Mr FRYDENBERG (Kooyong—The Treasurer) (09:33): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

The Treasury Laws Amendment (Making Sure Every State and Territory Gets Their Fair Share of GST) Bill 2018

reforms GST payments to the states and territories (states) by providing a fairer and more sustainable way of distributing GST.

It is a plan that leaves all States and Territories better off.

The Commonwealth makes significant payments to the states and territories. The GST comprises half or well over half of these payments for most states and territories.

The good news for states and territories, is that since 1998 when then Prime Minister John Howard and Treasurer Peter Costello introduced the GST the revenue pool has more than doubled. It is expected to grow anther 65 per cent over the next decade.

However, the system has not been working for everyone. The integrity of the GST was being threatened with Western Australia's share falling to 30c in the dollar. This compares to Victoria and New South Wales getting more than 90c in the dollar and the smaller states higher rates again.

The situation was so ridiculous that Tasmania and the Northern Territory both received more GST revenue than Western Australia, despite having populations that were one-fifth and one-tenth, respectively, of the size of Western Australia's population.

The current system of horizontal fiscal equalisation was effective when the Australian economy and states' and territories' economies were relatively stable.

It is a plan that leaves all states and territories better off, and it's a credit to the hard work and advocacy of my colleagues in this place.

The Commonwealth makes significant payments to the states and territories. The GST comprises half, or well over half, of these payments for most states and territories.

The good news for states and territories is that since 2000, when the Prime Minister John Howard and Treasurer Peter Costello introduced the GST, the revenue pool has more than doubled. It is expected to grow another 65 per cent over the next decade.

However, the system has not been working for everyone. The integrity of the GST was being threatened, with Western Australia's share falling to 30c in the dollar. This compares to Victoria and New South Wales getting more than 90c in the dollar, and the smaller states higher rates again.

The situation was so ridiculous that Tasmania and the Northern Territory both received more GST revenue than Western Australia, despite having populations that were one-fifth and one-tenth respectively of Western Australia's population.

The current system of horizontal fiscal equalisation was effective when the Australian economy and the state and territory economies were relatively stable. It meant that the GST was distributed so that all states and territories had their fiscal capacities equalised to be the same as the broad-based stable economies of either NSW or Victoria.

However, the current system of horizontal fiscal equalisation was not designed to deal with significant economic shocks. The mining boom was an unprecedented shock to the Australian economy. It exposed weaknesses in the system that could not have been foreseen when the GST was introduced. So, after the economic shocks of the past decade, it is time to make improvements to the system.

The way that GST is distributed in Australia has not been updated since it was introduced in 2000.

The coalition government—and I pay great credit to now Prime Minister Scott Morrison—asked the Productivity Commission to reassess how the GST is distributed. The Productivity Commission found that, although the current GST distribution system functions well and achieves high levels of fiscal equity, it can deliver perverse outcomes when there is a significant shock to the economy, such as a mining boom.

The government's interim response, released on 5 July 2018, proposed reforms to the way the GST is distributed that will leave all states better off and protect the integrity of the system.

GST will continue to be distributed using the 'fair go' principle of horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE).

In essence, states should have sufficient resources (fiscal capacity) so that all Australians can have access to vital government services, no matter where they live across the country.

The government's plan will:

First, create a new equalisation benchmark, the stronger of New South Wales or Victoria (whichever is higher). All states will transition to this new equalisation standard over six years from 2021-22 to 2026-27.

Second, introduce a permanent in-system relativity floor of 0.7 from 2022-23, increasing to 0.75 from 2024-25.

Third, permanently boost the GST pool of funds available for distribution to the states and territories, providing direct Commonwealth cash injections each year from 2021-22 onwards. These are in addition to GST collections.

The bill will enable an initial boost of $600 million in 2021-22 and a further $250 million boost in 2024-25, indexed each year to grow in line with the GST.

Fourth, during the transition period from 2021-22 to 2026-27, states and territories will be guaranteed the better of the old system or the new system. This means that, at the end of the transition period, each state and territory will have received the better of the cumulative total over the entire period of either the old system or the updated system. Payments will be verified annually by the Commonwealth Grants Commission over the transition period and any adjustments made accordingly.

Fifth, to be completed by 26 December, the Productivity Commission will conduct an inquiry to assess whether the updated system is working efficiently, effectively and operating as intended.

Sixth, we will separately provide short-term top-ups to Western Australia and the Northern Territory to keep their relativities above 0.7 and 4.66 respectively from 2019-20 to 2021-22.

At the end of this period in 2026-27, Australia will have a horizontal fiscal equalisation system that protects against economic shocks and provides a more stable source of revenue for all states and territories.

The horizontal fiscal equalisation 'fair go' principle has been an important part of our federal financial relations system since Federation. The government's horizontal fiscal equalisation reforms—implemented in this bill—continue to uphold this principle so that all Australians can have access to vital government services no matter where they live across this diverse country. All states will be better off, with the Commonwealth injecting an additional $9 billion over 10 years to 2028-29.

The GST pool from 2026-27 will grow by more than a billion dollars each and every year, compared to what would have occurred without these reforms. Importantly, the additional funding from the Commonwealth will not come at the expense of existing payments to the states and will be provided in perpetuity.

The Commonwealth's projections use the Productivity Commission's estimates, which uses the numbers the states provided them. This additional funding is on top of another $6½ billion in GST receipts states will receive over the next four years as a result of decisions the government has taken since the 2015-16 budget. These include measures such as applying the GST to online purchases and other compliance measures. All that extra assistance is untied funding the states and territories can use to fund hospitals, schools and other essential services.

The government has consulted extensively with all states on its proposal since the release of its interim response. But, unlike changes to the rate and the base of the GST, changes to the distribution of GST revenue do not require the approval of the states and territories. It is the Commonwealth's job to govern for all Australians.

Former Prime Minister John Howard put this best when he said, 'I'm an Australian and, as far as I'm concerned, all Australians should be treated equally no matter where they live.' We have sought the bipartisan support from the opposition and we have made a sensible compromise.

To provide certainty, the Commonwealth is now seeking to legislate these reforms by amending the Commonwealth Grants Commission Act 1973 and the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009. In the end, the GST provides an important source of revenue to the states and territories; however, the viability of the system is only as good as the formula that underpins it and the economy in which it operates.

Australia is seeing strong economic growth, record jobs creation and a federal budget that is on track for a return to surplus. This is not good luck but good management and a product of the policies the coalition has put in place. This positive momentum cannot be put at risk by the opposition's high-taxing and high-spending approach which threatens the reforms that we have underway. This is why the Morrison government and our GST reforms should be supported, because they will deliver real benefits to all Australians. We have provided a national solution to a national challenge. That is what leadership is about.

Full details of the measure are contained in the explanatory memorandum, and I commend this bill to the House.

Debate adjourned.

Mr FLETCHER (Bradfield—Minister for Families and Social Services) (09:43): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

Australia's copyright system provides the legal basis for supporting Australia's creative industries and ensuring that they are viable and successful. It is an essential mechanism for rewarding the creative efforts of authors, artists and musicians, and the investors who take the risks to bring creative works to the market. Our copyright system balances incentives to create and disseminate new works by allowing fair access and use of these works by Australian consumers and other users for public policy benefits.

The Australian government has made two major updates to this system over the past three years. These updates have given the disability, education and cultural sectors enhanced use of copyright material. Those reforms were long overdue and necessary to enable those organisations to go about their normal functions without harming copyright owners. Now it is time to provide our creators and copyright industries with updated tools to ensure their creative efforts do not go unrewarded.

Australian film, television and music is a major success story, and the digital age has created opportunities for consumers to access this content in new and different ways. Streaming of content through providers such as Netflix, Stan and Spotify has opened up new ways of enjoying content. The government encourages the ongoing development and rollout of these legitimate platforms because they enable Australian creators and investors to be appropriately rewarded for their efforts.

But the internet continues to create major challenges for Australia's creative industries. Online copyright infringement reduces the livelihood of Australian creators and investors, and foreign based websites continue to illegally distribute the content of Australian copyright owners. The operators of these sites are often difficult to find and are located in countries that do not have strong copyright laws.

In 2015, the government introduced a website-blocking scheme in the Copyright Act 1968 to provide a means of addressing large-scale copyright infringement by overseas operators. The scheme has been successful. Since it was introduced, a number of sites have been blocked and there has been a reduction in the rate of online copyright infringement by Australian users. Research commissioned by the film industry shows that traffic to blocked sites in the months after blocking dropped by around 50 per cent. That is an encouraging result. But in an environment that is subject to continual change, we need to make sure our regulatory protections are up to date and effective.

Australia's piracy rate still remains higher than in countries with strong copyright enforcement frameworks, such as the United Kingdom and Canada. There is still a proportion of Australian users who seek out infringing sites, and there are still pathways for them to get to these sites, including blocked sites.

In February this year, the government reviewed the existing scheme to determine whether it was operating effectively. In general, this assessment found that the scheme is working well and that blocking arrangements have been implemented by carriage service providers with minimal disruption. However, there are some clear pressure points. First, search engines enable users to discover the existence of blocked websites and provide alternative pathways to get to those sites. Second, the types of online piracy have also become broader, with increased uses of sophisticated online locations, such as 'cyberlockers', that allow mass file-sharing. Third, new pathways to the blocked sites appear after the initial blocking, and these new pathways can't be blocked because they are not part of the original court order. Finally, it can be difficult and costly to determine whether an online location is, in fact, located overseas.

The bill directly addresses these concerns. It will allow injunctions to be made against online search engines, who would be required to take reasonable steps to remove search results that refer users to an infringing online location. This will remove links that allow users to discover the existence of websites that may be the subject of an injunction. Some of these appear on the first page of search results, when they should not appear at all. Search engine results can also disclose alternate pathways to blocked websites, which can undermine the effectiveness of blocking orders.

The bill will provide that an injunction may be granted in respect of an online location that has 'the primary purpose or the primary effect' of infringing, or facilitating an infringement, of copyright. This will ensure that some overseas online locations, such as certain 'cyberlockers', may be captured under the scheme. Some cyberlockers are widely used as sites for sharing infringing music and movie files. At the moment, there is doubt about whether these sites have the 'primary purpose' of infringing copyright, or facilitating the infringement of copyright. The bill will enable sites such as these to be brought within the scheme.

