Australia and Animal Health Australia, and use this body to establish partnerships between the community, governments and environmental businesses in order to deliver on high-priority policy and planning issues in environmental biosecurity. My colleague, Senator Waters, will be addressing this issue in more detail when she makes her contribution to this debate.

Another area we are also deeply concerned about is that the definition of environment in chapter 1, part 2, section 9 of the Biosecurity Bill is not adequate; there needs to be a change to the definition to address Australian biodiversity so that we are clear we are talking about the variety of life indigenous to Australia and its extant territories encompassing ecosystems, species and genetic diversity. We want it to cover ecological processes and natural and physical resources. Again, Senator Waters will go into more detail about these issues when she makes her contribution. We believe these are key amendments necessary in order to strengthen the bill.

One of the areas we consistently bring up in this place is the delegation of a lot of powers from legislation to regulations—so that this place, the Senate, is not actually discussing the nature of some of the powers that have been developed through the legislative process such as this Biosecurity Bill. With so much going into regulation it is much harder to know what, in fact, the government is proposing. For example, one of the concerns that has been raised is that we are not exactly sure how the government intends changing the import risk assessment process, because that is going to be covered by regulation. We express our very strong concern, through this debate, that we do not know the extent of some of the changes that are being made, or whether they are sufficient, because they are going to be dealt with by regulation. It is a blunt instrument in this place. Yes, those regulations will be tabled in this place and we will have the right, or the ability, to disallow them; but we have always maintained that that is a very blunt instrument because you go 'yes' or 'no'. You vote them down; you cannot amend them, whereas through legislation we can. That is an area we think needs to be further developed and we would like to see those draft regulations as soon as possible.

We are also concerned that the bill does not adequately protect or provide for consultative arrangements such as the Eminent Scientists Group, and we believe this should be established in the legislation itself and not left up to a separate process. One of the other areas we think is also important is broadening the definition of biosecurity risk in chapter 1, part 2, section 9 to include consideration of the following matter: recognising changes through time, to require that risks are assessed over an ecologically-relevant time frame and take account of climate change. This is absolutely essential. I gave an example earlier in my contribution that outlined the risk to our biosecurity of climate change and the impact of the spread of pests in our marine environment. There are equally as many examples in our terrestrial environment, where climate change will enhance the risk of pests and diseases. We should be including the likelihood of new genotypes of disease or pest combining with others to exacerbate the potential for the disease or pest to cause harm, or to do greater harm than existing genotypes; and we should recognise regional differences and different levels of biodiversity, ranging from the ecosystem to the genetic level. The other issue we believe needs to be contained in the legislation is commitment to the precautionary principle. That is very, very important when we are talking about biosecurity and strengthening our system.

Another area we also think needs to be addressed is: we have the capacity to put in place biosecurity zones. We believe there needs to be the capacity, and a category, for a biosecurity zone for high-value conservation areas with high biosecurity risks, to be known as conservation biosecurity zones, as the basis for implementing biosecurity measures, plans and monitoring. I can give you a classic example of this, and that is the Fitzgerald River National Park in my home state of Western Australia. It is a bookmark reserve. It is one of the most significant, biologically-diverse places not only in Australia, but on the planet. It is at risk from pests and diseases and particularly from what we commonly call dieback. We already have elements of dieback in the park; there have been massive efforts to reduce that. They think it has already taken out 1,000 plant species in Western Australia, so you can see the risk it poses. Something like a high biosecurity zone and the ability to put that in place would help protect that park. That is an example of why we think that is important.

There should be a requirement to table a biosecurity outlook report every two years. Another area that has come up repeatedly when we have been dealing with biosecurity in this place over the years is regional difference. We know that is so important. I will speak again of my home state of Western Australia: we know we do not have many of the diseases that are already in the eastern states, and we want to keep it that way, thank you very much. You can keep your diseases and pests to yourself in the east! We need to be able to build that into our processes—into our biosecurity import risk analysis. It is absolutely essential that we be able to address regional differences. We know the WTO raises that issue. If it is in the legislation, it enables us to deal with it and sends a clear message to other countries that we are protecting our regional differences. It is very important, we believe, that that be included in the legislation. As always, there needs to be sufficient funding allocated by the government to ensure that the arrangements that are proposed under the bill can be properly implemented.

These amendments, we believe, would enhance the 2014 bill. The 2014 bill is an improvement on the 2012 bill—other than taking out the independence of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. That is a very significant mistake. It should be fixed. These other amendments would guarantee that we have a world-class biosecurity system that protects our agriculture, the industries that are based on it, and our environment and unique biodiversity. We will be moving a series of amendments to try and address these flaws in the bill. As I said, I have already moved my second reading amendment to address the need for an independent inspector-general of biosecurity so that that position is independent of any government, no matter what persuasion it is.

Senator O'SULLIVAN (Queensland—Nationals Whip in the Senate) (11:07): Before I start my contribution on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills, I would like to ask Senator Siewert if she would take the opportunity to correct a statement that she made in her contribution that was completely erroneous and has a capacity to impact adversely on a family farm in Tully in Queensland. Senator Siewert made the statement—Hansard will reflect—that there has been one farm in North Queensland affected by Panama Race 4 and that they will never grow bananas on their farm again. That is not true. I know the owners of this farm personally. I spent two days in the Tully district last week meeting with the quarantine professionals. That farm can continue to operate as a farm. The disease has been detected in five plants on one part of the farm and in one plant on another part of the farm. God willing, that will be the extent of the contamination of the disease on that plantation. That family has high hopes to continue to farm that land as they have done for a very long period of time. At some future opportunity, Senator Siewert, I would ask that you conduct your own inquiries, form your own view that present accurately—

Senator Siewert: Madam Acting Deputy Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I did not actually say the farm was in North Queensland. I actually said that North Queensland farmers have been taking measures to ensure that they do not. I was not actually referring to a specific farm in North Queensland. If either Senator O'Sullivan misheard me or I mistakenly said that, I apologise. I did not locate that particular farm. In fact I said the North Queensland farmers are taking measures to ensure that they are protected.

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Peris ): There is no point of order.

Senator O'SULLIVAN: I thank the senator for the clarification. I really do appreciate that. These people are struggling and any contribution we might make ought to be to help them rather than to hinder them. I accept your explanation and I really appreciate you having done that.

This legislation proposes to change or replace the existing legislation, which has served our nation now for over 100 years. As is well known, we are very well regarded at an international level for the production of quality agricultural product. At the heart of that is the ability for us in this clean, green quality arrangement to be able to keep pests and disease out of our agricultural industries. It should not be ignored that the act does reflect upon issues to do with the spread of disease with humans; it is not just about the agriculture alone. But the focus obviously when one talks about biosecurity is in regard to our agricultural industries.

Previous speakers have made the point—and I think it is a very important point—about the increases in passengers and trade volumes coming into our nation, which have increased exponentially over the 100 years but indeed more recently over the last two decades. Now the world is a much more mobile place. People find the ease and cost of travel are within reach and are now coming from all points of the globe. The traditional stream of visitors to Australia from traditional destinations is now much more diverse and this increases the risk involved with the transportation of diseases that can so easily impact upon our agricultural industries.

Panama Tropical 4 is a pathogen. As was raised by Senator Siewert in her contribution, it is a contemporary biosecurity example because we are currently dealing with an outbreak of it in the banana industry in North Queensland. That industry has a value of about $660 million and employs thousands of people directly—it is very hard to gauge—and probably over 100,000 people indirectly when you look at the importance of that industry to many of the small regional communities in North Queensland. The largest part of the banana industry is now located in that part of my state. The threat is real. It has virtually wiped out the commercial banana industry in your home territory, Madam Acting Deputy President Peris. It is proof that if we do not have sound biosecurity measures in place, entire industries can be completely devastated.

Additionally in this case—and this is true I suspect of many of these diseases—this pathogen can remain undetected and dormant in the soil—it is a soil pathogen—for up to 30 years, so we could have time bombs not just with Panama Race 4 but with other pathogen based diseases right across our nation. It is significantly important that we have the best most intensive biosecurity measures, particularly when it comes to agriculture.

It is right, as mentioned by one of the previous speakers, to refer to the free trade agreements, and also that Australia must put its interests first in issues to do with biosecurity, before we are to relent on any trade conditions that might affect those. Now, I would put to the Senate that there is no evidence—no evidence whatsoever—that there has been any part of the agreements made, particularly with our most recent free trade agreements, that would give rise to that argument. I believe that our trade minister, our agriculture minister and, indeed, everyone in this place and anyone in those industries, knows that the absolute Holy Grail of our ability to be competitive and to provide goods and services in agriculture and in the export industry is the quality of security arrangements that are in this country. They are the cornerstone of our reputation.

We live in a modern world. The passenger movements that I referred to are a significant focus of these future arrangements. We now have millions of people visiting our shores. I used Panama Race 4 as only one example of the many that could apply to quite literally thousands of contingent circumstances. That pathogen is a microbe. It can come in on a speck of dust on a pair of shoes belonging to someone who visited an infected area either in recent times, or—and I am no scientist, but I am happy to make this extrapolation for the sake of the argument—in the preceding 30 years. Our response to biosecurity is complex and I think that the government's decision to revisit this area and to develop this legislation is very appropriate and timely. I am very much looking forward to this place being on a unity ticket to allow this legislation to come into play so that we can further enhance these arrangements.

I am instructed that there was a very exhaustive consultation process in the development of this legislation. Indeed, there were certainly discussions with the relevant authorities and stakeholders in our state and territory governments. There has been a lot of consultation right across the nation with health professionals and the Australian community. Opportunities were provided for their input. Importantly, we have spoken with our trading partners because, as Senator Siewert rightly pointed out, it is very important that everybody involved—particularly those involved in the area of trade, which is where the cross-border potential for risk exists—is involved in these arrangements. So all stakeholders were consulted and, of course, the bill has had a rigorous examination by the appropriate parliamentary committee. Obviously, those recommendations have been published and taken into account for the most part, as I understand it.

Our agriculture, fishery and forestry industries have a value of some $51 billion in this country, and 77 per cent of those goods produced—those soft commodities—are exported. When one thinks about biosecurity, one thinks about protecting our borders from the importation of pests—and I used one for the purposes of this discussion. But earlier I alluded to something of significant importance: that we do not get a reputation for exporting pests. Whilst it is a matter for the importing country to deal with the arrangements that concern them in protecting their own agricultural industries, it is very important that we become even more prominent on the world stage with the export of clean, green quality products from this country.

Currently, trade arrangements are under constant review at the international level, and Australia continues to punch way above its weight in terms of its contribution to trade. We have see this most recently over the last 24-odd months where, for example, there has been a dramatic increase in our live exports. I know that not all colleagues in this place—certainly, on our side we are as one—are up for the live trade in animals. But it has become a significantly important—a very important—part of our trading arrangements in agriculture. Indeed, those who are students of such things would have noted that it has in part brought upward pressure on demand and volume within the domestic market. This means that for the first time in some 25 years many of our broadacre beef producers are enjoying returns domestically that they could only have hoped for and dreamed of even 12 to 14 months ago.

So the live export industry is a significantly important part of beef and live animal production in this country. We need to ensure that biosecurity arrangements are in place that will not ever bring threat to that industry. For example, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences estimated that if we had a relatively small foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in only one state, the impact on the economy of this country would be about $5.6 billion. And, of course, that does not include the impact it would have on families and small family corporations, who largely make up the production of beef cattle in this country. It would be absolutely devastating; it would devastate entire communities.

In the northern part of my home state of Queensland, if you were to take out agricultural industries—particularly bananas, sugar and beef production—then we would just close the shop; you could fence it off at the Tropic of Capricorn and the only reason you would go north is if you wanted to enjoy the wilderness or go for some other tourist impact.

Alarmingly, ABARES indicated that, if the outbreak were on a national level, a multistate outbreak, it would affect the economy by $50 billion. That would be a fifty-thousand-million-dollar impact on our economy for an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Those who followed the mad cow disease outbreak—and I might say I do a particularly good interpretation of a mad cow; I will not burden the Senate with it today, but I am happy to do it offline for anybody—would know that it absolutely devastated the agricultural industry of beef production in the UK. I personally had cause to be in the United Kingdom on a number of occasions during that time and I remember being in a restaurant or some venue having a meal and the British staff would spend a lot of time making sure you understood that the beef in any part of their menu was not British beef but that it had come from Australia or New Zealand.

So I think it is a unity ticket. If we have any sort of biological outbreak of any scale in very broad, widespread industries like the beef sector, it will not just devastate our economy and our terms of trade; it will devastate individual people. We have watched them get a caning over the last 10 years or so in some industries, and many of them—those who survived—are still recovering from the suspension of the live cattle trade.

I want to come back to putting a human face on this legislation. I can talk all day; I can quote statistics until I run out of them; I can talk about the merits of the bill. But, as is my intention in this place, I like to try and reduce the impact of legislation on people's lives. My interest is of course in agriculture. I sit here with the National Party very proudly and, whilst I am a senator for the entire state of Queensland, my interests are in rural and regional Queensland in particular and in enterprises that are involved in primary production, including horticulture and farming and of course beef and animal production.

So I can share with you recent events like this issue up in Tully with the Panama 4. I have met with dozens and dozens of families during my visit there. I attended a number of public meetings that were well attended—in fact, one on the tablelands at Mareeba I suspect was attended by just about every stakeholder in the banana industry and most particularly those who grow bananas—and I can say that some of the conversations are gut-wrenching. These are people who have invested millions and millions of dollars in family enterprises. Some of them are generational farmers. One farmer there was a fourth generation farmer and one of the pioneers of the banana industry in North Queensland. The angst that they are feeling at the moment with the outbreak of this terrible disease is very difficult to measure. These are farmers who are not necessarily wealthy people. At the moment they are investing—in some cases on the smaller farms—tens of thousands of dollars to put in measures to mitigate or to minimise the potential impact of this disease on their farm.

But let me close by saying this: in their conversations with me—knowing that I was a federal member of parliament—there was a sense of hopelessness about what they could do to protect their enterprise, their investment, and their own farm economy and their local economy. There was a sense of hopelessness about what happens beyond their farm gate. And they look to government. They look to the federal government in this case to respond and to put in place measures that will prevent these diseases coming into our nation and spreading on their farms.