The bill will make clear that the Federal Court has the power to issue responsive and adaptive injunctions, without the need for the copyright owner to go back to the court. This will give the court the power to grant injunctions on terms that allow the copyright owner and carriage service provider, by agreement, to apply the injunction to block other pathways that start to provide access to an infringing site. The bill will also introduce an evidentiary presumption that will provide that an online location is outside Australia, unless the contrary is proven.

None of these measures will impede or affect the capacity for carriage service providers or search engine providers to voluntarily block or remove links to copyright infringing online locations. Indeed, if these voluntary arrangements are effective, injunctions are unlikely to be needed. However, these legislative changes provide an important fallback should industry initiatives prove to be inadequate or ineffective.

The government is seeking quick passage of this bill so that Australia's creative industries can take action to protect their rights. These industries have put in place voluntary measures to make content more accessible and cheaper, and run education campaigns so that Australians are aware of the impact of piracy. It is now appropriate for the parliament to support these efforts by reforming our copyright website blocking scheme to ensure it is fit-for-purpose in a contemporary digital media environment.

I commend the bill to the House.

Debate adjourned.

Mr LITTLEPROUD (Maranoa—Minister for Agriculture and Water Resources) (09:52): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

It is with pleasure that I move the Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Legislation Amendment (Streamlining Regulation) Bill 2018.

Australians need access to safe and effective agricultural chemicals and veterinary medicines. They protect our crops, livestock and domestic pets; safeguard our environment from invasive weeds and pests; and meet consumer needs for things such as household insecticides.

Agvet chemicals, as these products are commonly known, have brought long-term benefits to Australian agriculture by supporting increasing productivity, better quality produce and more competitive industries. Agvet chemicals will play an important part in helping our agriculture sector achieve the $60 billion worth of farm production forecast in 2018-19.

It is important that the regulation of agvet chemicals continues to be streamlined to maximise the benefits for all Australians. It is also imperative to ensure that the strong safeguards built into the regulation of agvet chemicals are not compromised.

Through a cooperative scheme with the states and territories, the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority—the APVMA—is the national regulator of agvet chemicals up to, and including, the point of supply. The APVMA has an important role in ensuring that agvet chemicals supplied in Australia are safe for people, animals, plants and the environment, and don't adversely impact our trade market access.

The APVMA also needs to be efficient and effective in its regulation of agvet chemicals. This bill furthers these objectives by streamlining regulatory processes, while retaining protections for the health and safety of humans, animals and the environment.

The bill makes changes to enable the use of new, simpler processes for chemical product assessment based on risk. These changes support improved access to safe and effective chemical products and reduce costs associated with their registration. They do this by better aligning regulatory effort with risk and reducing red tape.

The bill specifically provides for new prescribed approval and registration processes that will be quicker and less costly than those currently available, while also ensuring these products remain safe and effective. These new processes will apply for those active constituents, chemical products and labels that require minimal or no assessment of technical information.

This measure has the potential to free up the time of the APVMA's assessors so they can focus on more complex assessments.

The bill also provides for incentives for registration holders to include certain uses of chemical products on labels that they would not ordinarily register. This will encourage more minor and priority uses to be added to labels, where the costs of adding those are not justified by the additional commercial returns to chemical manufacturers. For example, where a chemical product is needed to control pests in a high-value, low volume export crop   or where a chemical product is needed for a niche crop or to deal with a particular regional pest.

These uses will improve productivity for farmers by allowing access to a wider range of safe and effective agricultural chemicals.

Similar to the approaches applied internationally, the incentives in the bill operate by extending data protection periods on information for up to five years, if certain uses—such as minor and priority uses—are included on labels. These extensions would be prescribed in the regulations. Based on the experience of these incentives overseas, this could encourage more uses on labels, with significant benefits to Australian farmers.

A further measure in the bill provides for a disallowable instrument to be made by the APVMA in the future to prescribe a scheme for accredited third party assessment providers. This gives the APVMA the flexibility to implement a scheme that allows applicants and the APVMA to use accredited third party providers to undertake assessment services. It ensures though, that the APVMA remains the decision-maker in respect to approvals and registrations.

The bill also includes measures to improve risk communication about chemical products. This increases the transparency of voluntary recalls of agvet chemicals, and modernises the legislation so the reporting obligations are clear for persons recalling these chemicals.

Additional measures in the bill address some deficiencies or inconsistencies in the regulation of agvet chemicals. These are largely minor issues. However, when considered together, they improve the operational efficiency of the APVMA.

The measures in the bill represent a considered approach to improving agvet legislation and have been developed through a program of engagement with stakeholders. The bill has been consulted on publicly and this consultation has confirmed that the bill will deliver benefits to industry, the regulator and our community.

The bill will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the national system for regulating agvet chemicals, while ensuring safe and effective agvet chemicals continue to be available to our community. I commend the bill to the House.

Debate adjourned.

Mr ROBERT (Fadden—Assistant Treasurer) (09:57): I move:

That this bill ne now read a second time.

In the 2017-18 Budget, the government announced that it would establish the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation (NHFIC), a new independent corporate Commonwealth entity, to operate an affordable housing bond aggregator to provide cheaper and longer-term finance for community housing providers. This was intended to ensure that Australians, particularly vulnerable Australians, have more opportunities to access affordable housing.

Prior to the NHFIC Act being passed, the government and the opposition worked together and committed to amendments that would ensure that the board would have the appropriate skills to oversee NHFIC's activities and that after two years a review would be conducted on the operation of the NHFIC Act.

This bill implements this bipartisan commitment by making explicit that the board of the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation must collectively have an appropriate balance of qualifications, skills and experience in a relevant field (being banking and finance, law, housing, infrastructure planning and financing, local government, and public policy), and that at least one board member must have appropriate qualifications, skills or experience in social or affordable housing.

The bill also provides for the statutory review of the operation of the NHFIC Act to occur after the period of two years from the commencement of the act, rather than three.

In addition, the government is bringing forward planned annual appropriations for the purpose of the affordable housing bond aggregator to allow NHFIC to redraw amounts repaid to the Commonwealth. The amendments ensure that NHFIC is better placed to respond to demands from community housing providers. The amendments also provide certainty over NHFIC's available finance in future years so it can commit to potential loan transactions. To facilitate this, the bill provides for the creation of a special account for the purposes of the $1 billion line of credit appropriated to the Department of Treasury for the bond aggregator function of NHFIC.

Upon the commencement of the bill, the $150 million already appropriated to the Commonwealth for the purpose of the affordable housing bond aggregator is credited to the special account. The bill also appropriates the remaining $850 million of the $1 billion line of credit, which is to be credited to the special account over four years from the commencement of the bill.

The amendments fulfil the original intent for line of credit to be ongoing, by providing for the $1 billion to be reused and by avoiding the lapsing of any undrawn funds three years after appropriation.

This bill will help secure and improve NHFIC, who play a key part in the government's plan to help reduce pressure on housing affordability.

Full details of the measure are in the explanatory memorandum. I commend the bill to the House.

Debate adjourned.

Mr HILL (Bruce) (10:00): On behalf of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, I present the committee's report, incorporating additional comments, which I will remark upon in a moment, entitled Report 472: Commonwealth procurement—second report.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

Mr HILL: by leave—I will keep my remarks fairly succinct because there is a lot to say on this report. It covers a huge range of turf—we have been working on it since February. It will be referred to the Federation Chamber for further statements. To precis and signal some of the issues, because members may wish to add their names to the speaking list for further consideration: this is the committee's second report on Commonwealth procurement. It sets out the findings of the committee's inquiry, which is based on three individual ANAO audit reports.

Chapter 2 of the report discusses the committee's findings on Audit report No. 12 of 2017-18, concerning contract management of the telephone universal service obligation by the Department of Communications and the Arts. The Audit Office raised a range of concerns, including value-for-money principles, and concluded that the department had not actively managed the contract towards achieving value for money. The committee was unanimous in that section of the report.

I would note that there is a strong tradition of bipartisanship in this committee. Over the 100 years or so that it's existed there have been very few dissenting reports. It's the mechanism through which the parliament holds the Public Service to account for the expenditure of public money and public administration. However, for the first time in some years now, whilst the committee signed off on the substantive report, we did reach a point after some months of consideration where some members of the committee felt the need to make additional comments which were not agreed to by all members of the committee. They are in relation to the second of the ANAO reports that we considered. In just touching on those, I would note the statement by the chair of the committee, Senator Smith, and thank him for his acknowledgement that he regards this as the committee working as it should. We did sign off on the substance of the report.

Chapter 3 of the report discusses the committee's findings on Audit report No. 9 of 2017-18, concerning management of the preconstruction phase of the Inland Rail program by the Australian Rail Track Corporation. The report reveals through the inquiry some serious concerns regarding the financing and delivery of the $10 billion Inland Rail project. As is well known, it still fails to connect trains to the Port of Brisbane and, curiously, it is being financed by the government off budget, rather than by a grant using an equity injection of some billions of dollars to the ARTC. Just to record two quotes, this should mean—I quote the First Assistant Secretary of the Department of Finance in the inquiry:

The government needs to get a real rate of return on the project over the life of the project.

Yet, astoundingly, through the inquiry we heard the former CEO of the ARTC, John Fullerton, admit clearly to the committee under questioning in a public hearing that the project is never likely to repay its capital cost and provide a return to the government. He stated:

… no, the revenues that flow to us wouldn't cover the full capital cost and provide a return.

Despite questioning, the committee was not able to be assured of or given access to information, even in confidence, that provides an understanding of the expected rate of return of such a significant, multibillion-dollar investment. The point that is made in the additional comments is that, if such investments in rail projects outside the general government sector of the budget were used in this way on a wider scale, this would seriously risk decreasing the profitability of government entities and dividends to governments, repayment of their capital and net value.

So there's a range of concerns raised in the additional comments about the lack of transparency by the ARTC, which point blank refused to address a range of questions that the committee had and hid behind what I consider a spurious defence of legal professional privilege. It's well known in the practice of the Senate and the House that legal professional privilege is not to be used as an excuse to not provide information to the parliament, but we were not able to pursue that further. So, more can be said in the Federation Chamber on that.

The final part of the report is chapter 4, which discusses the committee's findings on Audit report No. 61 2016-17, concerning the procurement of the rather controversial National Cancer Screening Register by the Department of Health. Overall, I consider this a scathing report. It was a unanimous report by a government-controlled committee, which, in my words, slammed the government's failure to deliver the lifesaving National Cancer Screening Register for cervical and bowel cancer. In a recommendation—quite astounding—the committee recommended that the government consider terminating this bungled $222 million contract with Telstra Health. It has been disastrously handled over the last few years. It's cost taxpayers millions, as the committee was told, and risked the lives of Australian women due to delays with the new Cervical Cancer Screening Program, which is replacing the former Pap smear test. The failings are so serious that the unanimous report recommended:

whether, in the circumstances of such serious underperformance by Telstra Health, it may be in the Commonwealth's interests to terminate the contract and pursue other options …

Of course, this contract was rushed into just days before the 2016 election, with a questionable contract signed after a dodgy tender process in which senior health department staff who owned Telstra shares did not declare them when voting on the tender panel. The tender evaluation process was so flawed that the department could not rule out the possibility that, if they'd followed their own procedures in the tender evaluation plan, Telstra Health may not even have been awarded the contract.

Despite the urgency to privatise this register before the 2016 election, we also note that the bowel cancer screening component is nowhere to be found, lost in a dark place, no movement, and the old paper-based system continues. Telstra Health and the Department of Health cannot even guess when the new Bowel Cancer Screening Program might commence, which has left the committee to order six-monthly report-backs on progress until they find out what's going on and can tell us.

We also noted concerns during the inquiry—the subject of much questioning—regarding the impact of the lengthy delay on mortality rates of Australian women. It was a rather Fawlty Towers-Yes Minister kind of episode, because, very clearly, the new register and the HPV tests were intended to 'prevent an additional 140 cervical cancers each year and decrease mortality and morbidity rates by test 15 per cent'. That's from the government's explanatory memorandum. Then there were the press releases from the member for Farrer, when she was the minister, telling us how urgent it was that we privatise this register and pass the legislation. Mysteriously, nothing's happened since they signed this dodgy contract with Telstra Health, and yet they're trying to claim that no women would have died and no new cancers would have been created. So, I think there's more to be said in the Federation Chamber on this. I commend the report to the House and I move:

That the House take note of the report.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER ( Mr Rob Mitchell ): Well done. I thank the member for Bruce. The debate is adjourned and the resumption of the debate will be made an order of the day for the next day of sitting.

Mr HILL (Bruce) (10:08): I move:

That the order of the day be referred to the Federation Chamber for debate.

Question agreed to.

Mrs MARINO (Forrest—Chief Government Whip) (10:08): On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, I present the committee's Report 183: report of the committee visit to India and Indonesia.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

Mrs MARINO: by leave—This report gives an account of the visit by a delegation of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties to India and Indonesia in August, under the program of committee visits to the Asia-Pacific region. In its letter requesting the visit, the committee noted that Australia is currently negotiating trade agreements with both India and Indonesia. As a result, JSCOT believed the delegation would enhance its ability to examine these treaties—and other trade agreements—in any future inquiry.

Over the 22 years of JSCOT's operation, several themes have emerged from inquires into trade and economic cooperation agreements.

The aims and objectives of the delegation were: to inquire into the challenges and rewards of Australian businesses accessing, or attempting to access, the Indian and Indonesian markets; to examine the broader economic context of both India and Indonesia, including opportunities for Australia's further investment and trade; to obtain detailed information on the perspectives of both the Indian and Indonesian executive governments; to examine the mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of treaties, trade and foreign affairs; to identify successful examples of Australian businesses in Indonesia and Indian markets; and to ascertain the factors or criteria that contributed to their success. Discussions were had while we were there with a broad range of government, parliamentary, local and Australian businesses, and these gave the delegation a very nuanced picture of the trade and investment relationships in both countries.

The delegation expected India to be multifaceted and complex. Even so, the delegation was struck by the sheer scale of the Indian economy, by the complicated regulatory environment and by the cultural and economic differences across the states. This complicated political and economic environment underpinned everything that we, as the delegation, saw and heard, and explains that this complexity requires a careful process of negotiation. The delegation really saw that the opportunities in India for mutual benefit are great and growing, and JSCOT now has a much better understanding of both the trade agreement process and the steps that will be required for Australian businesses to really take full advantage of the opportunities in India.

In Indonesia, we had the opportunity to gain a different perspective on Australia's international trade relationships. We are really pleased to see that since the visit Australia and Indonesia have successfully concluded negotiations on the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. It's clear that there is potential to strengthen our economic and security cooperation with one of our major trading partners, that being of course, Indonesia. It is a country that has tremendous potential for economic growth, and the delegation was particularly pleased to meet with New Colombo Plan scholars and to see the growth of person-to-person—people-to-people—contacts and links to match our already strong links in security, tourism and education in Indonesia.

The delegation would like to thank DFAT officers for what was exceptional support provided by them in each location—a great program—and to thank everyone who made the time to meet the delegation with the warm hospitality the delegation was shown on so many occasions. We appreciated not only the expertise but the exceptional candour and frank assessments of everyone who we spoke to and who spoke to us. I want to acknowledge all the members of the delegation for their time and effort, and thank them for all the time they put into this particular delegation. I want to thank the then chair and also the secretary, Lynley Ducker, for her outstanding efforts during this delegation.

It really was a great privilege for the delegation to travel and engage at a personal level with a wide variety of people and organisations. We not only heard about India and Indonesia but also had the opportunity to explain the parliamentary role and the important oversight that is conducted by JSCOT. I thank the House.

Mr DANBY (Melbourne Ports) (10:13): by leave—I want to join the Chief Government Whip in expressing my appreciation of this important visit by JSCOT to India and Indonesia. Unfortunately, I was only able to participate in the Indian section of the visit. I think that as Australian MPs we learnt a great deal of important things, particularly from my point of view, about India.

We observed the Indian parliament in action, and it was a particularly interesting session that we attended. There was a debate on a proposed amendment to their constitution, with a 123-amendment bill. The bill sought to grant constitutional status to the National Commission on Backward Classes. That sounds a pretty arcane term in this parliament, but it refers to castes which are socially, educationally and economically disadvantaged. It is very interesting to see, as part of India's progress, that the disadvantaged castes are being legally addressed by the Lok Sabha and are being brought into equality—a very, very good thing from India's point of view.

We had a chance, as the Chief Government Whip said, to observe economic reform in that great country and to look at the possibility of a free trade agreement with Australia. I have to report—I think it was the view of the delegation—that that FTA is going to take a great deal of further work, because most of the Indian economic policymakers were interested in focusing on their huge economy rather than even trade with the outside world or the importance of FTAs with Australia or, indeed, other countries.

I would say, however, from our meetings with Australian businesspeople operating in India, that the abolition of different GSTs by states and the consolidation of them by the Lok Sabha has had an amazingly productive effect—just like the change in the Indian currency. The Indian government is to be congratulated on doing this, and it's made the doing of business between states in India—some of which, of course, are bigger than Australia, certainly in population size—a great deal easier, and we heard many commendations from Australian businesses about the benefit of that.

We had an extraordinary insight into Indian culture. We had a tour of the National Gallery of Modern Art in India under the auspices of Adwaita Gadanayak, who was a great host. Also, in Mumbai, we met the Governor of Maharashtra, C Vidyasagar Rao, who took us through the governor's palace.

The last point I would make is that we also gained an extraordinary insight into the political developments in Pakistan, being very close to them at the time of their national election. The widespread view was that the new Prime Minister of Pakistan is very close to the Pakistan Army and that little progress can be expected of the new government of Pakistan, in engagement on security issues with India and the rest of the world, unless the Pakistan Army is involved in those discussions, because the impression, certainly throughout India, was that they were the people strongly behind him.

Mr ALBANESE (Grayndler) (10:18): This bill, the Maritime Legislation Amendment Bill 2018, seeks to clarify legal questions concerning the nature of marine orders made by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. Its practical effect would be to ensure that marine orders have the same legal status as regulations, including that they include penalties for noncompliance. The changes make sense, and they have my support.

Where there is confusion or doubt on whether the legislation accurately reflects the intentions of the parliament, we must make whatever changes are necessary to clarify the collective will of this parliament. Indeed, we should always ensure that parliament provides the community with certainty in the law.

However, while we're considering this important issue, we should also reflect on our responsibility to provide certainty over the existence of an Australian shipping industry and certainty as to the jobs that Australians rely upon. For the past five years, this government has undermined Australian shipping, seeking to expose it to unfair competition in coastal trade from foreign-flagged vessels paying their crews third-world wages. This has created five years of uncertainty for the Australian shipping industry and Australian seafarers.

Labor will always support changes that enhance Australian shipping, create jobs or, as is the case today, amend legislation to clarify legal ambiguities. But what we won't do is undermine Australian industry and undermine Australian jobs. Put simply, those opposite want to replace the Australian flag on the back of Australian ships with the white flag of surrender when it comes to Australian jobs. That is the wrong approach. We should be nurturing the Australian shipping industry. We should be promoting job creation and job security. That's the principle behind the amendment that I will now move. I move:

That all the words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:

(1)notes that:

(a) despite the Government’s repeated claims, its proposed changes to coastal shipping legislation are all about eliminating Australian jobs, and ultimately the entire domestic industry; and

(b) during this Government’s period in office, 12 previously Australian-flagged vessels have been reflagged to foreign States; and

(2)reaffirms that:

(a) it is in the national interest to ensure a level playing field between foreign and domestic shipping operators; and

(b) Australia’s vital economic, environmental and national security interests are best served when there is a viable, competitive and growing local shipping industry".