I think this is a good bill. I think it is a well-considered bill. It is a very timely bill, having regard to the fact that we have not had an overhaul for a period of time. I strongly commend the bill in its form to my colleagues in the Senate.

Senator SINGH (Tasmania) (11:28): I rise to contribute to the debate on this bill. This bill very much goes to the fact that Australia's clean, green, safe food is the agriculture sector's greatest advantage, and keeping Australia's competitive edge is why this bill is of critical importance.

Having said that, though, I want to point out that the Abbott government has sat on this bill for 18 months, when the majority of the work was already undertaken by the previous Labor government. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws and it was Labor that first introduced this legislation back in 2012.

It was in fact on 19 February 2008 that the then Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Tony Burke, announced a comprehensive independent review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity arrangements to be undertaken by an independent panel of experts, chaired by Roger Beale AO. This report is very well known as the Beale review. The current bill before the Senate is essentially identical to Labor's initial bill introduced in the 43rd parliament, but the Beale review recommended, amongst other things, a statutory office for an inspector-general of biosecurity. The inspector-general would report directly to the minister, have broad powers of audit and investigation and would be responsible for conducting systems audits and reviews of the biosecurity programs carried out by the national biosecurity authority. It is incredibly disappointing and regrettable that the Abbott government has not continued to support an independent inspector-general of biosecurity but, instead, has decided to give those powers to the Minister for Agriculture, Mr Barnaby Joyce. The fact that Minister Joyce—as my Senate colleague Senator Cameron mentioned in his contribution—will have the final say on biosecurity will, I agree, remove all the confidence of the Australian community and remove all the confidence of the Australian agricultural sector.

Labor strongly supported the Beale review and strongly supported the need to have an inspector-general of biosecurity. There are many justifications, but a few recent examples are: Australians contracting hepatitis A from contaminated berries; northern Queensland's banana crop suffering its first exposure to the rampant and destructive Panama disease; Northern Tasmania's eucalyptus species suffering its first exposure to the devastating and virulent myrtle rust; and the first colonies of the invasive and ecologically overwhelming red fire ant found in Botany Bay. All senators in this place should consider these examples. They are examples that are only from the past two months, and they are good enough reason alone to take the time and the trouble to establish the very best biosecurity system we can. That, of course, should include the Beale recommendation for the position of an inspector-general of biosecurity—an independent statutory holder.

The clear and present danger from contaminated food has been well publicised recently; however, even the current alarm over the spread of myrtle rust in my own state of Tasmania, even though it does not directly threaten Tasmania's major food production crops, justifies the need to have strong biosecurity laws. As the Tasmanian Farmers & Graziers Association has made clear:

If myrtle rust gains hold in our eucalypt forests, the landscape will change irretrievably. For farmers, it threatens shelter belts, hardwood plantations and forests important for their biodiversity, honey production, etc.

Yet, for no good reason, the Abbott government wants to undermine the powers, the independence and the tenure of the inspector-general of biosecurity. It simply does not make sense. Labor stands by wanting to protect the powers, the independence and the tenure of the inspector-general for excellent common-sense reasons, exactly like those I have just mentioned. If you think about it, as trade liberalisation spreads, globalisation grows and global trade increases many more such threats inevitably will emerge for Australian agriculture. To maintain our reputation for high-quality, clean and safe produce we need strong biosecurity laws in this country. The Abbott government's unjustifiable decision to amend the former Labor government's bill will undermine the effectiveness of the inspector-general of biosecurity and will weaken rather than strengthen our biosecurity system. As my colleague the shadow minister for agriculture, Joel Fitzgibbon, said in the other place:

When you think about it, there are two things in agriculture policy that rise above all others; there are two things that are paramount. The first is natural resource management and sustainability. The second is biosecurity.

Why? It is because agriculture is so important to our nation's future. That is why we have tried to strive for a bipartisan approach when it comes to agriculture policy. Dropping the ball on agriculture policy would be an existential threat because maintaining our food security and our ability to sustain ourselves, independent of any other country, goes to the very survival of our country. I think our shadow minister for agriculture said it so well that I cannot say it any better myself. It goes very much to the very survival of our country.

For many of us, biosecurity is still in some sense about a quarantine regime rather than biosecurity. Whether you call it a quarantine regime or biosecurity, it is clear that both, being one and the same, are of paramount importance to our nation. Yet, as the Beale inquiry, a seminal report on our biosecurity system, noted, biosecurity in this place usually only rates a mention when something goes wrong rather than rating a mention as things almost always go right. I think it is somewhat a source of disappointment that we only highlight when things go wrong rather than looking at when they go right.

The Biosecurity Bill 2014, like the Beale review and other reviews that went before it, is clearly a past Labor government initiative. That is why it has Labor's support—because it was an initiative of a Labor government to start with. It was progressed and developed by a Labor government. But that was some 17 months ago now. The Abbott government could have brought this legislation forward some 17 months ago. It was Labor that recognised the importance of upgrading and modernising Australia's biosecurity laws, and it was Labor that first introduced this bill back in 2012.

I will just go to the heart of the Beale review. The Beale report concluded that we have a very good biosecurity system. Its overwhelming success, I think, is testament to that. We have had, by any measure, a very successful approach to keeping disease and pests out of our food chain. Beale also concluded that the system is not perfect, and that is fairly obvious. Beale also reinforced, very importantly, the view—and I am sure this is a view shared by all senators—that a zero-risk approach to quarantine is not a feasible approach, not one that is likely to lead to success and certainly not one we could afford in fiscal and resourcing terms. Rather, he reinforced a risk based approach to our quarantine system.

This bill is a significant modernisation that has been a long time in the making, and on that basis the opposition will be supporting the bill. Having said that, though, the position that this government is taking in relation to the position of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, a position that has been recommended in numbers upon numbers of reviews and inquiries over the last 17 years, is, as I have said, very disappointing. Labor's Biosecurity Bill 2012 provided for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity independent powers of review and detailed transparency provisions, including parliamentary reporting.

This government has carried forward, sensibly, Labor's lapsed Biosecurity Bill 2012, with some tweaking. It has introduced largely the same legislation into parliament. But this version has one important and irresponsible—I would say—change that has been made. Granting new powers to Minister Barnaby Joyce to conduct reviews on biosecurity performance and dropping the plan to create that statutory, independent Inspector-General of Biosecurity is very, very irresponsible. It is irresponsible, it is short sighted and it is unnecessary, and it is in complete contradiction to what was laid out through the Beale review, as I have said, along with many other reviews.

In brief, this important role, a very important role in the original legislation, will no longer be independent. That is the bottom line here. It is Minister Barnaby Joyce who will be having all the power and all the say. There will be no independence, and that is of grave concern. The minister has indicated that he intends to use these powers to delegate an ongoing review role to the current Interim Inspector-General of Biosecurity, which will now be a non-statutory position. So it appears now that, rather than having that independent statutory officer reviewing the performance of the biosecurity system and all of its players, we will have no less than just Minister Barnaby Joyce overseeing these processes. That is a concern to me. It is a concern to the opposition. It should be a concern to everyone in this place, if they are speaking honestly. It should be of concern, quite frankly, to the minister himself because it is not a responsibility he should even seek to have.

The inspector-general that Labor had in mind has, on an interim basis—and would have—reported independently of the minister's view and indeed of the view of the department, so the position plays an important role in ensuring the integrity and the transparency of the biosecurity import risk analysis process. Stakeholders also have the opportunity to appeal where they believe there has been a significant deviation from the biosecurity import risk analysis process, which might have adversely affected their interests. Not only does that inspector-general ensure transparency and integrity in the biosecurity system more broadly; the position also establishes a number of powers to ensure transparency in the way the role is carried out. The position was recommended, as I said, in numerous reviews as well. It was a fixed term appointment, allowing for the officer to give frank advice without fear of personal repercussions and to probe into the affairs of government even if that is politically uncomfortable.

How on earth will Minister Barnaby Joyce be able to conduct such a transparent role when he himself is a minister of the executive, a minister of government? How can there be confidence? How can the Australian community, the Australian agricultural sector or anyone have confidence in the integrity of any review process when Minister Barnaby Joyce is carrying out this role and cannot remove himself and be an independent player within it?

There is clearly a conflict of interest when the minister administering biosecurity legislation and the person responsible for reviewing biosecurity performance are now going to be one and the same. Surely those government senators see that. Surely those government senators have concern for that. It simply does not make sense. It simply highlights a conflict of interest that it has.

Of course, Labor was so much better than that. The legislation that we put forward in 2012 was so much better than that. We have tried to have ongoing bipartisan support in agricultural policy, because of the importance of agriculture to our nation's future, because it goes to the heart of food security in our nation's future. So to undo that bipartisanship by the removal of that independent statutory office holder to review our biosecurity processes is simply a backward political manoeuvre. I know it is a manoeuvre that is making a number of senators on the government side unhappy and uneasy, knowing that Minister Barnaby Joyce now has all the cards and all the power, carrying that conflict of interest.

Finally, I just want to say that this bill has no independent authority or alternative arrangement that minimises potential conflicts of interest. Its primary safeguard is a requirement that the Director of Biosecurity 'have regard to' the objects of the biosecurity legislation. However, this person is also the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and has broader roles relating to the promotion of agriculture and trade and government priorities. It is simply not good enough to hope that the Department of Agriculture will at all times be able to avoid conflicts of interest in managing biosecurity risks and resisting all the pressures from within and outside government. Further, the nature of any review is undescribed and totally discretionary. There is no requirement to publicly release terms of reference of any review or to release the results.

There is no good reason to undermine Australia's biosecurity framework as this government would wish. In fact, as Australia's exposure to biosecurity risks increases, the reasons for a tougher framework get stronger. I go back to those original examples that I talked about at the start of my contribution: the Panama disease affecting the banana crop in Queensland; in my home state of Tasmania, the myrtle rust in Tasmania's northern eucalyptus species; and the first colonies of the red fire ant in Botany Bay. They are, just in the last two months, some of the important reasons why I call on the Senate to demonstrate some more of our collective common sense and strengthen Australia's biosecurity legislation by installing the inspector-general position. (Time expired)

Senator BACK (Western Australia) (11:48): In rising to speak strongly in support of the Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2014 and those bills associated with it, it is disappointing to register the contributions by Senator Singh and Senator Cameron before her, two people who have had absolutely and utterly nothing to do with the formulation of the legislation we have before us. I am delighted to be able to record that here in the chamber with me are Senators Heffernan, Sterle and Siewert, who with me have been vitally associated with this legislation and its development over time—the transition to where we are today.

I suppose the best reflection of when you do not know what you are talking about is to spend 20 minutes ignorantly focusing on one or two very, very small areas that, in the overall context of the legislation, pale into insignificance. But, for Senator Singh's interest, the original inspector-general position had its origins as the inspector-general of horse imports as a result of the equine influenza outbreak that we had, which led to the Beale review and to others. Before she goes, I would just like Senator Singh to know that the inspector-general, Dr Michael Bond, is a very close personal friend. We are both Western Australians and were both at Queensland university in the 1960s, and I have maintained a very close association with him since that time. For that position to be belittled and to be focused on for the length of time it has! Dr Bond and the gentleman before him have been—and I am sure inspectors-general into the future will be—fiercely independent. If Senator Singh is in any doubt at all, she need just go back to the questions asked in Senate estimates of the inspector-general and about the role he plays and, in fact, his independence in terms of the questioning.

I did not even want to speak about partisanship, because this has been such a strongly bipartisan move that gets us to where we are today, and it is disappointing when people descend to political partisanship, especially in something of the importance of agriculture. I just reflect that this replaces a bill that came into existence in 1908, some 107 years ago. Senator Singh was going on about Minister Joyce having all these powers, almost as if they are particular to him. Does she think that he is going to still be the minister in 107 years time? Not even Minister Joyce hopes for that outcome.

But let us reflect briefly on what would have been the circumstances in 1908. Exports were of no interest at all. The newly formed states, once the colonies, were desperately trying to feed their populations. The concept of import was almost unknown. We were desperately trying to produce and to sustain those communities as they grew. Also, of course, one of the imperatives for Federation was to be able to try to normalise trade across what became state borders. So the concept of a Quarantine Act in 1908, important and all as it was, of course was totally and utterly different to where we are in 2015. And let us hope that, as a result of the excellence of the work that we are doing here and into the future, this 2014-15 bill will hold good as indeed the original Quarantine Act 1908 did. Of course, it was modified some 50 times. Yes, it was the previous government that introduced the first draft of the Biosecurity Bill that we are discussing, but to minimise, trivialise and simply say it is some failure of an Abbott government that we did not bring the legislation in five minutes out trivialises the importance of the work that has been done by senators in this place, by departments and by ministerial officers to get to where we are today.

And there may be further changes needed. If there are, all well and good, but how important are the agriculture and agribusiness industries of this nation, currently generating in excess of $50 billion a year, more than 77 per cent of which is export? That is a critically important thing for people to understand. We are an exporting nation. From our own home state of Western Australia, as Senators Siewert and Sterle know only too well, we export more than 95 per cent of our grain. We cannot consume it. And so, when people say to us, 'Why is it so necessary that we are trading internationally not only in the Asian region but beyond?' it is because we depend on export trade. As a result of that, we must allow import trade, and so the Biosecurity Bill goes to the issues associated with it.

In 2012-13—and contrast this to 1908—there were some 16 million international passenger arrivals, 186 million international mail items, 1.7 million sea cargo consignments and more than 26 million air cargo consignments. We know that, when the children sitting up in the gallery now are adults, those numbers will have increased exponentially. Therefore, while you are watching this you need to know that legislation we are debating here will have an impact on you as young adolescents and as adults. As you travel overseas, as you study, as you develop your links overseas, everything that relates to this Biosecurity Bill will be critically important to you. When you come back into Australia and wonder why there is quarantine inspection of what you are doing, remember what is being protected here.

We all know the importance of Australia's reputation as a green and safe environmental exporter and producer of foodstuffs. We also know—and again it would be of interest to those who are watching—that we will be feeding 1.9 billion people more in our region alone by 2050. But more importantly than that—the events recently with hepatitis A only serve to emphasise it—is that that community of people to whom we have the opportunity to continue providing foodstuffs want even more security of supply and greater safety of supply when we look at the risks. The Chinese—only one example—say that a hungry man is an angry man, and the government of President Xi is all about making sure his community does not become angry. So the opportunities that we have are enormous.