Can I outline the context of this legislation that's before the House today? The Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 and the Navigation Act 2012 give AMSA the ability to make what are known as marine orders. Marine orders are designed to be legislative instruments allowing AMSA, as the regulator, to keep pace with developments in a rapidly changing industry. Essentially, the idea is that these regulations can be changed at periods of time in order to ensure that the appropriate regulatory regime is kept up-to-date and that there is certainty and consistency. Indeed, when the Navigation Act 2012 was introduced, it replaced the Navigation Act 1912—for 100 years we'd sat on that legislation. It took a Labor government to modernise the legislation that covered Australian shipping.

Marine orders are generally practical in their nature. For example, marine order 15 relates to fire protection for ships. Marine order 17 concerns regulations for carrying dangerous liquids. The original intention of marine orders, as defined in the Navigation Act 2012, was that they would be legally enforceable and, particularly, would include a provision for penalties for noncompliance. However, the government has lately faced some legal questions concerning the enforcement of marine orders. This legislation clarifies the situation by giving marine orders the status of regulations, as was the original intention. The amendment to the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 inserts a definition for 'regulations' that includes marine orders, with relevant exceptions. The amendment to the Navigation Act 2012 makes the same change. Labor supports these changes. There's no room for legal ambiguity over issues such as the ones that I raise: fire protection and the carriage of dangerous liquids. These are not issues of partisan disagreement; they are issues of common sense. As the national regulator, AMSA does a very good job in this regard.

The parliament should also provide clarity over the security of the Australian coastal shipping industry, because the existence of this sector is fundamental to our national interest, given that we are an island continent. Yet, from the moment the coalition took office, and indeed before that, they have sought to undermine the industry. They want to cut costs, without any regard to whether that cost cutting is actually real. It is so dedicated to undermining the people who work in the Australian industry who happen to be members of trade unions that their solution to eliminating members of the maritime sector who are trade unionists is to eliminate the jobs that exist. That's their plan. No maritime sector? No Maritime Union of Australia. This is the logical conclusion of anyone who actually looks at the legislation that's been put forward by the government opposite. Tragically, it has been the National Party that has been in charge of this—the National Party, the party whose name implies standing up for the national interest, the party which historically arose out of an approach, in part, to protectionism and regulation of Australian industry.

Now, we don't say that there should be a protectionist model in the Australian shipping industry. We don't go the way that many countries have gone—for example, the United States with the Jones Act, where, if you want to take goods from San Francisco to Los Angeles, you have to have a US flagged ship built in the US and with US seafarers on it. It is a completely closed system for their coastal shipping. Indeed, Australia has one of the most open systems in the world. But what we don't support is the idea that an Australian flagged ship should have to compete with a foreign flagged ship with fewer regulations, less maintenance and less wages, because we know that that isn't a level playing field. That's why the 2012 reforms sought to genuinely have a level playing field through a range of measures, including taxation measures, so that the cost differential between a ship that was flagged in a Third World country or a country like Singapore that has a zero rate of taxation would not be at an advantage over an Australian ship.

The fact is that the changes that were sought in 2015 were about eliminating the Australian shipping industry. It actually said it in the regulatory impact statement, where it said that 93 per cent of the savings that were estimated to result from that legislation were a direct result of the difference between Australian wages and foreign wages. It also said that it anticipated that the Australian flag would be removed from ships and be replaced by foreign flags. We saw that in really practical and specific terms as the debate went on.

Perth businessman Bill Milby of North Star Cruises came to a seminar. In all of the seminars and launches of this policy the big hint was where the National Party ministers launched the policy. They launched it at events hosted by the foreign shippers. It was a bit of a hint. It's a bit like when Pauline Hanson moves a resolution on race: you kind of know where that's going. So you launch a policy that you say is about the Australian shipping industry and you launch it at an event hosted by foreign shippers—and, of course, foreign shippers are called Shipping Australia. That's what the foreign shipping organisation is called, because they know that it's untenable not to be seen to be supporting Australian shipping, because most Australians would think it's just a bit of common sense to have an Australian shipping industry as we are an island continent.

Bill Milby, a quite successful businessman and owner of North Star Cruises, goes along to this forum. He's listening to what these reforms are and he's a smart fellow. This business has been operating up around the Kimberley very successfully. It has been employing Australians and bringing dollars into the Australian economy from international visitors who, as Mr Milby says, actually want to hear an Australian accent while they're travelling around the pristine areas of the Kimberley and northern Australia. He has provided employment for crew, for cooks and for all the people who work for his company.

He goes up to the deputy secretary of the department and says: 'I can't see how, if these changes come in, I can compete. How can I possibly compete?' and he is told, 'Well, this is how you compete: you replace the Australian flag on the back of your vessels with a foreign flag and you replace your Australian staff with staff from the Philippines or some other nation. That's how you compete.' That's what he was told. He gave this evidence at the Senate committee into the legislation. He has said this outside of parliament as well. We know it's true because the legislation said it was in the regulatory impact statement. Quite extraordinary. Here we had an Australian government proposing legislation and providing advice to businesses that was specifically designed to put Australians out of work. In more than two decades in this place, I've never seen such a flagrant betrayal of the national interest by representatives in this chamber.

But the fact is that crossbench senators wouldn't have a bar of it. They put the national interest first. Former Senator Nick Xenophon, when I went to see him about the legislation, said, 'Well, I always vote for second readings.' In general, the crossbench has had a view that you vote for the second reading—not the amendments; the second reading—because it allows for further debate. It may well be that there are amendments that make legislation acceptable. But what happened with this legislation is it didn't even get a second reading. That's how bad it was. That doesn't happen too often in the Senate. I've dealt with a range of legislation in my portfolio, and it's the only time I can remember that they just said, 'No, go away; this is absurd.'

Just last month there was another tranche of legislation debated here in the House of Representatives. They came back. We had Minister Truss introduce the first legislation. Then we had Minister Chester introduce the second bit of legislation. We had Minister Joyce sit on the legislation. Then we had Minister Cormack. It's a revolving door. This mob speak about the parliament. I'd like to be able to say to the House that I, as shadow minister, am the best shadow minister there's ever been because I knock over a minister every few months. But I can't, in all honesty, say that this isn't self-inflicted as much as anything else. The fact is that last month we had debate on the latest tranche of legislation, maritime legislation from 2016. It took from 2016 to 2018 to get a second reading debate in this place. They'll go through another four ministers before it gets to the Senate. It's just extraordinary. The fact is, in spite of the government saying that they'll consult with Labor about shipping legislation, they essentially haven't sought to get any bipartisanship—you have one meeting, then the next time there's a new minister. Maritime Industry Australia Limited, MIAL, the peak industry body, a bunch of businessmen involved in an industry, regard the government as having treated them with contempt, because the consultation for the new legislation was all with the foreign shippers rather than with them as well.

Why do we need a shipping industry? Firstly, of course, it's clearly in our national economic interest. We are a maritime nation. Most of our exports and imports, close to 99 per cent of them, come and leave via our coast on ships. We rely on the maritime sector to train the people who become harbour masters and run our ports. It is essential for our national economy that those skills be maintained.

Secondly, there is the issue of our environment. We know that every time a major incident has occurred—Shen Neng;Pacific Adventurer—they have something in common: there's a foreign flag on the back of the ship. People aren't as familiar with our coastlines, with the pristine nature of our reefs. The accidents that have occurred have caused great damage, but the potential is there for a catastrophic event that would have enormous impact on our national economy.

The third reason is national security. There's a direct link between the defence industry and our merchant fleet. That's why, when we established an organisation to look at the maritime workforce development, we had the Navy represented on it. It was chaired by a former Public Service Commissioner. We had the Navy, we had the Australian shipping industry, we had the Maritime Union of Australia, we had the Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers and we had the Australian Maritime College down at Launceston. They all came up with a plan for workforce development, a common interest. They had funding of just $5 million from the government to make this plan work. What did this government do when they came to office? They scrapped it. They took the $5 million and scrapped the plan. The fact is that there is a direct link, and, in times of conflict, the merchant fleet has suffered great losses—during World War II, for example.

When this government speak about national security, when they speak about us stopping boats, we didn't think that meant stopping ships with an Australian flag on the back, but that's precisely what they've done. They've done it through abuse of the existing regulations. Take, for example, the Portland.The Portland operated from Portland in Victoria, where the refinery is, picking up the natural resources from over in Western Australia and essentially going to and fro with the natural resources, down to Portland and back again. There was nothing temporary about it. It was a permanent, two-destination voyage that had operated for many years. Yet this government allowed it to be replaced with a foreign-flagged vessel with a foreign crew. The government said that the journey and those regional jobs based in regional Victoria could be replaced by jobs offshore in the Philippines and other destinations. Somehow that was temporary. It's just a complete abuse of the legislation; it's an outrageous indictment of the government's failure to implement what is the law. Yet the government, of course, were completely determined to do that, because they don't seem to understand the synergy which is there between our naval and our merchant fleets.

Our Australian seafarers undergo very stringent background checks. They have to have an MSIC. Foreign seafarers don't have MSICs, but they operate in our ports and in our harbours. The government should think about where ships are, what they have on board and the potential issue for national security that this represents if the proper checks aren't made. I say to the government: don't say that you didn't know about it if there is an incident. Don't say it, because this is called Hansard, and I'm saying in it that there are national security interests in Australia having an Australian fleet operating around our coasts. And don't say that you don't understand the economic reasons for why we need an Australian shipping industry. Don't say that you're not aware of the Pasha Bulker, the Shandong Hai Wang, the Pacific Adventurer and, in New Zealand, the Rena, which I flew over with the New Zealand transport minister. Essentially, that incident had an enormously damaging impact on the environment and also on the economy of the region around Auckland and the north coast of the North Island of New Zealand.

The fact is that Labor does understand the importance of the shipping sector and the need to provide Australian seafarers with secure work. In government we created the Australian International Shipping Register, allowing operators of Australian-flagged vessels to employ mixed Australian and foreign crews on internationally agreed rates and conditions. We enacted the first major rewrite of the nation's maritime laws. That was consistent with the other work that we did on the National Ports Strategy. We made sure that the oil companies pay for any and all damage their ships may cause. We had to fix legislation to fix that. We replaced the myriad laws that operated separately from state to state with just one national regulator administering one set of modern nationwide laws.

By contrast, the coalition have completely undermined the Australian shipping industry. As I said at the outset, I'm all for certainty in legislation, but I'm also an advocate for job certainty for Australian seafarers and investment certainty for the Australian shipping industry. It is in Australia's economic, environmental and national security interests to maintain a vibrant Australian shipping industry. It is also the case—to give a comparison that I think is appropriate—that, if you want to take freight from Sydney to Melbourne down the highway, you use a truck that's registered in Australia; you have a truck driver with an Australian licence; and you are obligated to pay Australian wages. If you take those same goods down the blue highway, which is free from Sydney to Melbourne, you can have a foreign-flagged ship with foreign wages and foreign conditions, regardless.

What that does as well, as the Australian rail industry has pointed out, is to distort the market across transport modes towards foreign ships. That's over Australian jobs in the rail sector, in particular, but also in the roads sector. That's a distortion that, again, undermines Australian conditions and wages.

If we're going to compete in the Asian century, we can't compete on the basis of how low we can drive our wages. We need to compete on the basis of how smart we are, how innovative we are, how creative we are as a nation—creating the jobs of the future. This government doesn't seem to understand that. In spite of the Reserve Bank saying that wages being reduced in real terms is a problem for the national economy, in areas like this what we see is that they have contempt for Australian industrial conditions. There should be no difference between the blue highway and the Hume Highway. It's a very simple principle of operation.

The fact is that those opposite do want to replace the Australian flag on the back of Australian ships employing Australian seafarers with the white flag of surrender when it comes to Australian jobs, and it is much to their shame that they remain determined to pursue this course after five years of destructive attitudes towards Australian shipping.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER ( Mr Rob Mitchell ): Is the amendment seconded?

Mr BRIAN MITCHELL (Lyons) (10:46): I second the amendment.

It gives me great pleasure to rise to speak to this bill and particularly to the amendment moved by the shadow minister. I will always get to my feet whenever I can to speak on coastal trading and the maritime fleet in Australia. What's happened under this government and, indeed, under the previous Howard government with respect to our maritime fleet and our maritime workers has been a disgrace in terms of jobs and, particularly, national security and fuel security, which I'll come to a little bit later.

Australia is an island continent, surrounded by water in every direction—north, south, east, west. My own state is an island state of our island country, and we recognise our geographical peculiarity in our national anthem, noting 'Our home is girt by sea'. Unless you fly, the only way to get here is by sea. You cannot drive or walk to Australia from any other country in the world, and in this we are unique. Every other country in the world you can get to by land; this is the only country inhabiting an entire continent and it requires either a plane or a ship to get to it.

You would think that, as an island connected to other nations only by water and air, Australia would have a maritime flee the envy of the world, developed over 200 years of colonial, intercolonial, interstate and international trade. You would think that Australia would be producing the world's best maritime engineers, world-class shipbuilders, the best civilian sailors and officers, the best technicians, the best navigators not only for an Australian fleet but to send out to the world to give the world the best-trained maritime fleet officers and staff. But no. Our maritime fleet in Australia is all but in mothballs, sacrificed on the altar of neoliberalism. Our maritime self-reliance has lost out to greedy corporations and multinationals and to foolish coalition governments more interested in saving a few dollars in sailors' wages than in protecting our national security. We have a government that has absolutely destroyed our domestic shipping industry and annihilated our domestic maritime fleet. For some reason, the coalition—those opposite—has never seen the benefit that these industries offer to Australia and to our economy.

I was at a function at the parliament this week with the Maritime Industry Australia Limited representatives the shadow minister talked about earlier in his speech. At that occasion, the Minister for Defence turned up and extolled the virtues of what he was doing with the Defence program, the shipbuilding, the subs and all that. People were looking on thinking, 'What on earth is this guy talking about?' These were representatives of commercial shipbuilders, and he was going on about a naval shipbuilding program. They could only look on in wonder and think, 'We're missing out on this.' Why can't the minister and this government see that our Defence capabilities are just as important as our merchant capabilities? They just don't see it. They are blind to the implications.

Similarly, they turn a blind eye to the absolute rorting of the temporary licences for foreign vessels in Australian waters. Australia's coastal shipping industry, under various Liberal governments since Howard, has eroded and virtually disappeared. The shadow minister made reference to the Portland, a vessel that travelled the same route between Western Australia and Victoria for 27 years. It was crewed by Australians and flagged as an Australian vessel, but, under this government—under those opposite—it's been allowed to be deflagged and recrewed by foreign crews under foreign conditions, despite plying a domestic route.

If the sea route that it took was just a few kilometres inland, it wouldn't be allowed. It would be illegal to have foreign workers on foreign conditions on a foreign registered vessel adhering to foreign maintenance standards using Australian land based conditions and roads. It would be disallowed. We require that vehicles on Australian roads and Australian highways adhere to Australian conditions and Australian law, but, somehow, even though it's still in Australia but on the water, all those rules are out the window. And why? It's because you save a few dollars in wages. It's an absolute disgrace.

My own state was the sorry last resting place of the Alexander Spirit, the very last Australian crewed fuel tanker, where a crew was basically forcibly removed and told: 'That's it. We're replacing you with foreign crews.' Australia no longer has fuel delivered to Australia by Australians. What does that do to our fuel security? It means we are entirely reliant on foreign nationals and foreign crews in foreign vessels.

Labor supports this bill. As the shadow minister has said, marine orders are critical to the successful operations of ships that come to Australia, and, as such, those marine orders need to be enforceable. There need to be penalties for noncompliance and there needs to be clarity. They are critical components of the successful and safe operation of ships. As regulations made under Commonwealth legislation, marine orders are a flexible instrument that allow our laws to keep pace with the often fast-paced technical and technological change in marine safety and implement Australia's international maritime obligations.

Australia currently has two series of marine orders. One is marine order 198, which generally fulfils our international obligations and expectations and applies to Australian and foreign vessels, as well as some domestic commercial ships. We also have marine orders 500 to 507, which apply solely to domestic commercial vessels. Marine orders dictate behaviour and activity on a range of issues, including fire and emergency safety, garbage and waste disposal, working and living conditions, skill and health requirements for crew, and safe navigation and traffic processes.

All industries are governed by regulations. Whether they be specific to safety requirements or environmental management, they are important components of industry operations. Marine orders, in particular, provide flexible and responsive measures that can fill gaps not filled explicitly by legislation. Marine orders are created by the Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, who delegates their enforcement to a range of AMSA staff. This bill offers sensible and necessary reform. There can be no question, and there must be no question, of the legal authority or enforceability of marine orders.

I come back to the second reading amendment. This government has overseen the demise of our fleet and our capability as a merchant marine nation. I just can't believe what it's done. The shadow minister is similarly aghast at how those opposite almost take perverse pride in what they've achieved with their coastal shipping legislation.

Mr Ramsey: It was Albo's legislation.

Mr BRIAN MITCHELL: No, no. Don't mislead the House. Your coastal trading legislation is decimating Australia's maritime capability. What we on this side of the House did in 2012 was introduce legislation that allowed for temporary licences—temporary licences—which those opposite, in government, have absolutely rorted. As the shadow minister alluded to, we had a system which was a commonsense system whereby foreign vessels importing goods into this country could, upon bringing their goods in, move from one port to another port with the same crew—without having to replace the entire crew with Australians. They were from another country, they'd dropped off their cargo, and they could make another trip on a domestic route. That was a sensible allowance under the temporary licence. What those opposite have allowed is for foreign vessels to come in and then do business, almost exclusively, around the coastal trading routes. That's a big difference, and it's killed the maritime fleet in Australia.

I want to come briefly to an exceptional speech given at the Australian Naval Institute by Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods. He gave this speech at the Australian merchant navy day of remembrance on 8 April this year. He spoke at some length about the contribution of the merchant fleet in wartime. It's often forgotten and neglected when we come to remember those who've sacrificed everything for the nation. We often forget the contribution of the merchant fleet, and the men and women of the fleet. Lieutenant Commander Woods said:

The Merchant Navy of the whole British Empire, which included the Australian Merchant Fleet, suffered proportionately the highest casualties of any of the allied services in the Second World War. Thirty thousand two hundred and forty eight British Empire merchant seamen who served at sea under the red ensign lost their lives doing so. The Australian Department of Veterans Affairs nominal roll records 3,500 Australian merchant seamen serving in World War II in Australian registered ships. The Australian War Memorial has placed the names of 845 of them, who are known to have died on war service during World War II, on the commemorative roll.

These are men, and perhaps some women, who didn't take up arms. They were serving in the merchant fleet during wartime and they died during their service. They were absolutely some of the bravest men and women this country has ever seen. We'll never know the true number of Australians who died, because there were many who served in British and international fleets and they're not included among those 845.

The contribution of the merchant fleet is often forgotten when, on Anzac Day and Remembrance Day, we come to teach schoolchildren about the contribution of our armed services. We often forget the merchant seamen. I'm pleased to say that the War Memorial and the official records don't forget them; they are appropriately recognised in official records. But, in the national consciousness, we often forget the contribution of our merchant seamen. They have made an incredible contribution to this country, and it must never be forgotten.

The lieutenant commander goes on to say:

This omission from the national recollection is most profoundly true of the period of the campaign in New Guinea in 1942. Those brutal battles on the Kokoda track were finally won because the Japanese army was cut off from re-supply and was starved into retreating. First Australian and later also American troops in the jungle and on the northern beaches at Gona and Buna were supplied with bread and bombs, bacon and bullets and fuel in vast quantities from the sea and were therefore able to take the fight back to the Japanese. New Guinea was won back from the enemy by the combination of the matchless courage and endurance of young soldiers and airman ashore and by the merchant seamen afloat who supplied them and the RAN who escorted those ships.

A combined national effort won that iconic battle that turned the tide in that great struggle. It wouldn't have happened without the contribution of the merchant fleet. But where is that merchant fleet today? If we were to have a conflict of that magnitude on our doorstep today, would we be able to resupply our troops from an Australian maritime merchant fleet? No, we would not.