For me, one of the absolute delights of this legislation found its way as a joint submission in January of last year by the departments of agriculture and health. Why is that so critically important? Simply because we have got to have the world understand the one-health approach, not a health department associated with human health and a department of agriculture associated with animals and plants. It is well known internationally that more than 65 per cent of all human infectious and probably parasitic diseases have their origins in animals, and so therefore this legislation, in my view, is groundbreaking because it combines into the Biosecurity Bill those elements that are required in associating ourselves with the risks to human health and indeed those for which agriculture has responsibility.

The concept is of us joining human health and agricultural responsibilities into the one biosecurity bill to address the risks of pests and diseases that may be coming into this country. We need only think of the risk of the Ebola virus at the moment. We have the Hendra virus, which has killed a number of my veterinary colleagues. That same virus, borne through bats in this case into horses and on to humans, with a mortality rate in excess of 70 per cent is exactly the same virus as the Nipah virus, which in Malaysia, India and Bangladesh has caused and is causing the deaths of children and adults as a result of that virus coming through bats to pigs to humans and indeed directly from bats to humans. So that is just one area of significant importance in this Biosecurity Bill before us. I think that is what made me so disappointed when all I could hear from Senator Singh and Senator Cameron was some mention about an inspector general. Important and all though that position is and occupied though it is by my very close friend Dr Bond, there is far more to it.

I ask you to reflect for a moment on the figure I just gave, which is that agriculture contributes some $50 billion to the Australian economy. It has been estimated by ABARES that, if Australia gets foot and mouth disease,—and as a veterinarian I would extend that comment to 'when Australia gets foot and mouth disease'—if it spreads nationally, the estimated figure of the cost to eradicate foot and mouth disease is the same figure—$50,000 million. If there is one state alone, be it Western Australia, Queensland or the Northern Territory, into which the disease is going to come, the cost estimate is somewhere between $3½ billion and $5½ billion. As, I believe, Senators Siewert, Sterle and Heffernan would know, those are just the direct costs. They are not the costs associated with stopping the movement of people across the north. Imagine that now, in March, at the end of the wet season, we got foot and mouth disease across the north of Australia and we had to put a halt to vehicle movements, in other words, halt tourism across the north of Australia. That $50 billion would be short change compared to the overall impact on the economy of the north. Why do I say 'when' rather than 'if'? I am not suggesting to you that the presence of veterinarians is going to stop foot and mouth disease. Between Geraldton and Darwin we have one Commonwealth veterinary officer for the risk of a disease that would decimate this country's economy. So, there are very, very important elements in this bill associated with the capacity of this country to be able to deal with an incursion.

Of course, because of those figures that I quoted earlier, we have had to move to a risk based approach. In other words, we cannot guarantee that there will be no incursion of any organisms into Australia. Senators Sterle and Heffernan were very much involved when there was a strong request by America, Canada and Japan to allow beef to come into this country. Of course Canada and America did have—and probably in Canada's case it still does have—BSE, mad cow disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy. At the time there was pressure on the then minister, Mr Burke, by the then Prime Minister, Mr Rudd, and the then trade minister, Mr Crean, to allow that beef to come into this country without there being the discipline of an import risk analysis. Senator Heffernan and Senator Sterle would well remember this, and maybe Senator Siewert would remember also. We had a number of hearings into that issue. Japan fell out as an applicant because they got foot and mouth disease. The Americans could not meet what Australia imposes on itself, which is a national livestock identification scheme for cattle. I do recall it was about this time in 2010 when we had what turned out to be the last hearing when I said to the then chief veterinary officer, 'Well, Dr Carroll, are you going to tell us about the seven-year-old Angus cow from Manitoba in Canada that has BSE, or am I?' and that led, of course, to Minister Burke requiring that there be a full import risk analysis. I make that point because the processes in place in this bill will ensure that there is a full biosecurity import risk analysis.

Time does not permit me in this discussion to actually go through all of the safeguards that are in place. Contrary to the comments made earlier about what role the Department of Agriculture might have, or what role the minister might have, it is the parliament that has responsibility to the Australian taxpayer. The reason I used the example of the importation of BSE beef, or beef from countries that have had it, was simply to make the point and to remind the chamber that on that occasion, despite the intense pressure of then Prime Minister and the then trade minister, eventually the then agriculture minister made the right decision. That decision was made as a result of the processes of the Senate, and the processes of the Senate required that there be an inquiry and that there be a number of hearings. The inadequacy of the original decision process was, in fact, exposed and the then minister made the right decision. History records, of course, that the Americans, the Canadians and the Japanese on that occasion all withdrew. It just makes the point that the parliament must always have the right and the role.

There are issues associated with regionality. We have a rich difference regionally in this country. The island state of Tasmania has certain advantages and challenges by virtue of it being insular. Australia, indeed, has certain benefits as a result of being an island continent. We in Western Australia have a whole series of different sets of circumstances, and each state and territory would claim those. I am pleased to see in the legislation that there is acknowledgement of regional differences within the overall capacity to deal.

If I have one concern, it is the question of regulations. The committee, which prides itself on putting policy before politics and has done so for some years, made a number of very, very important recommendations to which the government responded. For those interested, they should get hold of the responses by the government to the recommendations. Many of them are not in the act itself, if proclaimed, but in the regulations. Some of the issues that we have discussed here today are, for example, the demand to obtain independent scientific expertise, the demand and the right of wide consultation, the expectation and the opportunity of those who are likely to be adversely affected by decisions to be given further information prior to a final decision being made, and there are others that relate to the regulations. The point that I want to make, and I would make it whether or not we were in government or in opposition, is that the Senate committee must have the right to review those draft regulations, to examine them and to challenge them, if need be, before they are accepted. That is a normal process.

There are some definitions, for example, associated with external territory. There is some change in definition to the 12-mile limit rather than the 200-mile economic exclusion zone. There are issues associated with ballast water. The 1908 act was silent on ballast water in ships. I do not want to make light of it, except to say how critically important this is. What pleases me about this legislation, which was started by the previous government—to whom I give credit—which is being continued now and which will hopefully be completed by this chamber is the fact that it can be a living document; it can grow as time needs. We are all aware that the future of this country lies in our agricultural production, our agricultural exports and, indeed, our reputation.

Senator STERLE (Western Australia) (12:08): I rise to make my contribution to the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills. Senator Back makes some very good points. Probably one of the most poignant points that Senator Back makes is that the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport references and legislation committees are diligent. We set about in our work to do what is best for our nation, what is best for our farmers, what is best for our fishermen—anyone involved in horticulture, aquaculture or agriculture food production—and what is best for Australian consumers. There is absolutely no doubt about that. We do our best. We do not politicise it. Unfortunately, sometimes we have a few senators who blow in and want to make a political point, but we are all focused on the main intent: to look after Australia's agriculture, horticulture and fishing industries. We have worked diligently together for a number of years and under some fantastic chairmanship by me—I give myself a plug there—and by Senator Heffernan. So it is the same farm but a different paddock with whoever may be chairing at the time.

As Senator Back said, this bill is to replace and act that was first introduced in 1908. All credit to former agricultural ministers in the Rudd-Gillard era—Minister Burke, Minister Ludwig and Minister Fitzgibbon. I got agreement with my committee members that the new biosecurity bill, which we are going to put in place of the last one, was too important to rush. I got agreement that it did not matter what might be the will of the government of the day, we could not rush this bill. We had to thoroughly examine it. I had their full support. Of course, we know there has been a change of government.

Before I go to the circumstances of my problems with the bills as they stand now, I want to reiterate that biosecurity is probably one of the most important issues this nation has to address. We are an island and so fortunately we have some defences to save our agriculture and food production industries, but unfortunately through the best efforts of everyone involved we do get some serious incursions. I am fortunate to be part of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport committees. We have looked into just about every incursion that has hit this country; and, if we have not looked it and examined it, we are very well aware of it and have certainly not been backward in coming forward to talk about it and make recommendations to our relevant ministers.

When I walked into this place in 2005, the first inquiry I copped was on citrus canker. I had a fistful of papers put on my desk and was told, 'Read that, because you've got to come up to speed with citrus canker.' It frightened the living daylights out of me! What I did find out through those first few months in the Senate committee process was that that incursion came in through—I cannot put it any other way—a devious method. I have to tell you that, at the time, the department did not cover themselves in glory. They were very, very shoddy in their work. They could not have been any more shoddy than warning the perpetrator that they were coming to have a look at the possible place of incursion. They gave them plenty of notice. The rest is history. It is something which we should not be proud of. But what it did do was take the committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Heffernan, to Emerald in Queensland. We saw firsthand the devastation that occurs to not only an industry but a community when someone drops their guard or when someone is being sneaky. We saw the wipe-out of the citrus industry in Emerald, even to the point where orange, lemon and lime trees in people's own backyards—everything—had to be destroyed.

This is not political, but we have got another incursion on our doorstep in Queensland—and this is damned frightening. The rural and regional affairs committee was in Darwin last year, inquiring into something else, when we stumbled on the fact that the banana industry in Darwin was going to be wiped out by banana freckle. We know that every banana tree on every plantation in Darwin—I do not think it went any further than Darwin; I do not think it went down to Katherine, although I am not sure—had to be destroyed. Because of the incursion of banana freckle in Darwin, the industry was brought to its knees. There was a $26 million package. I do not know how you come to a figure like $26 million, because all I could see were family businesses put out of business, employees who worked in those family businesses put out of work and the service industry was left with nowhere to go. They lost a massive chunk of income and their workers were affected. This is just not good enough. I remember saying in Darwin, 'Let's hope to hell this doesn't get across the border'—and it has not.

I want to talk about the panama incursion. What we know at this stage about panama is that once it is in the soil it does not leave. I am told that it can be around for 40 or 50 years. So, goodness gracious, I have my fingers crossed! I really hope and pray that that incursion can be contained. I do not want to start scaremongering but, boy oh boy, if that gets into Queensland, not only do we talk about it being around for 40 or 50 years but it will wipe out the banana industry in Queensland. To a lesser but no less important extent is the fact that the banana industry in Carnarvon has just been wiped out by a cyclone. Fortunately, they will be able to bounce back because they are resilient up there.

I also want to touch on the importance of biosecurity, not only to our food industry but in terms of, as Senator Back touched on, the equine influenza outbreak in 2007, where we nearly did not have a Melbourne Cup—and putting aside the number of horses that were infected and put down. To come back to the intent of the bill, all I want is what is best for Australia. I want what is best for Australian consumers, and I want what is best for Australian farmers and food providers.

Not that long ago, in February, we had a Senate inquiry into this. I raised a number of concerns, as did my colleagues, with the Department of Agriculture. One of the biggest problems that I had was the possible watering down of the powers of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Another issue was that the department could not supply us with a copy of the regulations that were going to be hanging off this piece legislation. They tried to defend that by saying—and I am paraphrasing now—if we did not like it, it did not matter because they had consulted everyone. I think it was Senator Williams who asked who they had consulted, and they said stakeholders. Then I think it was Senator Ruston who asked for a list of the stakeholders that they had consulted, and then it came out that the stakeholders that they had consulted had not seen the regulations—there were no regulations!

When I asked Ms Mellor from the department where were the regulations and how far away were they, all I got was, 'They'll be here sometime this year.' When you are told that in February, 'sometime this year' could be up to 31 December. As a committee, and as representatives of the rest of the Senate, we were being asked to vote on a piece of legislation when we did not know what was in regulations. That was not the case when the bill was put up by the previous government; the regulations came out. We had to flush that out at Senate estimates, because the answers were a little bit different from what actually happened.

I am very keen to tighten up and do whatever we need to do to put biosecurity foremost in every government's mind, but I find it very disingenuous. I cannot accept voting on a piece of legislation when we do not know what is in the regulations. One of our fears of the regulations concerned the Eminent Scientists Group. The Eminent Scientists Group are now a part of the handbook of the decision making. When I asked Ms Mellor whether we had any guarantee that that the Eminent Scientists Group would still form part of the handbook of the decision making, I could not get a clear answer: 'We don't know; they're not ready yet.'

We in the opposition trenches cannot accept the bill as it is. In the committee, we put in a dissenting report. For us on the opposition side, putting in a dissenting report is not something we do every week, I can tell you. That goes for the government senators when they were in opposition too. We always did everything we could to achieve a consultative position where we could all agree. We would tweak words and we would add a few. We would have a few little disagreements, we would have a bit of heartburn and we would have the odd bit of biffo amongst ourselves, but we would come to an arrangement. So when a dissenting report goes through the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, it certainly does cause more heartburn. In this case there were some things that we just could not accept. I will share my concerns with the Senate. The dissenting report says:

Labor Senators do not agree with clause 567 of the Biosecurity Bill 2014 that provides the Agriculture Minister with review powers that will allow him to conduct reviews into the biosecurity system to identify opportunities for improvements in the assessment and management of biosecurity risks.

Our fear was this would all fall to the minister and he would have the final say. The report goes on:

Labor Senators also do not agree with clause 643—Delegation of powers by Agriculture Minister. This clause allows the Agriculture Minister to delegate any or all of his or her powers and functions under the Act (and any regulations made under the Act) to the Director of Biosecurity, an SES employee, or acting SES employee in the Agriculture Department, except for those relating to the Minister.

Labor Senators acknowledge concerns raised by submitters regarding the proposed review process under clause 567 and 643. The proposed review process was condemned as a 'backwards' and 'retrograde' step that would potentially allow conflict of interests.

That is the last thing that we would want to see in anything to do with biosecurity or enforcement of biosecurity. The report says:

Submitters highlighted key differences between the Biosecurity Bill 2014 clauses 567 and 643 and the review process designed under the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill 2012. Specifically, submitters noted with concern the proposed discretionary timing, conduct and scope of the reviews and the internal, confidential nature of review findings would not guarantee independent transparent review for example, the Australian Veterinary Association stated:

'If the Inspector-General's role is designed to be similar to that of an ombudsman (as described in the Beale Review) the public must be able to refer matters directly to the Inspector-General.'

AUSVEG came before us too, and they stated:

The explanatory memorandum for Clause 567 states that "… as the review powers are provided to the Minister, reviews will be conducted independently from the Department, ensuring independence between the subjects and the review (biosecurity officials) and the powers of the person conducting the review." However, as the powers for conducting a review into the biosecurity system lie with the Minister for Agriculture and may be conferred by the Minister for Agriculture, this cannot legitimately be described as an independent review process.