That's why I support the shadow minister's second reading amendment. We must do all we can to rebuild our merchant fleet and support the men and women of Australia's maritime industry.

Mr McCORMACK (Riverina—Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Leader of The Nationals) (11:02): The Maritime Legislation Amendment Bill 2018 makes important machinery changes to the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 and the Navigation Act 2012. These acts establish key parts of Australia's regulatory framework for maritime safety and protection of the marine environment. Primarily, the bill will insert a definition of the term 'regulations' into each act, to clarify that this term includes legislative instruments known as marine orders. This clarification is necessary to ensure the regulatory framework operates as intended. Provisions of each act rely on vessel owners and individual seafarers operating or working on vessels complying with requirements of regulations, such as requirements to hold valid safety or pollution certificates. The bill provides important legal clarity and certainty that existing obligations and requirements for individual seafarers and vessel owners include requirements set out in marine orders.

In practical terms, the machinery changes made by the bill will have no impact on maritime industries operating under these acts. Individual seafarers and vessel owners will continue to comply with the same requirements set out under the existing acts, regulations and marine orders in the same manner as today and continue to be subject to the existing compliance framework. Use of marine orders is a longstanding practice to deal with detailed technical and operational requirements and processes and to give effect to international obligations and standards. Australia's maritime industries are familiar with this practice. Marine orders are used to set out potentially complex standards and requirements in the clearest and simplest manner possible, to help the maritime industry to understand and comply with their obligations.

Use of marine orders also ensures these requirements are set out in a consistent and familiar way which is easily and freely accessible in one place on the Australian Maritime Safety Authority's website. They are also registered and freely available on the Federal Register of Legislation. Marine orders are legislative instruments for the purpose of the Legislation Act 2003, which means that they are subject to crucial parliamentary scrutiny and disallowance. Importantly, the explanatory memoranda for the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Bill 2012 and Navigation Bill 2012 make clear that policymakers intended marine orders, rather than the acts or regulations, to continue to be used to set out these operational and technical matters and requirements, in line with longstanding regulatory practice. This bill gives effect to that intent.

The amendments made by this bill will ensure Australia's regulatory framework for maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment continues to function as intended—efficiently, effectively and consistent with international law. This framework is vital to ensure the safe operation of vessels in Australia's waters and to ensure seafarers and passengers aboard these vessels return home safely.

This framework is also vital for protecting Australia's pristine coastal and marine environments, including our internationally recognised areas of outstanding national significance, such as the Great Barrier Reef. I would like to thank honourable members for their constructive contributions to this debate. I commend the bill to the House.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER ( Ms Bird ): The original question was that the bill now be read a second time. To this the honourable member for Grayndler has moved as an amendment that all words after 'That' be omitted with a view to substituting other words. So the immediate question is that the amendment be agreed to.

Question negatived.

Original question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Mr McCORMACK (Riverina—Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Leader of The Nationals) (11:06): by leave—I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a third time.

Mrs ANDREWS (McPherson—Minister for Industry, Science and Technology) (11:07): For the information of honourable members, I present an addendum to the explanatory memorandum to this bill.

Mr MARLES (Corio) (11:07): I rise to speak on the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018 and to indicate Labor's support for this bill. Labor knows how important it is to make sure our national security arrangements are kept up-to-date to keep Australians safe and protect the freedoms that make our society what it is.

Just over 12 month ago, the government announced a number of measures to enhance the support provided by the Australian Defence Forces for national counterterrorism arrangements. I note that the Department of Defence and the government have already implemented a number of initiatives to provide greater practical support for state and territory law enforcement agencies which include an enhanced counterterrorism liaison network, an enhanced program of specialist training activities, and streamlined police access to Defence facilities such as ranges. This bill, while implementing relatively minor administrative changes to the existing call-out powers, is part of the measures that were announced by the government back in 2017.

The Defence Act 1903, as it currently stands, outlines two basic types of call-out orders: an order for the Australian Defence Force to be called out immediately, and a contingent call-out order whereby the Australian Defence Force can be called out if specified circumstances arise. This bill amends the Defence Act in a number of ways but mainly for four purposes: the first is to make it easier for states and territories to request ADF support; the second is to simplify, expand and clarify the ADF's powers; the third is to enhance the ADF's ability to respond to incidents occurring in more than one jurisdiction or across jurisdictions; and the fourth is to allow for preauthorisation for the ADF to respond to threats on land and sea as well as in the air, typically used as part of measures during major events such as the G20 or the Commonwealth Games.

It is important to note that, following implementation of these changes, the state and territory police forces will continue to be the first responders to terrorist incidents, and call-out of the Australian Defence Force for the protection of states and territories will only be able to be considered following a request by the state or territory. Call-out of the ADF for the protection of Commonwealth interests may be initiated by the Commonwealth itself or requested by a state or territory. To this end, the explanatory memorandum outlines four principles that underpin the proposed changes in this bill. The four principles are:

the ADF should only be called out to assist the civilian authorities

if the ADF is called out, the civilian power remains paramount, but ADF members remain under military command

if the ADF is called out, ADF members can only use force that is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances, and

ADF personnel remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions.

That gives the broad rationale for this bill.

I now intend to go through in more detail the specifics of the four general or main purposes of this bill, which I will outline further. The first makes it easier for states and territories to request ADF support. Currently, The Defence Act prevents the Australian Defence Force from being called out until such time as the state or territory:

… is not, or is unlikely to be, able to protect Commonwealth interests against the domestic violence; …

The effect of that provision is to say that a state or territory would need to have exhausted its law enforcement resources before it would be in a position to request the assistance of the Australian Defence Force. The amendments in this bill provide a more flexible and responsive threshold that requires the ministers of the Commonwealth to consider, firstly, the nature of the violence or threat and, secondly, whether the calling out of the Australian Defence Force would be likely to enhance the ability of the state or territory to respond to the threat. That's a much more flexible basis upon which a state can make a request. The effect of the new provisions will be to allow greater flexibility for the ADF to provide the most rapid, effective and appropriate specialist support in responding to terrorist incidents, while at the same time respecting the position of the states and territories as the first responders.

In respect of simplifying, expanding and clarifying the ADF's powers in incidents of this kind, the bill does this in respect of the existing search and seizure powers when the ADF is operating under a call-out order. Currently, the Australian Defence Force search powers in specified areas focus predominantly on 'dangerous things' and do not authorise them for search for or detain people. The effect of this amendment is that ADF personnel will be authorised to search for and seize items, and search for and detain people, that are likely to pose a threat to a person's life, health or safety or to public health or safety generally. This ensures that ADF personnel operating under a call-out order, in collaboration with state and territory police officers, who will be leading the response to a particular incident, have search and seizure powers that complement and assist the state and territory law enforcement powers. However, the amendments will also ensure that Australian Defence Force personnel can only detain a person whom it is necessary as a matter of urgency to detain. The explanatory memorandum makes it clear that where the police are also present, for example, it would not generally be necessary as a matter of urgency for the ADF to detain a person in that circumstance. Again, this highlights the fact that state and territory police forces will be the lead in respect of responding to these incidents, and the ADF are there very much for the provision of support.

The third issue is the pre-authorisation of the ADF to respond to threats on land and sea as well as in the air. Pre-authorised or contingent call-out will allow ministers to pre-authorise the Australian Defence Force to respond if specific circumstances arise. Currently, contingent call-out is limited to the protection of Commonwealth interests from air threats alone. This kind of contingent call-out order has been regularly made as part of security measures to protect major Commonwealth events such as the G20, the ASEAN summit and the Commonwealth Games. This is done now only in respect of air threats, for that is the limit of the contingent call-out power. This bill will extend contingent call-out to be available for the protection of both Commonwealth interests and state and territory interests from threats in the land, air and maritime domains. This reflects a greater conception of what a possible terrorist incident may be. The purpose of this amendment is to remove potential delays in seeking ministerial authorisation for ADF support once a threat is considered imminent or immediately after the event occurs. It will also provide additional support options in planning for major events such as the ASEAN special summit or the G20.

The bill provides for greater enabling of a multijurisdictional call-out. It enhances the ability of the ADF to respond to multiple incidents occurring in more than one jurisdiction, as well as to incidents which cross jurisdictional boundaries, including incidents which may occur in Australian waters and in respect of assets that are offshore. Again, this imagines, or has a greater conception in its underpinning, the potential of what a terrorist incident might look like. We have seen incidents around the world which are coordinated but occur in more than one place at the same time. So this seeks to reflect how a response might be made were that to occur in our country in more than one jurisdiction.

Finally, the bill also contains a number of provisions in support of those amendments which I have outlined above. These include an increase in the requirements for the ADF to consult with state and territory police where it's operating within their jurisdictions, as well as adding the Minister for Home Affairs as a named alternative authorising minister in cases of an expedited call-out, which occurs when the otherwise stated ministers in the chain of responsibility are not present to provide that authorisation.

The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee conducted an inquiry into the bill. The committee tabled its report on 3 September and recommended the bill be passed by the parliament. However, the committee also recommended that the government give consideration to providing clear definitions of specified circumstances in the legislation itself or in the explanatory memorandum. I acknowledge that the government accepted the committee's recommendation and I thank the minister for tabling an amended explanatory memorandum just now which provides further explanation of the term 'specified circumstances' in the context of the contingent call-out powers.

As I outlined above, a contingent call-out order is one where the Commonwealth pre-authorises the Australian Defence Force to be called out if specified circumstances arise. The revised explanatory memorandum now states:

It is not intended that contingent call out orders under proposed section 34 will be made on the basis of vague or indefinite specified circumstances.

The specified circumstances must be sufficiently particular to allow authorising ministers to make the assessment required in order to satisfy themselves that the domestic violence or threat in the offshore area is likely and that the call-out of the ADF would resolve the incident. By way of example, the explanatory memorandum now states:

For example, a contingent call out order could be made to protect Commonwealth interests during a major international summit. Commonwealth interests requiring protection in these circumstances could include Commonwealth property, and visiting dignitaries or heads of state. A foreseeable risk may be a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack at the summit venue. Accordingly, it would be appropriate for a contingent call out order to be in place to deal with this foreseeable risk, empowering the ADF to use its specialist capabilities should the specified circumstances of an imminent or actual CBRN attack at the summit arise.