I want to quote the words that I have heard many, many times from my colleague Senator Heffernan, a government senator. In his view, and I find it very hard to argue with, you are only as independent as the person who pays you.

The Labor senators' dissenting report says:

Labor supports option 2 of the regulation impact statement that determined establishing the role of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity through legislation as a statutory officer, responsible for reviewing the performance and exercise of powers by the Director of Biosecurity, biosecurity officers and biosecurity enforcement officers as well as conducting biosecurity import risk analysis.

This is the preferred option as it would help assure stakeholders and Australia's trading partners of the integrity of the department's processes and would provide an independent, systematic approach towards maintaining and improving Australia's biosecurity system.

Labor recommends that the government adopt the recommendation of the Beale review to establish the Inspector-General of Biosecurity as a statutory body.

Establishing the role of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity through legislation would ensure that there is a statutory officeholder responsible for the independent audit—

I cannot stress enough that, on our side of the chamber, we want the independent audit—

review and assessment of the department's biosecurity activities and processes. The role and function of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity would align with the Beale review's recommendation that an effective risk management system should include formal auditing activities.

In summary of that, in our dissenting report we had one recommendation, and that was:

That the Senate either amend the bill or request the House of Representatives to amend the bill to provide for establishment of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity as a statutory body.

For the life of me, I cannot understand why Minister Joyce has a problem with that, why Minister Joyce would want to start a brawl with us, to put himself in a position where he could be the be-all and end-all of any biosecurity issues. I do not think any minister in their right mind—because of their workload and what they have to do—would ever think that was a good idea. Unfortunately that is what Mr Joyce has done, and only Mr Joyce, the Minister for Agriculture, can answer about that.

I go back to saying this: biosecurity should never, ever be used as a political football. Biosecurity is something that should unite this chamber and the other place on whatever issue it may be. Sometimes we lose sight, as a nation, of what we are actually consuming, what we are putting in our mouths, where it comes from and what the labels may say. The classic example is the unfortunate incident we have had with the frozen berries. That could be anything. In defence of the company, it was identified quite rapidly. It would have been nice if it had been quicker, but anyway it was identified and it was stopped. But it is imperative that Australians understand that, if you want to have the best biosecurity, if you want to have the best opportunity to consume the safest food, whether it be—

The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Order! I just remind advisers that they are unable to enter the chamber. I ask the whip to address that issue for me.

Senator STERLE: Mr Deputy President, you frightened the living daylights out of me! I thought: 'What the hell have I done this time? I'm on my best behaviour on this one. I'm not my normal self.' So thank you, Mr Deputy President. I cannot remember where I was at—it would have been good, but!

I was talking about what we are putting in our mouths. I digress a little bit, but is important for all those out there. We can have the best biosecurity system in the world—and we should; there is absolutely no doubt about that; we should never skimp on biosecurity—but we should also understand that, if we want to have the best biosecurity systems, we need to fund them. We need to have agreement in this house and in the other place. But we also have to support our farmers. The best biosecurity thing we could do is support our farmers, our horticultural industry, our fishing industry. We should also be able to expect and demand and receive the greatest opportunity, when we pick up a food product, to know, through whatever is on the label—none of this nonsense about imported goods but it is put together in Australia or whatever the rubbish is—whether we are actually supporting Australian industry, Australian jobs, Australian farmers, Australian fishermen and Australian horticulturalists.

Biosecurity is one very important issue, but unfortunately in this nation we have a real mismatch and we are at the behest of monsters like—in my opinion; not in anyone else's opinion—the Australian Food and Grocery Council. Every time we talk about food labelling, my goodness don't they bolt! What have they got to fear?

In wrapping up: we are calling on Minister Joyce to have a look at our request for the Inspector-General of Biosecurity. Give us a good reason why we cannot have that. It would be foolish to take away another avenue or two of the level of biosecurity we need. And to have the department not even able to tell us that the regulations will definitely contain the clause that will keep the Eminent Scientists Group—it smacks of something absolutely ridiculous. I call on the minister. It is not too late, Minister, to pick up the Labor Party's amendments and take them forward. Let us keep biosecurity foremost as one of the most important issues in this country, not only for food consumers but for our industries and for all those rural communities who are out there—we do not see them in Melbourne, Sydney and Perth—working their guts out, day in and day out, to feed all of Australia.

Senator RUSTON (South Australia—Deputy Government Whip in the Senate) (12:28): Before I make my contribution in relation to the Biosecurity Bill 2014, can I just acknowledge the extraordinarily bipartisan approach that the Labor Party has taken with the government in trying to come up with a good and robust set of security measures for Australia's biosecurity. This particular bill has been around in various guises for a number of years now. It has been debated, and the committee system has consulted widely on this, both when Senator Sterle was the chair of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee and now with Senator Heffernan as the chair of the committee. What we see today with the Biosecurity Bill 2014 is certainly a reflection of the extraordinary work that was done with the Biosecurity Bill 2012 and the committee that was chaired by Senator Sterle. This particular bill has come about because of the need to replace the complex 106-year-old Quarantine Act 1908. As anybody would realise, an act that was put in place in 1908 is most likely not going to have a great deal of relevance today. That is exactly what has happened over the intervening 106-year period—the act has been continually amended but the original act of 1908 remained principally in place. This particular bill is a reflection of the need to update that 1908 act to make sure it reflects the biosecurity risks we face in 2015.

It is interesting to note that, when that act was first passed in 1908, the only way any goods came to Australia was by sea. You can imagine that sea arrivals only would have meant there were a lot less things arriving by sea, a lot less regularly, and the ability of any government or agency to intervene, and to test and check those sorts of goods, was quite a different story than it is today. In the last decade alone, the number of air passengers has grown by 80 per cent; sea containers have grown by 82 per cent; bulk cargo has grown by 16 per cent; and these numbers are just going to continue to grow. If you look at it in the context of the requirement on the department's resources to deal with these quarantine issues, in 2012-13 alone the Department of Agriculture had to clear 16 million arriving international passengers, 186 million international mail items, 1.7 million sea cargo consignments and 26 million air cargo consignments. It really does put in context the quantum of the issue this particular Biosecurity Bill is seeking to deal with.

The main purpose of this bill is the management of biosecurity risks in general—that is, the risk of pests and diseases, including human diseases, entering Australia, getting themselves established in Australia or spreading in Australia. The risk of causing harm to humans, animals, plant health, the environment or the economy needs to be considered in the context of this Biosecurity Bill. One of the major issues is the risk of ballast water, as you can probably imagine, with our seagoing vessels in areas such as the Great Barrier Reef and the extraordinary importance of protecting that particular asset. We have to be very mindful of what is being discharged at sea. Dealing with biosecurity and human biosecurity emergencies also needs to be considered.

The idea with this bill and its principal purpose, as I said initially, is to get into the 21st century with an act to enable the administration of what is a very changeable space. It also seeks to deal with some of the complexities of the regulatory requirements and administrative practices to make sure they are much easier to administer, and to give greater flexibility to the Commonwealth so it is able to manage these risks in a modern and flexible way and in a way that reflects the current environment and contemporary industry practice. It also seeks to give powers to make sure we are able to continuously monitor and manage both onshore and offshore risks, and that the tools we give to the people we require to undertake this compliance are fit for purpose—that they are modern and useful and reflect current-day activity. The Quarantine Act only contains criminal penalties and, as we know in modern society, there are a whole heap of other tools which should be made available to compliance officers to make sure they get the best possible outcome to deliver what is being sought for Australia.

The primary objective of this bill is to manage biosecurity risk. It is interesting. I mentioned in my opening statement that this process was started under the previous administration with the Biosecurity Bill 2012. As part of that process, the rural and regional affairs committee and the department undertook a lot of stakeholder consultation to try to determine what was going to be the best possible outcome. There were a number of things that came out of that consultation process which have been incorporated in the 2014 bill, which makes this bill a much better tool to reflect our needs. One of the things that was very strongly put to us as a committee, in our negotiations and consultation with the broader industry around Australia, was the need to accept that there are regional differences. A one-size-fits-all biosecurity approach to biosecurity risk was something the regions and industries did not believe was necessarily in their best interests, so this new bill reflects the need to identify regional differences and that the risk analysis process that is associated with various products needs to be considered in this context. As a result there have been some changes to this bill, particularly to clarify the consideration of regional differences in biosecurity and how that plays out in the risk analysis—making sure that there is an level of independence in doing so. There was quite a substantial engagement with stakeholders and that consultation has resulted in these changes. One of the things we need to be very mindful of is that, while we have identified the regional differences as they currently exist today, it is a requirement that we constantly continue to talk to industry, and to monitor changes in the region and in the landscape, to make sure that future regional differences which may well come about are considered as an ongoing issue when we develop our biosecurity position in Australia.

There is no doubt that there is constantly a dilemma in this space about our ability to assist our agricultural industries, particularly in finding new markets around the world and making sure we have as free a marketplace as we possibly can to benefit the consumers of Australia, so they can get access to products which are coming into Australia they may well want to consume. As an exporting nation, Australia relies heavily on our primary producers and manufacturers to make sure the balance of payments of this country is such that we remain the prosperous and First World country we are. But one of the things that constantly and increasingly has become a risk to Australia is biosecurity. It is about maintaining a level of biosecurity that ensures into the future so that Australia does not end up a country that does not have the clean green image it currently has. But, at the same time, we have to be very mindful that we are a trading nation—and we would not be as successful or as prosperous as we are if we were not.

Senator Sterle raised in his speech the consequences of an incursion and how terribly difficult this balancing act is. Governments are faced with finite resources to put into the myriad areas which government has to fund and look after. As a primary producer myself, I would love to think that we had unlimited resources to put into biosecurity but that is not the case. So we need to make sure that we have legislative tools in place to maximise the level of protection that we can give to our farmers within the reasonable context of those parameters.

Whilst I have been a critic of the way the department has approached risk analysis in the past and I have also been a critic of letting biosecurity play second fiddle to trade on a number of occasions, there are some very clear examples that we can put on the record. There are two things that need to be balanced here. One is: what is the likelihood of an incursion? And the second one is: what are the consequences of that incursion should it actually occur? Subsidiary to that are a whole heap of other things about our readiness to respond to any incursion and our capacity to actually deal with it even if we had the resources.

The Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics and Sciences estimated that even a relatively small outbreak of foot and mouth disease in only one state has the potential to cost Australia in excess of $5 billion. When you consider that that is one tiny little outbreak in one state, you can imagine the consequences if an outbreak of foot and mouth disease was able to get away in Australia. You have to weigh up the cost of the biosecurity measures that are put in place against the potential outcome should an outbreak occur. The level of likelihood of an incursion may be quite small but it does not take you very long to realise that the cost of such an incursion would have such a devastating impact, not just on the people who are in this industry but on the broader Australian economy. We need to be very mindful that that is considered when making a decision to allocate resources.

Citrus canker occurred in Emerald in Queensland and we saw the entire citrus industry in one state completely decimated. Luckily for Australia, we were able to quarantine it in Queensland—no consolation for the Queensland industry but certainly for the rest of Australia. But once again you see how something as small as one person being able to import a particular product into Australia that was infected by disease completely took out an entire industry in a state. It is really important that when we are looking at this risk analyses that we weigh up not just the cost of the biosecurity measure but also the potential cost to our economy should such an incursion occur.

As I mentioned, we have been working on this in the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport since 2012. This particular bill was referred to the rural and regional affairs committee to have a look at. The committee has only had the bill for a very short period of time but, given the amount of work that was done previous to this bill, we were able to use a lot of the information that had been obtained in the consultation that occurred over the 2012 bill. The committee made a number of recommendations, 14 of which were recommended in a non-partisan approach.

I suppose it was a tiny little bit disappointing that despite the extraordinary amount of effort that went into this particular investigation as well as the one in 2012 that there was a dissenting report and also so some adverse comments by the Greens. I was disappointed but, nonetheless, that should not go against the fact that there was a genuine attempt to try and come up with a consensus report. It was just disappointing that in the end we failed to achieve that. Given how sensible the recommendations in the report appear to be, I would think it very likely that the government would certainly consider them. There was a recommendation to ensure that any review undertaken under ministerial review powers is publicly released and tabled in parliament to give a level of transparency to this particular review process. There is no doubt that the committee unilaterally thought that that was good idea.

It was once again very clear that the committee thought: that the use of or reliance on scientific evidence and best scientific endeavour were absolutely essential to getting the right outcome; that the director of biosecurity should be given the opportunity to use whatever expert skills and advice needed to ensure the biosecurity risk assessment was as thorough as it possibly could be; and also that in the process of undertaking these risk assessments there is a constant and ongoing requirement to consult with industry. We have got science underpinning the decision making, but we also need to make sure that the interests, needs and first-hand, on-the-ground experience of the people that are going to be impacted by any consequence of an importation of a product into Australia are included in that risk analysis.

It once again comes back to this whole balance between the likelihood of the outbreak and the consequences of the outbreak. The only people who can truly give you a clear—

Debate interrupted.

The PRESIDENT (15:37): Does any senator wish to have any of those motions put? There being none, we will proceed.

Senator McKENZIE (Victoria) (15:37): I, and also on behalf of Senators Williams, Canavan and O'Sullivan, move:

That the following matter be referred to the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee for inquiry and report by 12 August 2015:

The effect of market consolidation on the red meat processing sector, and in undertaking the inquiry, the committee consider:

(a) the potential for misuse of market power through buyer collusion and the resultant impact on producer returns;

(b) the impact of the red-meat processor consolidation on market competition, creation of regional monopolies and returns to farm gate;

(c) the existing selling structures and processes at saleyards, particularly pre and post sale weighing, as well as direct sales and online auctions, and whether they remain relevant;

(d) the regulatory environment covering livestock, livestock agents, buyers and meat processors; and

(e) any related matter.

Question agreed to.

Senator BILYK (Tasmania—Deputy Opposition Whip in the Senate) (17:22): On behalf of Senator Polley, Chair of the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, I present the third report of the committee. I also lay on the table Scrutiny of Bills Alert Digest No. 3 of 2015, dated 18 March 2015.

Ordered that the report be printed.

Senator FAWCETT (South Australia—Deputy Government Whip in the Senate) (17:22): On behalf of Senator Williams, I present the Delegated Legislation Monitor No. 3 of 2015.