In those words, I quoted from the explanatory memorandum itself.

The explanatory memorandum has also been amended to provide greater clarity on the meaning of 'Commonwealth interests', which includes Commonwealth property or facilities, Commonwealth public officials, visiting foreign dignitaries or heads of state, and major national events such as the Commonwealth Games or the G20. It has also been amended to provide greater clarity on the meaning of 'domestic violence' as conduct that is marked by great physical force and would include a terrorist attack, hostage situation and widespread or significant violence. It is perhaps worth understanding that this is a legal term of art deriving from a previous age and has a very different meaning from the way that term is used in current parlance. And it also has been amended to make it clear that the amended criteria that ministers will be required to consider in making a call-out order recognise that the calling out of the ADF to respond to an incident is a significant and exceptional act and is not to be done in relation to incidents that are within the ordinary capability of the police.

With those comments, the opposition provides its support to this bill and notes that, as I said earlier, the Senate inquiry and the Senate committee unanimously recommended that this bill pass the parliament, with a request for additional explanation to be provided through the explanatory memorandum, which has been done this morning. We appreciate that. Given all of that, it is a piece in the further evolution of making sure that all our agencies in Australia are coordinated as well as possible to deal with the kinds of incidents which, unfortunately, are a fact of our contemporary life.

Mrs MARINO (Forrest—Chief Government Whip) (11:22): I certainly support the government's Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018, in front of us today. As you would understand, Deputy Speaker Bird, and the members in the House know, the world today is a very different place from that which existed in 1903, when this type of legislation was formed. The threats we face today are, unfortunately, greater and far more complex than those of many years ago and even in 1903.

Essentially, this bill makes it easier for the state and territory governments to request ADF support in circumstances of a terrorist attack. These amendments complement the practical measures already being rolled out by our government to enhance the ADF's support for national counterterrorism arrangements. As we all know and as we've seen all too regularly both overseas and in Australia, acts of terrorism are hugely challenging. Think of the truck attack in Nice, the attacks in London, the Lindt cafe siege in Sydney, the hijacking of a commercial airliner or a mass casualty or mass hostage event. When incidents such as these happen, local police are put under an enormous pressure, and they respond and react very, very well, but often long and drawn-out or multiple-perpetrator and multiple-location attacks require perhaps additional and specific responses. Under our Constitution, the circumstances where the Commonwealth, through the Australian Defence Force, could step in were very, very limited.

As I started to say, they date back to 1903 and were set out in the Defence Act. Laws were tweaked somewhat in 2000, prior to the Sydney Olympics, to ensure that the New South Wales police had sufficient federal support to provide what was described, as we all know, as the best Olympics ever. Unfortunately, as we're aware, the world keeps changing—certainly since the end of 2000. We all remember the events in 2001; we've all experienced the impact they've had around the world not just in air travel but in airport security, security in public transport and security even here in Parliament House.

As has been said before, the government's first duty—any government's first duty—is to protect its citizens. We have a very proud and enviable record with national security and with supporting our men and women in uniform, and that includes our Defence Force people as well as our people in our local and state police. It's about supporting troops here or overseas, and even our local police. Those of us who live and work in regional areas see the extraordinary work done by our local police with our own families in our own communities. I acknowledge and thank them for what they do every single day.

On the details of this bill: the bill implements the recommendations of the review of Defence support to domestic counterterrorism arrangements. That was announced by the Prime Minister in July 2017. The government initiated the review in response to the changing nature of the threat, demonstrated by the attacks around the world. We've seen so many of those. The key factor in launching the review was actually the Lindt cafe siege in Sydney, which was one of the most significant terrorist incidents in Australia's history. The resultant inquiries, including the coronial inquest, found, among other things, that the option to call out the ADF in support of the New South Wales police was considered but rejected due to the complexity of the process and the criteria involved.

This bill seeks to change those criteria. The government is keen to ensure that states can determine when to call on the ADF to assist in a way that is rapid, effective, predictable and transparent and, ultimately, where it would be beneficial to a potential situation. The changes in this bill remove the threshold requirement that says the state:

… would not be, or is unlikely to be, able to protect the Commonwealth interests against the domestic violence …

Changes will also require that, in deciding whether to call out the ADF, Commonwealth authorising ministers consider the nature of the violence and whether, specifically, ADF support would be likely to enhance the state or territory's ability to protect itself or the Commonwealth's interests. It's a key issue.

Police and other emergency services are, and will remain, our first responders in this country. It is the immediate responses and actions of these first responders that can, and often do, have the greatest impact in terms of saving lives, protecting people and neutralising any threats. Each state and territory police force has specifically trained personnel who have expert capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks—hopefully not on Australian soil, but, as we know, we have to be prepared for whatever may befall us. We have to be prepared for what may be ahead, and there may be times when state and territory police actually need additional support to respond in the most effective manner. I see some young people in the gallery today listening to this. All of us in this chamber desperately hope that there is not a major terrorist incident in Australia that affects any of you. The reason we make the laws in this place is to protect young people and people of all ages just like yourselves.

While the Australian Defence Force's primary counterterrorism role is offshore, the ADF has the personnel, resources, specialist skills and assets that can assist our emergency services to respond in the event of a terrorist attack. The support can include capabilities such as tactical assault forces and any form of response and recovery that's required. For this reason, it's really essential that the defence forces are actually able and enabled to contribute effectively to our domestic counterterrorism efforts in every environment. In all honesty, we do not know what's ahead. We are aware of some of the threats and risks, but some are yet to unfold.

There are a number of key underlying principles that inform the operation of the amended call-out provisions. The ADF should only be called out to assist civilian authorities. If the ADF is called out, civilian authorities will remain paramount, but the ADF members remain under military command. And, when called out, ADF members can only use force that is reasonable and necessary in all of the circumstances, and they remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions.

These factors do not limit the range of matters that authorising ministers can take into account. The amendments here will allow states and territories to request that the Commonwealth call out the ADF in a broader range of circumstances, making the process what we need, which is more flexible and responsible to the needs of states and territories, whilst at the same time recognising and respecting the different requirements of each state and territory. Importantly, the amendments do not mean that the ADF will be called out to respond to every threat; however, they will be given greater flexibility to respond to the wide range of threats that may arise—and we hope they don't arise, but we have to be prepared for them—and the range of response capabilities of every jurisdiction. It will also give responding state or territory authorities more flexible options to deal with an incident. They will make the call.

Recent terrorist attacks in cities like Paris and London have also prompted a reassessment of the scope of the ability to preauthorise call-outs of the ADF. It's known traditionally as the contingent call-out, which allows Commonwealth ministers to preauthorise the ADF to respond if specific circumstances arrive. This removes any potential delay, which is so critical. Time is critical in these situations. We've repeatedly seen how important time and timing is. It also removes any potential delay in seeking ministerial authorisation to act once an incident is actually taking place, and it enables the ADF to already be on the scene and ready to assist the police response. Contingent call-out is presently limited to only aviation and the protection of Commonwealth interests. From the passage of this bill, these amendments will extend contingent call-out to be available to protect state and territory interests, whether they are on the land, in the air or in the maritime domain.

In light of the current threat environment, where terrorist incidents can be over in a matter of minutes, these amendments provide additional options when planning for and dealing with anticipated terrorist threats. It is the case that terrorist threats can be highly mobile and can occur in multiple locations simultaneously. That is what we are dealing with. It's more than conceivable that a threat may arise in one jurisdiction and rapidly move to another; therefore, it's critical that legislative arrangements do not hinder an ADF response in this context. These amendments will enhance the ability of the ADF to respond to incidents across state or territory borders by allowing for call-out orders to authorise the ADF to operate in multiple jurisdictions, as well as an offshore area.

The government recognises the importance of the ADF working cooperatively alongside state and territory authorities by increasing the consultation requirements to work closely with first responders if called out. Under these amendments, the ADF will be required to consult with every state and territory affected by a call-out order to the extent possible in those circumstances. They also require that the ADF be utilised only in accordance with the written requests of the police force of the jurisdiction in which the ADF is operating—again clarifying the circumstances where the ADF is involved and limits on their involvement.

The bill further clarifies the powers of the ADF members that may be exercised by organising the powers into three distinct divisions. They will apply in both onshore and offshore areas to facilitate the ADF's ability to respond to multijurisdictional incidents and to streamline the legislation.

One important addition is the inclusion of the Minister for Home Affairs as a named alternative minister. Under the existing legislation, in an extraordinary emergency an expedited call-out can be made by the Prime Minister acting alone or, if the Prime Minister is unable to be contacted, the Minister for Defence and the Attorney-General acting together. If only one of the authorising ministers can be contacted, an expedited call-out order can be made by either the Minister for Defence or the Attorney-General together with an alternative minister, including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Treasurer. Following the reorganisation of the security agencies into the Home Affairs portfolio, the Minister for Home Affairs now plays a key role in counterterrorism coordination. He is a member of the National Security Committee of cabinet, with important security agencies falling within the Home Affairs portfolio. These amendments will add the Minister for Home Affairs as a named alternative minister for the purpose of expedited call-out.

In conclusion, can I say that it's a dreadful statement of fact that the world has changed. Many of us in this place are very concerned about what's ahead. It's changed significantly since 1903 and it's changed even more significantly since 2000. One of our important duties as a government—the most important duty—is to keep our citizens safe. The measures in this bill will ensure that Defence's specialist counterterrorism capabilities are readily available to states and territories if and when they are appropriate and needed. It will ensure the most rapid response possible, which is absolutely critical given the importance of timing and, equally, the current threat environment. The bill represents a huge improvement to the Commonwealth's ability to support national counterterrorism arrangements. While we in this place hope that they never need to be utilised, these changes, if they're needed, will help save Australians' lives in the event of a significant domestic terrorism threat. I commend the Attorney-General for his work and I commend the bill to the House.