Senator FAWCETT (South Australia—Deputy Government Whip in the Senate) (17:23): On behalf of Senator Back, I present the third progress report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee on the implementation of the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, together with the Hansard record of proceedings and the documents presented to the committee.

Ordered that the report be printed.

Senator BILYK (Tasmania—Deputy Opposition Whip in the Senate) (17:23): On behalf of Senator Dastyari, the Chair of the Economics References Committee, I present the report of the Economics Reference Committee on retail leasing, together with the Hansard record of proceedings and documents presented to the committee.

Ordered that the report be printed.

Senator BILYK (Tasmania—Deputy Opposition Whip in the Senate) (17:24): I move:

That the Senate take note of the report.

I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.

Senator CASH (Western Australia—Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women) (17:25): I move:

That this bill may proceed without formalities and be now read a first time.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a first time.

Senator CASH (Western Australia—Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women) (17:25): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I seek leave to have the second reading speech incorporated into Hansard.

Leave granted.

The speech read as follows—

SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN BILL 2015

The Succession to the Crown Bill 2015 will provide the Parliament of Australia's assent to three important reforms to modernise the law relating to royal succession. These changes are consistent with changes being made to the law in the United Kingdom. They will align the royal succession laws with modern values and ensure that the same person is the Sovereign of Australia and of the United Kingdom.

The first reform will end the system of male preference primogeniture so that in future the order of succession will be determined simply by order of birth. Female heirs will no longer be displaced by their younger brothers. The reform will apply to any person born after 28 October 2011.

The second reform is to remove the bar on succession for an heir and successor of the Sovereign who marries a Catholic. The existing restriction applies to Catholics alone and not to any other faith. The reform will apply to all existing marriages at the time the law comes into force as well as future marriages.

The third reform is to limit the requirement that the Sovereign consent to the marriage of a descendant of his late Majesty King George the Second to the first six persons in line to the Crown. Failure to obtain permission to marry will no longer prevent a person from marrying, but simply mean that the person and the person's descendants are removed from the line of succession. The reform will also validate some marriages voided by the Royal Marriages Act 1772 of Great Britain. The existing rule applies to hundreds of descendants. Many of them would not have been aware that they needed the Sovereign's permission to marry. Their marriages may be legally void as a result. This bill will correct this situation by validating those marriages, provided they meet certain criteria.

The reforms were enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom on 22 April 2013, and will come into force on the commencement of the UK legislation, as soon as all 16 Realms, including Australia, implement the reforms in their jurisdictions.

The Commonwealth, States and Territories, in the Council of Australian Governments, COAG, agreed to the reforms in July 2012, and agreed in April 2013 to implement them using a legislative consent-and-request approach relying on s51(xxxviii) of the Constitution.

Under this approach each of the States must pass legislation requesting that the Commonwealth enact legislation for the whole of Australia. All States' legislation needs to commence before the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia can enact the Commonwealth legislation. I note that all States' legislation has now commenced.

COAG further agreed that any States that wished to could also enact State legislation dealing with the rules of Royal succession alongside the request legislation.

This modernisation of the laws of succession ensures the continued relevance of the monarchy to Australia and her people and reflects the commitment that all Australians have to equality and non-discrimination.

We are proud today to be changing the laws of royal succession to reflect the values that we all hold dear.

I commend this Bill to the Senate.

Debate adjourned.

Senator XENOPHON (South Australia) (17:26): I move:

That the Part 145 Manual of Standards Amendment Instrument 2014 (No. 1), made under regulation 145.015 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, be disallowed [F2014L01316].

Six sitting days remain, including today, to resolve the motion or the instrument will be deemed to have been disallowed.

I am moving to disallow these regulations today for several reasons. Primarily, the impact of these regulations is to reduce the safety of Australia's aircraft maintenance regime by transferring the authorisation to certify airworthiness of aircraft from licenced engineers to non-licenced and less-qualified people. The role of licenced aircraft engineers is vital. They have a thorough and sound knowledge of the aircraft as a whole—they know them nose to tail and back to front, and from wing tip to wing tip. And, while the other individuals who may work on specific areas of maintenance are undoubtedly experts in their particular field, I am concerned that they do not have the same comprehensive 'big picture' knowledge as licensed aircraft mechanical engineers.

This is an important issue about airline safety in this nation. We do not want to see airline safety being diminished. The regulations propose to have non-licensed aircraft engineers to do certain types of maintenance and to have certain powers. It is my view that they should not have the authorisation to sign off on the airworthiness or maintenance undertaken on aircraft. I am concerned that the changes in these regulations may put our aircraft maintenance systems below the minimum global standard. Clearly, this has significant implications not only in terms of safety but in terms of our international reputation, and may even put us at risk of being restricted or banned from international airspace.

I am also concerned that the impact of these regulations has not been fully understood or clearly communicated by the regulator to the parliament. Further, in an expert legal opinion to the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers' Association, Mr Bret Walker SC, one of the nation's most senior counsel, indicated that the regulation may possibly even go so far as to make it illegal for licensed aircraft engineers to continue to carry out the work they have done for many years without new and costly administration processes being established by maintenance organisations and airlines. If Mr Walker is right, and I believe he is, that is a shocking unintended consequence.

Aviation safety issues are particularly complex, especially so when it comes to our regulatory regime. In brief, the Australian Civil Aviation Act requires CASA to regulate safety by developing and promulgating appropriate, clear and concise aviation safety standards. The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, known as the CASRs, parts 42, 145, 66 and 147 were passed by the parliament in December 2010 and came into effect on 27 June 2011. Part 42 relates to the continued airworthiness of aircraft, including what maintenance is done, where and by whom. It specifies that maintenance must be certified and who must certify it. Part 145 relates to organisations that carry out maintenance on airline aircraft. Part 145 is accompanied by a manual of standards, a MOS, that prescribes how the organisation conducts its activities—that is, what facilities, tools, procedures, manpower and certifying staff are required, and details their qualifications. Part 66 relates to the licensing of aircraft maintenance engineers. Part 66 also has a MOS, which prescribes the standards of training and experience required for the issue of an aircraft engineering maintenance licence. The standards in part 66 are based on the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, standards for licensing. Part 147 relates to training organisations and the conduct of training licensed personnel. To aid interpretation of the regulations, CASA publishes guidance material that outlines in plain language how the regulations and accompanying MOS are to be understood and applied. The guidance material specifies in plain language the regulation's policy intention.

The amendment to the part 145 MOS, which we are debating today, has the effect of significantly reducing safety oversight of Australian aircraft maintenance. That is not just my view and that of licensed aircraft engineers but also, effectively, the very powerful opinion of Bret Walker SC, who has looked at the issue of its legality. The effect of the amendment has been to introduce two fundamental changes. Firstly, they have transferred the internationally recognised authority of a part 66 aircraft maintenance engineering licence holder to certify for the airworthiness of maintenance tasks to non-licensed personnel, who do not meet minimum international requirements. Surely we in this place should all be concerned about that. Secondly, it invalidates the existing guidance material for part 145 that requires an airworthiness determination and certification to be conducted only by a part 66 licence holder following specialist maintenance tasks.

The standards put forward by ICAO specifically require that personnel who are providing airworthiness certifications and signing maintenance releases meet minimum training and experience requirements. These standards are the global minimum—I emphasise that they are the global minimum—requirements for aircraft maintenance safety. The government's policy for the Australian aviation regulatory reform program is to align with these international standards wherever possible. Where this alignment is not able to be achieved a state difference must be notified to ICAO. It is my view that the changes outlined in these regulations do not align with ICAO and do not meet the minimum safety standards set out by it. Again, I refer to the very considered opinion of Bret Walker SC.

Further, if we look at the regulatory framework set out by the European Aviation Safety Agency, or EASA, which Australia is also aiming to align with, we see the same disconnect. The EASA regulations—what the Europeans do—allow for the use of specialised maintenance staff in maintenance organisations, provided they are qualified to specific standards. Apart from non-destructive testing, Europe does not identify in regulation what fields are considered as specialist maintenance. Specialist maintenance is a term used to describe maintenance tasks and processes, such as non-destructive testing and welding, that require training and skills that fall outside of the normal training undertaken by a licensed aircraft engineer, thereby rendering them to be designated as special. Importantly, the EASA regulations do not permit specialist maintainers to certify the airworthiness of maintenance tasks. Except in exceptional circumstances, they require all maintenance airworthiness certification to be carried out by persons qualified to the European licensing regulations. By doing this, Europe complies with ICAO annex 1 standards and practices.

The Australian regulations also allow for the use of specialist maintenance staff, but there are two distinct differences between Australia and Europe. Australia prescribes certain maintenance, in broad categories and terms, as being specialist maintenance and requires that people undertaking these tasks are qualified and authorised by the maintenance organisation. More importantly, Australia requires the specialist maintainer to certify the airworthiness of their work. But CASA have made this requirement without including the required training standards necessary to meet ICAO standards.

Further, by transferring airworthiness certification from licensed personnel to non-licensed personnel, these amendments have in essence removed the ability for the government to manage effectively the risks of aircraft maintenance. Effective risk management is absolutely fundamental in an industry where managing risk to the highest possible standard is absolutely critical. If a licensed aircraft engineer fails to exercise their privileges safely, the government may take administrative action by suspending or removing their licence in order to prevent that person carrying out further work or certification. That is a very significant penalty. However, the government cannot do that for a non-licensed person. That non-licensed person has the ability to move from organisation to organisation without sanction. This must create a further reduction in safety. It is also important to note that the guidance material that accompanies these regulations seems to be at odds with the regulations themselves. The guidance material clearly states that specialist maintenance is maintenance which is unable to be carried out by a licensed engineer. It states that maintenance that is normally performed by a licensed engineer is not to be classed as specialist. It further states:

Following Specialist Maintenance tasks, where an airworthiness determination is to be made regarding an aircraft, such an airworthiness determination and related Maintenance Certification should be made by the holder of an appropriate Part 66 Maintenance Certification Licence who is a Certification Authorisation holder—

that is, a licensed aircraft engineer. The guidance material gives a very clear reason for this requirement:

Specialist Maintenance personnel are trained and qualified in the specialist field and may not have a holistic understanding of the interrelationship of an aircraft’s systems, or airworthiness implications, such that a Maintenance Certification Licence holder should have. For this reason, the Maintenance Certification for Specialist Maintenance work will only be for the scope of the specialist maintenance and is not intended to cover work normally performed and certified for by a Part 66 Maintenance Certification Licence holder …

If I may, the emphasis needs to be on the words 'holistic understanding of the interrelationship of an aircraft's systems, or airworthiness implications'. You will not get that holistic understanding with unlicensed people, in my view.

The amendments to the Part 145 MOS, however, in a direct contradiction to this existing guidance material, reclassifies a large number of tasks that are normally and easily performed by licensed engineers as 'specialist' and thereby removes the requirement stated clearly in the existing guidance material. This amendment has had the direct effect thereby of invalidating the Part 145 Guidance material and transferring airworthiness certification from licensed personnel to non-licensed people who do not meet international standards. It is so important that these regulations be disallowed, for that reason alone—and there are many others. The net effect of this direct contradiction is that the regulations that apply to aircraft maintenance are in no way 'clear and concise', as they ought to be. In fact, to interpret any of the regulation relating to specialist maintenance, at least five separate documents are required to be accessed and read.

The Explanatory Memorandum for the Part 145 Manual of Standards Amendment Instrument 2014 (No. 1) makes a number of important claims that are critical for the assessment of the amendment instrument by the parliament. Firstly, the amendment states that:

The MOS amendment corrects, revises and clarifies certain aspects of the MOS. The MOS amendment does not significantly alter any existing policy of the MOS.

I will repeat that:

The MOS amendment corrects, revises and clarifies certain aspects of the MOS. The MOS amendment does not significantly alter any existing policy of the MOS.

These are key words. Further, it states:

There are a large number of amendments but their intent is essentially to clarify the existing operation of the MOS without departing in any significant way from the original purpose and intent of the MOS as in force before the amendments.

A reasonable person, when reading those statements, would be entitled to come to the logical conclusion that the existing policy and intent of the MOS had been preserved.

Sadly, this is very far from the case. The current published guidance material that instructs the reader on the policy intent and purpose of the MOS and regulation clearly describes a regime of specialist maintenance that is not consistent with these amendments. In short, I believe the explanatory statement is wholly inaccurate and misleading. It is simply unsatisfactory.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has provided information to the industry that the guidance material in relation to specialist maintenance was accurate at the time the amendment was made. This guidance material has been in place for four years and the provisions for how the specialist maintenance scheme was to be applied have not been altered in any significant way, despite the guidance material having undergone four reviews and amendments in this time. This guidance material was published prior to the regulations and MOS coming into force in 2011, and provided a holistic understanding of the intentions of the regulations that were approved by parliament.

CASA now says that the guidance material needs to be 'fixed'—other people talk about people fixing things, but I will not talk about the education minister—to suit the amendments because the regulations no longer mean what the Guidance material says they mean. Therefore these amendments have been put before the parliament for approval either based on error—as one of Australia's most eminent legal counsel Bret Walker SC has opined—or CASA has inadvertently issued misleading material or material that is substantially inaccurate. Mr Walker's opinion supports the above view and also contends that further to the above concerns, there are additional problems around the ongoing legality of licensed aircraft maintenance engineers now certifying for maintenance they have been performing safely and legally for years, as well as their ability to actually release an aircraft back to service if a non-licensed person has provided an airworthiness declaration for a maintenance task.

In my view, there are simply too many concerns around these regulations to allow them to stand. The amendments do not deliver clear and concise regulation. The amendments do not support the existing MOS policy, and fundamentally alter both Australia's long-established safety philosophy and processes. The guidance material does not seem to accurately reflect the regulations. The regulations do not improve alignment with EASA and ICAO standards—the stated object of Australia's aviation sector—and in fact move us further away. The regulations do not strengthen safety outcomes and instead remove a critical layer of licensed oversight. The regulations increase costs for the industry through increased administrative requirements. The regulations do not reduce complexity in the regulatory environment, and in fact seem to make it more complex. In short, these amendments do not meet CASA's functions under the Civil Aviation Act and are not an appropriate use of CASA's delegated legislation powers. They are bureaucratic, complex and ineffective. They reduce safety and increase cost. The amendments do not support our aviation industry and should be disallowed.

However, I do want to acknowledge Mr Mark Skidmore, the relatively new Director of Aviation Safety at CASA, who has spent significant time with me and industry representatives to try to come to a satisfactory conclusion. I must say that I am incredibly impressed by Mr Skidmore, as is the entire industry. He has been a terrific appointment by this government; he is someone who has been welcomed in a bipartisan and a cross-party fashion. I look forward to working with him, and I understand that this is a legacy issue that Mr Skidmore has taken on. I understand that because he must rely on advice from senior members within his organisation, given that this is something he has inherited.

Unfortunately, a compromise has not been reached. As such, the best and most appropriate way to resolve these issues and to ensure Australia's high level of safety and maintenance is maintained is to disallow these regulations. In the case of disallowance, we will simply go back to what was in place, and something that worked, previously. There may be scope for compromise and there may be scope to improve the previous regulations, but these regulations are not the solution. If they are disallowed, CASA can then address these concerns in redrafting and ensure the best outcomes can be achieved. I trust our licensed engineers and I think it is important that we listen to them. Steve Purvinas does have a national reputation as a moderate union leader; he is highly respected; he works constructively with airlines; and he is someone who takes safety incredibly seriously. A fundamental error has been made here

I urge my colleagues on all sides of this chamber, for the sake of airline safety, to heed the advice of the licensed aircraft engineers—those who keep our aircraft in the safest possible condition—and also to listen to the very considered opinion of Bret Walker SC and to disallow these regulations.

Senator CASH (Western Australia—Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women) (17:45): The government does not support this disallowance motion. The motion would wind back the clock on regulatory principles which have been in place since 2011. If successful, the disallowance motion would prevent important safety measures being incorporated into the Part 145 Manual of Standards, or MOS, and impose additional regulatory burdens on the Australia's approved maintenance organisations without any demonstrated improvements in aviation safety. It cannot be supported without setting back the process of modernising Australia's aviation safety maintenance regulations, introduced by the previous government and supported by this government. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority, or CASA, has after extensive consultation with both industry and the unions developed this MOS amendment to implement important safety and oversight measures on approved maintenance organisations, whilst at the same time adding four extra tasks to the list allowed to be performed by specialist maintenance personnel. The concept of specialist maintenance has been in place in the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Regulations since 2011. It is acknowledged that the union representing licensed aircraft maintenance engineers, the Australian Licensed Australian Engineers' Association, is opposed to the use of specialist maintainers. I am advised that the Australian Licensed Australian Engineers' Association does not want the list of specialist maintenance activities expanded to include on-wing engine maintenance or inferior furnishing roles such as carpet laying. I also advised that the Australian Licensed Australian Engineers' Association argues that the continued monopoly provision by licensed aircraft maintenance engineers for maintenance service certifications for all aircraft maintenance is the only safe situation, and that outcome should continue.

However, the position CASA has taken is consistent with International Civil Aviation Organization standards and recommended practices. CASA's position is also consistent with that which is being applied by overseas aircraft maintenance organisations in other major aviation jurisdictions, such as Europe, the United States, Canada and New Zealand. That position is that an approved maintenance organisation is responsible for providing the safe outcome on the maintenance of an aircraft. This concept is included in the Part 145 Manual of Standards amendments which are the subject of Senator Xenophon's disallowance motion. While the government appreciates that Senator Xenophon's motion was put forward with good intentions, and we certainly acknowledge Senator Xenophon's longstanding interest in aviation policy matters, the government will not be supporting the disallowance motion and urges other senators to also not support the disallowance motion.

Senator CONROY (Victoria—Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) (17:48): Labor will support this disallowance. Labor's position is that air safety is a paramount consideration in regulation and management of their operations and including maintenance. We appreciate the hard work undertaken by CASA in overseeing safety in civil aviation. Australia retains one of the safest air safety regimes in the world. Generally Labor believes that CASA regulations should be allowed by the parliament.

The issues surrounding this regulation are highly complex and technical. This includes concerns about matching with international standards set by International Civil Aviation Organization, legislation, regulations and guidance. As we understand the issue, this regulation adds to the list of specialist maintenance tasks in a way that potentially conflicts with ICAO standards, and potentially removes a level of checking on maintenance that forms part of a safety regime. We are concerned that the system of checks and the chain of qualification is at least confused by the regulatory change. Where there is a legitimate question raised about safety concerns, Labor favours a precautionary approach. Labor believes that a clearly understood system of checks and crosschecks is an important element of good safety practice, and that this regime should be clearly delineated and understood by all involved in the system. It is clear to us that if the system is indeed clear to CASA, it is not well appreciated or understood by those at the coalface. There are concerns about the legal effect of this change, as expressed in a legal opinion from Bret Walker SC.

We note that this regulation has been in place since October 2014. Since that time a new CEO has been appointed to CASA: the opposition has had the opportunity to meet Mr Skidmore, the Director of Aviation Safety, and we acknowledge his new approach centred on five key principles, including on safety, clear communication, reducing complexity, measuring regulatory impact, and consistency. At this point, the opposition believes that there are sufficient questions around the regulation of safety arising from this regulation to urge the parties to reconvene and clearly articulate a safety framework around these changes. The parliament needs to be assured that safety standards remain—and at least some are arguing that this is not the case. The opposition has taken considerable time and a number of meetings to listen closely to CASA's rationale and to the views of the workers at the coalface in the industry. Through that process, it is clear that the benefits to industry from these changes are on the low side, although uncosted at this point. Further, the consequences of disallowing are not characterised as major by CASA. For these reasons, Labor favours a precautionary approach on this occasion.

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Lines ): Senator Xenophon, do you wish to have a right of reply?

Senator XENOPHON (South Australia) (17:51): Very briefly; thank you Madam Acting Deputy President. I am grateful both to the government and to the opposition for their responses. With respect to the government, if you look closely at Bret Walker SC's opinion, there are real issues in respect of this. This is a minefield, in terms of how this will be interpreted. I have outlined this highly complex technical issue in terms of the problems with these regulations. I am very grateful to the opposition for their support in respect of this. I think Senator Conroy has hit the nail on the head: there needs to be a precautionary approach in relation to this. Let us not in any way compromise airline safety. There are legitimate questions that need to be asked about this issue. I want licensed aircraft engineers to maintain the aircraft that I and everyone in this place, and indeed millions of Australians, fly on each year. So let us get this right. I do not blame Mr Skidmore, who I think is an outstanding appointment. But disallowing these regulations will mean we go back to the previous system, which has served us well for a number of years. There could be scope for improvement. But these changes are very, very problematic.

I do want to pay particular tribute to the shadow minister for transport, the Hon. Anthony Albanese, who has supported this by taking that sensible precautionary approach. I do not know if there are the numbers for this to be disallowed, but I hope it will be, for the sake of aviation safety in this country.

The PRESIDENT: The question is that the disallowance motion moved by Senator Xenophon be agreed to.

Senator RUSTON (South Australia—Deputy Government Whip in the Senate) (18:00): I would like to say how tremendously important the Biosecurity Bill 2014 is. It is absolutely essential that it be passed to protect Australia's agriculture industries. Before I conclude I would like to put on the record that Australia's relative freedom from many pests and diseases is an extraordinarily invaluable asset to Australian agriculture, and it must be protected at all costs. Regardless of the fact that we have been left in a financially extraordinarily difficult position by the largess of the previous government and their lack of financial control, it is absolutely essential that we continue to fund biosecurity and to protect our Australian industries.

The intelligence gathering about new and emerging biosecurity threats is absolutely critical. As I mentioned in the earlier part of my contribution to this debate this morning, it is very clear that the increasing amount of movement and activity around the world, and the fact that we have become a global marketplace, puts continuing and increasing pressures on Australia's biosecurity systems. We must ensure that we are at the forefront of intelligence gathering to ensure that any new and emerging biosecurity threats are dealt with before they become an issue. This absolutely emphasises the need for pre-border activities designed to do exactly that. It is too late once the threat gets here.

However, one of the things that must be commended is the flying squad, which was provided $20 million at the election to have a fast and effective response to biosecurity emergency. Obviously the first thing we want to do by this legislation is ensure that we do not have the incursions at all and that we deal with them pre-border. But, if in the unfortunate circumstance we do have a post-border incursion, we need to be very, very quick to respond to it, as you would know yourself, Mr Acting Deputy President. The quick response to any incursion, not only rescues our industries, but will save millions and possibly billions of dollars for Australian taxpayers and obviously protects Australian industries. In the case of some of the industries in Australia, they face a lot of threats from our borders. We have a very long border and we have a very small population. The potential for incursions is alive and well every single hour of the day.

One of the things I would like to put on the record, which has been a very positive initiative of this government, has been the establishment and re-ignition of the National Fruit Fly Strategy, which is so terribly important in my home state and in the Riverland where I live. We all know that we have fruit fly in Australia, but there are hundreds of different types of fruit fly that exist in other parts of the world. It is absolutely essential that we prevent those fruit fly from coming to Australia so that we can maintain our reputation as being a pest- and disease-free country and continue to be able to access the export markets around the world in the way that we do. We are renowned for the fact that we do not have many pests and diseases, and people aspire to eat Australian food and to wear Australian fibre, and they want to continue to buy products from Australia.

In speaking on this bill today I want to emphasise how terribly important it is that we get our biosecurity settings absolutely right. Australia's future is going to be based, I think, very solidly on our agricultural industries, therefore it is absolutely essential that we protect them.

Senator BULLOCK (Western Australia) (18:04): Before I start, given that Senator Ruston was just referring to the fruit fly problem, it would be remiss of me as a Western Australian not to express my great disappointment in the effective banning of fenthion in Western Australia, which is a known and effective method of combating Mediterranean fruit fly. Orchardists in Western Australia deeply regret no longer being able to use it, given that it never caused any known human side-effect, and it has been removed from their arsenal in combating the fruit fly which is peculiar to Western Australia.

I was asked earlier today to share a few thoughts on the Biosecurity Bill, and I only had a few. I have now had a look at this bill and I may have some concerns that others may have not picked up. It may be that at least a couple of the things I say in this debate will not have been referenced before, and that gives us an opportunity to look at some of the provisions in some detail.

The first issue I want to raise relates to the declaration of a biosecurity emergency. To put that in context I want to start by referring to the scope of the application of the bill to invasive pests. At section 25 it says:

(1) This Act (other than Part 1 of Chapter 8 (biosecurity emergencies)) applies in relation to a pest only if:

(a) the pest is capable of:

(i) infesting humans, animals or plants; or

(ii) acting as a vector for a disease; or

(iii) causing disease in any other way; or

(b) the pest is an invasive pest.

To know what an invasive pest is you have to go to the definitions. An invasive pest:

… means a pest that:

(a) is an alien species (within the meaning of the Biodiversity Convention); but

(b) is not capable of:

(i) infesting humans, animals or plants; or

(ii) acting as a vector for a disease; or

(iii) causing disease in any other way.

So it would seem that the bill sets out to cover the field in dealing with pests, and to look at pests that are and are not capable of infesting humans, acting as a vector for disease, or causing disease in any other way.

When we go to the relevant section dealing with a declaration of a biosecurity emergency, which is section 443, we find:

(1) The Governor-General may declare that a biosecurity emergency exists if the Agriculture Minister is satisfied that:

(a) a disease or pest is posing a severe and immediate threat, or is causing harm, to any of the following on a nationally significant scale:

(i) animal or plant health;

(ii) the environment;

(iii) economic activities related to animals, plants or the environment; and

(b) the declaration is necessary to prevent or control the establishment or spread of the disease or pest in Australian territory or a part of Australian territory.

All of that is subject to note 2, which states:

This Part does not apply in relation to invasive pests …

All of those invasive pests are excluded for the purposes of declaring a biosecurity emergency. I think this is a serious deficiency in the bill. There are many alien invasive pests that are not capable of infesting humans, animals or plants and acting as a vector for disease or causing disease in another way which could well and truly constitute an emergency. The example that comes immediately to mind is our new visitor to Western Australia, the cane toad, which the good people of Queensland brought to our shores, and it has been making its way westward, seeking a better place to live, ever since. It seems to me that some future invasion of a pest like that of the cane toad should rightly be regarded as an emergency, yet this bill specifically excludes invasive pests from being defined as a biosecurity emergency. This seems to me to be a rather serious shortcoming in this bill.

The next thing that attracted my attention as I flicked through the bill were the provisions dealing with entry requirements to the country. When dealing with entry and exit requirements, section 44 provides:

(1) This section applies for the purpose of preventing a listed human disease from entering, or establishing itself or spreading in, Australian territory or a part of Australian territory.

(2) The Health Minister may determine one or more requirements for individuals who are entering Australian territory at a landing place or port in accordance—

in accordance with provisions within the act. It goes on in a few subsections later to say:

… Without limiting subsection (2), the determination may specify one or more of the following requirements: (a) a requirement for an individual to provide either:

…   …   …   

(b) a requirement for an individual to complete a questionnaire on his or her health, which may include confirmation of whether the individual is undergoing or has undergone specified treatment within a specified previous period;

(c) a requirement for an individual to provide a declaration in relation to a specified listed human disease;

(d) a requirement for an individual to provide a declaration or evidence of where the individual has been before entering Australian territory;

It goes on with all the requirements that the health minister may determine. That is all good and well. I think it is appropriate that the health minister should determine requirements along those lines. Let us turn to section 46, which deals with civil penalties for failing to comply with certain entry or exit requirements. These are the requirements that the minister has determined under section 44, and if you fail to comply with them you are subject to penalties. It states:

An individual to whom a requirement determined under section 44 4 (entry requirements) applies must comply with the requirement.

There is no discretion there. It is a requirement and it must be complied with. Subsection (2) and (3) go on in the same vain that the requirements must be complied with.

And then there is this section, which attracted my attention. It states:

(4) To avoid doubt, an individual may contravene subsection (1) or (3) of this section even if the individual is not able to comply with the requirement.

This section concerns me a great deal. It is one thing to say that requirements must be complied with—they are requirements, so one would presume that they must be complied with—but I can envisage a range of circumstances in which a person might not be able to comply. The person might be desperately ill. The person might be disabled. The person might be from a non-English speaking background with regard to the completion of a form that the minister might require. I am concerned about subsection (4). It says that even if you are not able to comply—and the bill presumes that the person concerned just cannot; they are not putting it on, they cannot comply—they will be deemed to have contravened the section and be subject to a civil penalty of 30 penalty units. I am not sure how much 30 penalties is when you translate it into dollars, but I am sure it is not an insignificant amount.

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Back ): $5,000.

Senator BULLOCK: I am very grateful to you, Mr Acting Deputy President, for whispering to me that it was $5,000. It is not peanuts, indeed. So this is a serious penalty, and even the legitimate inability of a person to be able to comply with that requirement will not prevent them from feeling the force of this law. I am concerned about that provision. I think it should be reviewed and removed and that the mandatory nature of the 'must require' in the bill be sufficient. If a person cannot comply then it is something they could use in defending themselves against the charge that they have failed to comply with the provision with which they must comply.

Another issue which attracted my attention in the bill was the change in the definition of the 'quarantine zone' It has long been the case that Australia's exclusive economic zone, extending 200 nautical miles from the coast, has been the benchmark for establishing requirements for quarantine. That is no longer the case. The bill says in section 12:

A reference in a provision of this Act to Australian territory is a reference to:

(a) Australia, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands and any external Territory to which that provision extends; and

(b) the airspace over an area covered by paragraph (a); and

(c) the coastal sea of Australia, of Christmas Island, of Cocos (Keeling) Islands and of any other external Territory to which that provision extends.

Note 2 to that provision refers to 'The definition of coastal sea of Australia or an external Territory in subsection 15B(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.' As I understand it, that definition extends the coastal sea only 12 nautical miles from our coast.

Like you, Acting Deputy President Back, I come from Western Australia. Off our shores are riches beyond comprehension, which we are endeavouring to exploit. The biosecurity regimes employed on those rigs and operations off our coast are renowned for being of an exceptionally high standard. The vessels servicing those offshore installations can today leave the mainland, supply the offshore installation and return, and remain comfortably within the 200-nautical mile border of our exclusive economic zone. But that will be the case no more under the terms of this bill. Those vessels will be leaving Australia and then returning and having to meet all of the compliance requirements as if they had come from foreign shores. This is something that has concerned the Australian Shipowners Association. They have said:

This change will result in an enormous compliance and operational burden for thousands of vessel movements compared to the handful of international facilities that previously required quarantine clearance each year.

They are concerned, as they say, that this will result in an enormous operational burden for thousands of vessels. The Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association share those concerns. They say that they estimate that the change in this definition will add compliance costs of $10 million a year. Our LNG industry, which is soon to be leading the world, is facing an extra $10 million a year in costs. For a government that is committed to cutting red tape, this is just a ridiculous additional expense. At the stroke of a pen, by changing the definition of our maritime boundary in this way, it is imposing that sort of a cost on our industry for no good reason, when the facilities that the industry visit offshore are of renowned biosecurity standards. Again, that provision needs to be revisited.

I understand it is suggested that it will all be sorted out in the regulations. That is another issue that we are very concerned about, because we have not seen the regulations. When the Labor Party had carriage of these sorts of measures, it brought forward at the same time, in draft form, some regulations that people could see to see whether concerns such as this—a $10 million impost on the shipping industry—were going to be adequately addressed. The Australian Shipowners Association say this:

"We'll sort it out in the Regulations" is not a satisfactory basis for industry to be assured that the requirements will not pose an excessive burden.

They are absolutely right, and they are echoing the concerns that the Labor Party has raised that the regulations are nowhere to be seen. This legislation operates at quite a high level, with the nuts and bolts hidden in unseen regulations that we really do need to examine before we can cast a judgement as to whether or not this bill is deserving of being passed. That is a third issue that I have drawn from the provisions of this bill.

There are other issues that have arisen in more recent times. For example, I am sure everyone is concerned about the 27 Australians who have been infected with hepatitis A as a result of the importation of berries into this country from China. I am sure that the average Australian thinks that somewhere along the line these contaminated berries slipped through a sound testing regime, that somehow there was some failure with the tests that would normally be applied to detect hepatitis being brought into this country on berries or anything else, and that these berries just slipped through the net. I think that was generally the feeling of senators at estimates—that somehow this had been an anomalous breach of a testing arrangement, which the department should explain. I was not convinced that that was the case, so I asked whether they had the capacity to test for hepatitis. The answer was a shocking no; there was no testing for hepatitis A or any other pathogens, merely for some chemical residues in imported foodstuffs. That is something that I am sure the people of Australia would be very concerned to know.

The bill defines an appropriate level of protection, which I am sure will come to be called an ALOP, for the high level of sanitary protection aimed at reducing biosecurity risks to a very low level but not zero. I am very concerned that we as a country have not learnt from the other outbreaks of hepatitis A, in this country and around the world, and have so far taken no action. In 2009, a multistate outbreak of hepatitis A affected 280 people in Australia. As far as I have been able to ascertain to date, there were no steps taken to prevent a repeat of this outbreak associated with any of the foods known to be a real risk of carrying hepatitis A. There is a list. Pomegranate seeds, tomatoes and, surprisingly, berries are commonly known to carry hepatitis A. But it is not just in Australia. Just a couple of years ago, there was an outbreak of hepatitis A, associated with frozen berries, in several European countries. It affected some 1,318 people between January 2013 and April 2014. I have not been able to find out any steps that have been taken to protect Australia from a similar outbreak. Authorities in Ireland and Italy recommended that consumers boil their berries. If similar advice had been issued here, perhaps we would not have suffered the outbreak that we did. There have been a range of measures taken by other countries to reduce the chances of hepatitis A contamination.

Now we have in Australia the Biosecurity Bill that is before the Senate. Will the Biosecurity Bill improve things? I have got no idea, because this bill does not deal with matters at that level. The answer to these questions will be in regulations, which we have not seen. Until we have got a good view of what the whole package of this legislation offers us, we should be very cautious in dealing with its terms. We have consistently said we need to see the regulations. Issues like the hepatitis A outbreak are certainly sufficient to attract our attention in the biosecurity area, and yet there can be no confidence, based on this bill alone—without the material that we have not seen—that we will have those issues resolved.

I was going to talk briefly also about the importation of prawns and the level of antibiotics that is found in prawns from Vietnam. (Time expired)

Senator RHIANNON (New South Wales) (18:24): I rise to speak on the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and four separate but related bills. My colleague senator Rachel Siewert has set out in a detailed way why this bill does need to be supported but it needs to be strengthened to gain that support. The majority committee report has a number of very useful recommendations regarding the bill, and the Greens amendments detail why we need to protect our environment, our industry and our economy. Biosecurity issues go to the very fabric of society. They are just so important.

In these introductory remarks, I would like to give particular emphasis to the issues of the health of our communities and the health of our agriculture. In many ways, these are the two key factors when one starts talking about biosecurity. I acknowledge that there is obviously a huge impact—and I will deal with this later—in relation to trade from this country and therefore our wider economy.

Biosecurity risks are very real, and the current framework we have and the legislation we have before us highlight the need for a comprehensive overhaul and far-reaching improvement. Unfortunately, the coalition and Labor are often conflicted when we get into the details of what needs to be dealt with here. Having said that, I do not doubt the commitment that many on all sides of politics have to addressing biosecurity. So many members have spoken about it with understanding, recognising the need to take this issue very seriously. Members have spoken with passion about the need for a comprehensive, responsible response. However—and it is a big qualifier—the profits of agricultural businesses, many of them giant multinationals, and the trade deals that are pushed and backed by conservative governments, are obstacles. When they butt up to our consideration of biosecurity, too often biosecurity measures are weakened. That needs to be put on the table and recognised, because it reminds us why this bill needs to be tightened.

I want to return to some of the work of my colleague Senator Siewert. We have important recommendations, from the committee that looked at this bill, about how we can strengthen the bill, and we have the extensive work that Senator Siewert has undertaken over many years. The comprehensive amendments that we will be putting forward cover a range of issues, and I want to consider some of these, because I think they should be front and centre while we are in the second reading debate.

There is the all-important need for the creation of a separate biosecurity agency. The director of that agency should be separate from the Department of Agriculture secretary. This is one of the things that you see as a theme through the suggestions that the Greens are making. We need the expertise and we need the independence, and that needs to be in legislation. Enshrining the independence of the inspector-general is very important. It needs to be done in legislation by reintroducing the Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill 2012.

Then we have the need for draft regulations, but they should be provided to the committee and industry stakeholders for review. I will come back to this issue about the regulations, because there is a real weakness with this legislation—a failure on behalf of the government to ensure that the regulations are front and centre before we sign off on this legislation.

We know consultative arrangements are needed. That should be a priority. A prime example here is the need for the Eminent Scientists Group to be established in the legislation itself. If it is not there, we do not have confidence in how this is going to play out. We need to establish a body that can act on environmental health in the same manner as Plant Health Australia and Animal Health Australia. That is clearly needed. What we need is not only for that to be established, obviously, but for it to be thoroughly resourced. We need to use this body to establish partnerships between communities, governments and environmental businesses—those people who are working in this area. That is a key role; it needs to happen. It is needed in order to deliver on high-priority policy and planning issues within biosecurity. This really goes to the heart of dealing with biosecurity—how we are going to be organised. This is where we feel there is a failure with what we have before us at the moment.

We are also suggesting there is a need for a category of biosecurity zone for high-value conservation areas. This should be the basis for implementing biosecurity measures, plans and monitoring. We need to state clearly those regional variations, both on land and in the marine environment, and that they need to be considered in biosecurity import risk analysis.

I mentioned before resources and, to give that more emphasis, there needs to be sufficient funding allocated by the government to ensure that the arrangements that are proposed under the bill can be properly implemented. I also want to mention the precautionary principle. My colleague, Senator Larissa Waters, will go into this in more detail. This is a prime area where we need the precautionary principle in place. That is the very foundation of how decisions and actions should be taken forward. The precautionary principle is something that should be so integral to life and to the work of government in the 21st century. It is still not given enough emphasis at all, and that is why I was so pleased to see that my colleagues have been raising it in a very comprehensive way.

To elaborate further on the need for the biosecurity agency that I have mentioned, and the need for it to be separate from the Department of Agriculture's secretary, that is something I have given some coverage to. Then there is the issue of the inspector-general. We see that this should be a statutory position. It is very important for this position to be independent. The decision to not create a statutory inspector-general position we see as one of the most significant differences between the 2012 and the 2014 versions of the bill. It goes back to the point I made in my opening remarks about the conflict the major parties have when they come to deal with this issue, because biosecurity butts up against the trade deals they are doing and how they work with big agribusinesses. Again, this position is urgently needed. The dropping of the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, proposed in the Biosecurity Bill 2012, remains one of our big disappointments. The minister, when the minister comes in at the end of the second reading debate, really should address this issue—he should put on the record why that has happened.

I also want to take up and make reference to some of the important work undertaken by the Invasive Species Council. I found their submission and I have been aware of their work over many years; it has been very useful here. The Invasive Species Council submission to the inquiry outlined why it is not suitable for the minister to have the level of control currently set out. The Invasive Species Council submission made a very useful contribution here and I will share some of it with you:

The Minister for Agriculture has a clear conflict of interest as both Minister administering biosecurity legislation and person responsible for reviewing biosecurity performance. The areas subject to review are likely to be influenced by political considerations, and matters that could embarrass the government of the day are likely to be avoided. The risk of this would be substantially reduced and the public would have greater trust in the reviews if they were initiated and conducted by an independent statutory officer.

How can you argue against that? If you are sincere about biosecurity and you really want to ensure that the bill before us is top rate—that it will really work to deliver on biosecurity measures that will protect not just our current arrangements but will be a solid process for decades and generations to come—that needs to be taken on board. That is why the Greens have taken this up very strongly.

I want to move on to the issue of regulations. I know some earlier speakers also spoke about their concern that the regulations are still not known in detail. That becomes a problem because it means that the legislation leaves a significant amount of detail about the practical effects of the reform to what can best be called subordinate legislation. This is something that, again, I would urge senators to consider very carefully. If you are sincere about biosecurity, the detail needs to be there. Again, I would return to the example of the Eminent Scientists Group. We need to get that detail in there because we need to have that independence locked in. It needs to go hand-in-hand with greater transparency because, at the moment, there really is a lack of clarity about the role of external expertise. I find that very concerning. The Eminent Scientists Group is urgently needed. It needs to be locked into the legislation and it needs to be independent. I would really argue that should be obvious.

Another area that is relevant when we are considering biosecurity is what are often called ag-gag laws. These are laws that we often see—

Senator McKenzie: Ah!

Senator RHIANNON: I acknowledge the gasp—that is probably the way I would refer to it—from Senator McKenzie. Maybe it is a favourite issue of hers.

Often at a state level, when you have state legislation on biosecurity, it is cover for introducing laws that are about restricting the role of investigators and whistleblowers who are working to end animal cruelty. It is an issue that also needs to be injected into this debate. First off, I want to put on the record the important role that undercover agents, whistleblowers and investigators play in exposing the abuse of animals. There is already a huge amount of criminal law at a federal and a state level across this country that can allow it to be handled if people believe or are concerned that the law is being broken. But the purpose of ag-gag laws is not about addressing biosecurity; it is about stopping and limiting the opportunities people have to expose animal cruelty issues. I have seen this issue misused on many occasions. People who are taking often personal risks to expose the cruelty to animals are described as a biosecurity risk. That is the total misuse of the term. It really does no credit to those who use it. I notice Senator Back, in many of his speeches about his legislation currently before this parliament and in interviews about it, attempts to make this association, which really does not wash.

The other issue I want to turn to is about international trade agreements. This is something that is very relevant and really does highlight the massive failure of the Liberal-National government when it comes to dealing with biosecurity. How we manage our trade, what deals are made and how the trade is conducted are enormously relevant to biosecurity, particularly for a country like Australia where we know we have an advantage. We are an island—yes, we have a huge border—but being an island does give one some protection.

But trade is the link between Australia, which has been relatively free from so many of these diseases that can wreak such havoc on the health of our agriculture and of our communities, and countries that unfortunately suffer from some terrible diseases amongst their livestock, amongst their agricultural produce. Clearly, how trade is going to operate needs to be open, needs to be transparent and needs to be on the record. But what did this government do? It came up with some arrangements that are the most secret that you could ever imagine. We just cannot get any details about how it is going to operate. That is so deeply offensive. I think it is actually quite insulting to the people who are putting so much time into trying to get this legislation right, to the people who wrote the submissions and to the people who give advice on how we should conduct our biosecurity.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the trade agreement right at the top of the list at the moment that should be out there for the public to scrutinise, to understand. There should be a thorough debate in this place firstly about what it means for the Australian economy, for Australia's environmental and industrial relations standards because we know they are in the target when these agreements operate. But there is also the issue of biosecurity. What does it mean in terms of how trade is conducted? When you hear from the Nationals, you are not going to hear them say, 'Let's learn how our trade arrangements are going to play out in the coming years, the coming decade'.

Senator McKenzie: More jobs in regional Australia.

Senator RHIANNON: I just heard Senator McKenzie say 'more jobs in regional Australia'. The Greens are working hard for more jobs in regional Australia but we want reliable jobs, jobs that are based on industries that are sustainable and on agriculture that is sustainable. If we have biosecurity risks or biosecurity break-outs in our agriculture, that is what is going to devastate jobs in those areas, and this is where Senator McKenzie really trips over her own argument.

Senator McKenzie interjecting—

Senator RHIANNON: I think it is interesting that she comes in with these in interjections. I will listen with interest when the Nationals come in on this debate to see if they have the courage to bring the issue of trade into this consideration of biosecurity. Because if they do not know how our trade is operating, biosecurity is weakened enormously and at least they should acknowledge it. It would be one area where the Nationals should have the courage to break ranks with their partners in government and their partners in crime and have some courage to stand up on this issue. Biosecurity is absolutely central to how the Nationals say they operate but when it comes to the hard issues, they are missing in action. Australian agriculture does depend on high standards.

Senator Nash: Mr Acting Deputy President, I rise on a point of order. I just have to point out to the chamber that the senator is misleading the Senate. Far from being missing in action, the Nationals are actually leading the way.

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Back ): I think that is a point of debate, Senator Nash. Resume, Senator Rhiannon.

Senator RHIANNON: Thank you, Acting Deputy President Back, for your ruling. I was recognising that Australian agriculture depends on the highest standards of biosecurity and that is why the Greens put so much effort into this issue at all stages when it has come before this parliament and in our discussions and consultations with groups in the community.

Pests and diseases can potentially wreak such havoc not just on our agriculture, not just on our health but on the whole economy. That is what is central to this debate. But the problem we have with this legislation now is, yes, it is a step forward, yes there are areas where we can agree but the safeguards are inadequate. We need to address the tough issues. We need to get the transparency right. We need to get the independence right. This legislation has a long way to go if it is going to address the challenges that we will face in this century.

Senator McKENZIE (Victoria) (18:43): I would like to pay a particular thanks to your own role, Mr Acting Deputy President Back, in all matters pursuant to biosecurity over the time that I have been in the Senate. I have seen your involvement in the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee and Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee where we have discussed this numerous times. Your leadership in this area given your background has been significant. I would also like to pay similar respects to Senator Siewert, who, with her agricultural science background, has similarly made a contribution over a long period of time. And obviously Senator Nash as Deputy Leader of the Nationals in the Senate has been a strong proponent of stronger borders when it comes to all things nematode. Sorry—those in the room who know what we are talking about found that joke quite interesting!

It gives me great pleasure to stand today to address the Biosecurity Bill 2014 and related bills. This is a bill that has been a long time in the drafting. I think that in 2012 we had Senator Ludwig begin the process with the Quarantine Act 1908—a fledgling young nation decided to have its own quarantine act—to turn that into a modern-day biosecurity bill that actually addresses all the challenges that an island nation such as ours and an agricultural-producing nation such as ours face. We are a destination for many tourists and travellers, whether by boat or by plane, who can bring significant risk to one of the key economic underpinnings of our nation, and that is our agricultural industry. I like to think that there is a bipartisan approach to ensuring that our borders are safe from disease risks from overseas.

Let me please turn to the bill in front of us. As I said, it is actually built on a long period of work by the Rural and Regional Affairs Committee under the former government. I remember that one of the first inquiries I arrived at when I arrived in this place was around fire blight and the apple industry, which is so important to my home state—in the Goulburn Valley and Shepparton area. We grow a lot of the apples. There were issues around the former risk assessment model that was being used to assess the risk of the trash of apples coming in from New Zealand. It was a severe concern for local growers right throughout the Goulburn Valley.

I remember attending a very large gathering of angry growers and also angry processors and community members in Shepparton, where the local member, Dr Stone, was very loud and passionate in her defence of the local industry. Indeed, I and the then member for Indi, Sophie Mirabella—who was then the shadow industry minister—spoke to the crowd about the risks posed by the importation of apples from New Zealand and that we needed to be forever vigilant in our quarantine and biosecurity measures and in our risk assessment.

The risks are significant. As an island nation we have seen what happens with the Hendra virus, for instance—a disease that attacked our equine industry. That affected millions and millions of dollars and jobs, not to mention the human and animal impact that virus had right throughout the north-east seaboard. So it is a significant issue.

Right now in the modern era it is not a couple of wooden boats that make their way over here from the motherland with some convicts and some brave settlers, but rather 16 million international passengers arriving here every single year, wearing clothes and having walked in dirt, bringing all manner of potential risks with them. That is something that a modern-day biosecurity system actually needs to address. One hundred and eighty-six million mail packages arrive. You can find Glocks mailed from overseas. Any manner of plant or animal material can be mailed and we need a system that can actually assess appropriately the risks contained in those 186 million packages.

In terms of shipping, we have 1.7 million cargo movements and 26 million container consignments. This is a lot of stuff. We are a trading nation. There are a lot of people, a lot of packages and a lot of potential for risk to damage our very clean, green image internationally. Our disease-free status underpins so many of our trade negotiations, which Senator Rhiannon made reference to. It has just been so fantastic, I think Mr Acting Deputy President Back, that the current government has built on that strong trade relationship and the capacity for free trade agreements—and bilateral agreements in the absence of multilateral agreements—to actually develop and grow our regional economies and contribute to the national economy.

The free trade agreements with South Korea, with Japan and with China will absolutely deliver; the opportunities are just so exciting. But we must be very careful that the risks they pose are adequately dealt with; that we do have a system that can ensure confidence for consumers here and, obviously, buyers overseas, that the products they are purchasing—whether locally in supermarkets or overseas as part of an export consignment—are actually disease-free and continue our great reputation internationally.

This is providing the primary legislative means and modern regulatory framework for biosecurity in Australia. It was first introduced in 2012 and referred to the Rural and Regional Affairs Committee, which is a fabulous bipartisan committee which does some really great work. Obviously, that inquiry was put on ice while parliament was prorogued for the last election. So many areas of concern that were raised by that committee, chaired by Senator Heffernan, are identified within this new legislation.

A number of significant reviews have been held of the biosecurity system. Most recently, the review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity—the Beale review—has outlined opportunities to improve the system, and we have taken the opportunity to do that. I think we have heard numerous senators over today and yesterday outline the many benefits that the new legislation will provide.

The import risk analysis review was crucial, and it really did arise from the fact that the matrix used in the previous risk assessment was not appropriate and we needed to review its applicability. We took on board stakeholder concerns around many of the issues that were raised through the fire blight issue with the apples and also zebra chip in our potato industry. There is a great potato industry down in Victoria, down at Koo Wee Rup and across in Ballarat. We grow some of the best potatoes in the land—sorry, South Australia and Tasmania, but I do believe that Vic potatoes are the best!

There were some significant issues with the zebra chip virus, so we need to ensure that the risk assessment is actually adequate. There were significant issues with the old one. So some stakeholders expressed the importance of considering regional differences in biosecurity legislation, and that is another thing that our legislation takes into consideration.

So there has been a wide consultation process. Since 2009, I think, we have been talking about how we can make that 1908 Quarantine Act more functional. We have consulted with over 400 stakeholders to ensure that. It is not just the government; it is primary producers; it is all state and territory governments; it is importers and exporters; it is the wider Australian community. We have had Senate inquiries; we have independent inquiries. The department has been on the ground consulting. So I think the Senate can rest assured that the minister has brought to this place a bill that reflects the concerns, and indeed the solutions, that the community broadly sees that we need in a 21st century biosecurity bill. Over 440 organisations have been included in terms of actually being able to facilitate and develop this bill.

In terms of a deregulatory impact, I know our government is absolutely committed to reducing red and green tape and reducing the regulatory burden on farmers, on communities, on small businesses, on exporters and on importers. Part of that means that our economy is more productive, and that is exactly what this nation needs. I look forward to the Labor Party, and indeed the Greens, supporting us in our efforts to streamline those processes around environmental tape and red tape—processes that have put a stranglehold on the capacity of our small businesses, in particular, to employ more Australians and to get on with doing what we do best, which is growing fabulous, clean, green produce to send overseas. The legislation will have a deregulatory impact of approximately $6.9 million per annum. It is anticipated that the bill will commence 12 months after royal assent, and we are hoping that that can occur by early to mid-2016.

What is the purpose of the Biosecurity Bill? I have touched on a couple of key issues for me as a Victorian senator, and that has been the zebra chip virus, fire blight with our apples. There has also been the issue of the entire Queensland citrus industry being wiped out. This is big stuff. There is the risk of foot-and-mouth disease entering this country and wiping out significant producer holdings and key underpinnings of our rural sector in one fell swoop.

The bill includes managing 'the risk of listed human diseases entering Australian territory or a part of Australian territory, or emerging, establishing themselves or spreading in Australian territory or a part of Australian territory'. Also it deals with the management of risk of causing harm to human, animal or plant health, the environment or the economy; because this government cares about the environment. We want to ensure that our human animal or plant biosecurity framework actually protects our environment. I think our environmental credentials are unparalleled.

It also looks at the management of the risk of ballast waters. When we think about the shipping industry, there are fewer and fewer Australian flagged ships entering our ports. Ballast water can come from far away, and contains many, many risks to our local environment, and it is just being pumped out into our ports. We need to be sure that we have a legislative framework that ensures we can have confidence that that ballast water will not infect and degrade our marine and land environments.

The bill also seeks to remove current complex regulatory requirements and administrative practices in an effort to streamline processes. It is designed to provide greater flexibility for the Commonwealth to manage our biosecurity risks—as I have said—in a much more modern and flexible way. It is designed to have compliance tools which are much more reflective of how best practice exists in today's modern environment.

I did want to touch on a couple of issues, such as how the Biosecurity Bill addresses environmental biosecurity. In this bill we specifically ensure that the environment is protected from biosecurity risks; the same weight is given to that as is given to the harm posed to human, animal and plant health and the economy. So we are actually taking a triple-bottom-line approach to biosecurity risk. How does this risk affect the environment, the economy and our citizenry? And that is actually viewing our nation as a whole and all its components. And I think clause 9 deals with how we are going to do that.

Biosecurity risk is a core concept of the legislation and part of the threshold test for the use of the powers throughout the bill. The bill provides powers to assess these risks where there is an unacceptable level of biosecurity risk and allows measures to be imposed to manage that risk. It is designed to work in conjunction with other Commonwealth state and territory marine protection and conservation legislation, regulations and policies.

The definition of environment in the Biosecurity Bill is consistent with the definition provided under the EPBC Act. And the Commonwealth powers as reflected in the bill have been extended to allow for the management of invasive pests consistent with articles 7 and 8 of the international convention of biological diversity.

I just want to briefly touch on an issue that Senator Rhiannon mentioned, and that is how the Biosecurity Bill gives effect to Australia's international rights and obligations. We talk about FTAs and the importance of having biosecurity measures in our national interest. That is what we are all here to do, to ensure that Australia's best interests are protected by the federal government. We should all be putting our shoulders to the wheel in that effort. I am very proud of our government's efforts in this regard.

The bill allows for the management of biosecurity risk in a manner that is consistent with our international obligations. This includes our obligations under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, the International Health Regulations 2005 and the Convention on Biological Diversity. When we talk about how this interacts with other nations, those other nations that are signatories to those international agreements will find great sympathy with the legislation before the Senate today. We look forward to the support of the opposition, both in the form of the Labor government and the Greens, as this bill will ensure that as an international community we can start to manage some of the global biosecurity risks and ensure that those nations that are disease free continue to maintain that status.

I want to briefly touch on what the process will be for biosecurity import risk analysis. That is contained in chapter 3 of the bill and it is intended to replace the import risk analysis process currently prescribed in the quarantine regulations. As I said, I think that was as a result of very direct feedback from producers, exporters, industry bodies and, indeed, Senate reference committees—of the time—that there was an issue with the matrix. I do not want to get all Neo on everybody, but there was a significant issue with how we were assessing risk under the former process—hats off for actually dealing with this issue. I think our producer bodies will take great confidence from the fact that our government has done the hard thinking, because it is not easy. We had to go international to get expertise in this area and to get some evidence to ensure that we came up with a system that works for us, for our producers and for the type of nation that we want to be in the international environment. We are an island nation. The systems and processes that other countries have in place are not for us. I think it was entirely appropriate that we completely reviewed the IRA—so thank you. We now have the BIRA. It assesses the level of biosecurity risk posed to Australia if a specific good is imported and it considers what conditions, if any, might be needed to meet Australia's appropriate level of protection.

The bill sets out the broad principles and states the powers and obligations relevant to managing our biosecurity risk. It is largely administrative in nature and for this reason the details are to be included in regulations and supporting guidelines rather than in the bill. Earlier, I heard Labor Party senators decrying the fact that the regulations were not in the bill. There is a reason for that: they are heavy to carry around and regulations need to be flexible enough to allow for significant changes without having to come back and re-prosecute the whole bill. I think it is absolutely imperative that ministers and departments have the discretion that the regulatory environment allows them. It is completely appropriate that that level of detail is not contained in the bill. The details that are intended to be included in the regulations and supporting guidelines include the use of independent scientific expert advice. I love that . Every single time we must be using independent scientific expert advice even if we do not like it. Even if you do not like what they choose to put in front of you, you can absolutely have the public debate, but do not hide behind the veil—

Senator Waters interjecting—

Senator McKENZIE: Senator Waters, you are here and I know we can have a coal seam gas argument any time—

The ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT ( Senator Bernardi ): Senator McKenzie, please address your comments to the chair.

Senator McKENZIE: My apologies. I was pushed right back to the by-election where we had a significant win over the Greens on the weekend on the coal seam gas issue. But I digress. I ask the Senate to support the bill. (Time expired)