Dr MIKE KELLY (Eden-Monaro) (11:36): I'm pleased to rise to speak to the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018 because it does address a lot of issues I've been concerned with over many decades. I see over there in the advisers' box a colleague of mine who has been at my side through a lot of these issues over the years—it's good to see you here.

This bill comes at the intersection of critical issues that this parliament must deal with in terms of, as we heard, the safety of our citizens, but also the preservation of our essential democratic values and structures. So this is serious business. It also reflects the changing nature of the threats that our nation faces over the years and the need to remain agile and flexible in dealing with them and to give our agencies the ability to respond effectively. Obviously, the preservation of life is always at the forefront of that, but there's also the management framework within which force is applied in our democracy. In my own service, in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq and Timor, and in the time I spent in Afghanistan, one thing that was very much brought home to me was that democracy is not so much about laws and instruments and elections but about a culture of democracy. So the signals we send when we take these measures are very important.

To reassure the public in understanding what's being attempted here, I want to put it within context. Our modern story of dealing with domestic terrorism threats began predominantly following the Hilton bombing in February 1978. That led to the death of three people, a police officer and two garbage collectors. Eleven people were injured. It was in the context of a regional Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. There were 12 heads of state staying at the Hilton at the time. It was really the first significant act of terrorism of that nature, but it came in the context of what had been building up through the sixties and seventies elsewhere in the world. There had been the development of organisations like Baader-Meinhof, or the Red Army, and Middle Eastern terrorism activities had grown in scope and nature around the world. So the bombing was something in the context of those things happening, when Australia had to wake up and say: we need to be ready to respond more effectively in these situations.

At the time, Prime Minister Fraser called out the Army to secure the town of Bowral, where the further meetings for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting occurred. He did that as a direct Commonwealth interest call-out mechanism, which is distinct from responding to a state request for assistance. It did raise questions of how we were prepared, structured and legally provided for in dealing with the terrorist threats we may face. That led to the Hope royal commission which followed. The Hope royal commission canvassed a whole range of issues, including whether Australia needed a paramilitary force, a third force, to deal with terrorism and who should be responsible, whether it be police, military or a paramilitary force. At the end of the day, having duly considered this in detail, looking at experiences from the UK and elsewhere, the decision was made that we shouldn't go down the road of creating a third, paramilitary force and that the close-quarter-combat role should be handed off to the Army in dealing with hostage recovery or confrontations with heavily armed terrorists. That was the decision that was made.

The Special Air Service Regiment was handed that mission. My joining the Army was at the time of that actually taking place—the putting into effect of the raising of the black squadron, as they called it, the sabre squadron responsible for counterterrorism response within the SAS, and training and skilling it up to deal with those issues. That was the time I first entered the Army. Most of the early work I did in the operation space was in working with the regiment on building up its capacity, conducting exercises and working with state law enforcement authorities.

It raised a whole range of issues. One of the things that hit me in the face straightaway was just how archaic the legal framework was for call-out of the Defence Force at the time. A lot of people may not appreciate this, but effectively the old model was built on an 18th century construct. The British Army was responsible for responding to acts of domestic violence; there were no police forces at the time. The framework within the legislation that we had involved the blowing of bugles, the reading of proclamations—which I'm not sure many terrorists would have been too impressed by—and the forming of troops into formations, possibly to conduct firing on crowds, et cetera. It was a terrible construct which didn't have a proper democratic framework around it.

Something really needed to be done. There'd been various attempts to try and do that, but people were always very sensitive to the ability to explain what had to be done and to create the right legal framework. Several stalled attempts followed, and various governments tried to move forward and failed. It was one of the things that I made a particular mission of mine to try and cure. We had the opportunity emerge in the context of the 2000 Olympics. I thought, 'This is it; if we don't use the 2000 Olympics to get this fixed, we may never get it done properly.'

I could also see the rise of growing and escalating threats moving into more dangerous spaces, such as weapons of mass destruction. That also informed how we approached the reform to the framework. In particular, we'd had the experience of the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo in 1995. Using the Tokyo subway, this extremist cult group used the sarin agent to attack the general population of Tokyo in several coordinated incidents within the Tokyo subway, and 5,500 people were severely injured or killed. The injured ran off in all different directions, approaching hospitals in Tokyo, spreading contamination as they went. This raised the spectre of having to contain events like this of a widespread nature. This event actually had a tie to Australia, in that Aum Shinrikyo had come to Perth in Australia to set up chemical-processing facilities. At the time they even looked at acquiring uranium deposits in Western Australia to facilitate the development of so-called dirty bombs or even nuclear devices because of the capabilities of some of the Aum Shinrikyo personnel. This informed how we would approach dealing with the reform of this framework in the lead-up to the Olympics.

It was difficult at the time. There was a lot of misinformation and, frankly, some reprehensible politics played by the Greens at the time. We took them through what we were attempting to do, and I think they were attempting to play politics around it, because they obviously could not see—or would not see—the threats that were coming down the pipe towards this nation. But, in the end, good common sense prevailed, because what we were doing was putting a proper democratic framework around this issue.

It was meant to deal with not only the problem of hostage recovery in stronghold situations but also recovery of vessels, protection of offshore platforms and containment of incidents of weapons of mass destruction. It would mean that we would be able to bring to bear all of the skills and assets that the Australian Defence Force had, which went way beyond what the civil infrastructure and assets were capable of. They included some very refined capabilities; some in technologies that I won't talk about. But obviously that close-quarters-combat role is something that the Australian Army is particularly adept at. There were also other capabilities, such as being able to have large-scale deployments of troops wearing nuclear, biological and chemical clothing and equipment to be able to do decontamination, to contain an area, to prevent what happened in Tokyo, for example. All of that informed what we did. We put boundaries around how we could set up controlled areas to provide for searching for dangerous items and authorising Defence personnel to do particular things.

But all of this, and all of what's still at the heart of this legislation, is encapsulated around fundamental legal standards within this country. The same principles in the use of force apply to members of the Defence Force as apply to our civil law enforcement agencies. Underpinning all of that is the principle that members of the Defence Force, if called out in these situations, are still there at the request of civil authorities. The civil authorities have primacy, and Defence will only be used if it's necessary.

This bill is slightly expanding that concept to where we can look at particular skill sets and assets and capabilities that also might be better used. When I talk about new incidents and new issues emerging, a couple of our recent challenges that have informed these amendments include the Lindt Cafe siege and of course the rise of ISIS and its highly networked global operations using new methods of communication and encryption et cetera—more sophistication in that space—but there are also new styles of attack, which are there not necessarily to take hostages but to immediately cause casualties of any scale they can. So being rapid in your response and being able to deal with situations of hostage recovery or sieges is still a requirement, but there are also these other, wide-scale issues.

The Lindt Cafe situation in particular brought home to me quite a few deficiencies in our response regime. Some of those are definitely in the public space now. There were issues around the communications insufficiencies in the New South Wales Police situation at the time. We had our TAG East team, who were doing constant rehearsals, who were there to be called on to resolve the siege. But we had a problem with the lack of numbers of personnel in New South Wales Police, so doing a rotation meant they were going to have to reach out to Queensland Police to do the backup rotation that was necessary, when we had TAG East sitting out there, doing their rehearsals, ready to go, in Sydney. The other component of that force structure of course was TAG West in Western Australia. TAG East in Sydney was ready to go, ready to deliver that assault, if called upon.

The standard of training is difficult in civil police forces; they are not often called upon to do a lot of actual operational activity, which is different from the 2nd Commando or SAS regiment which the TAG teams are based upon. So it is almost certain that the actual assault that had to take place in the end would not have resulted in the civilian casualties that we saw and would've been done more effectively. Also, our Sierra teams are more sophisticated in terms of sniper capabilities and have the ability to deal with certain other types of threat as well.

It is important that we create this flexibility for the situation where Defence assets are more appropriate to be used in a given situation or where you have a longer-term situation which needs a lot of redundancy built into it and you need the supplementary capacity that the Defence Force can provide. This is an important step forward in helping to deal with that.

We also saw, obviously, a lot of lessons learned out of the Man Haron Monis situation. He came in as an asylum seeker under the Howard government and then the Howard government denied an extradition request from Iran and granted him citizenship. Then of course there was a failure of passage of information between the Attorney-General and the state authorities, and the state coalition government let him out on bail et cetera. There were a lot of issues that emerged out of that about passage of intelligence, communication and tracking and proper vetting of people in this country, which we've been dealing with on several levels through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and proposals that have been put before it.

The essential nature of this legislation was also building on the experience we have with 9/11. There were changes made to the framework then because of the demonstration of those types of aerial mass casualty attacks as well. Already steps were taken at that time to facilitate the pre-emptive employment of air power to be on standby for major events like APEC meetings and heads of government meetings in our region, to provide that support across the region and in that Australian context to have that ability to respond quickly and effectively to deal with those kinds of air threats.

The essential nature of the fine-tuning of this legislation, as we've heard, in dealing with multijurisdictional call-outs, is simplifying, expanding and clarifying the ADF's powers in these situations, particularly in relation to searching, so that it's no longer just confined to dangerous items but also extends to detain persons who pose a threat to life, public health or safety generally, and also to detain people in certain circumstances beyond what had previously been catered for. Giving more flexibility to the call-out regime, in terms of extra ministerial backup, was also a logical step to take.

Obviously this nation's going to continue to need to respond and react as circumstances change. The essence of this type of legislation and the processes which we engage in through the IS committee—I note the chair is here today, and he has personal experience of the sabre squadron I was referring to—this is a situation where we must continue to work together in a bipartisan way. (Time expired)

Mr DRUM (Murray—Nationals Whip) (11:52): It's my privilege to be in the House today to talk to the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. We understand very clearly that we, like every other nation, are in the firing line for a whole range of threats into the future. We always hope that these violent threats may not be inflicted upon the people of Australia, but we have to put this type of proactive provision into our legislation so that we can be prepared for whenever we are the subject of these terror threats. We also understand that if people want to get at Australians, they don't actually have to come to Australia. We saw that very much in the Bali bombings, where we had people inflicting great pain and loss of life on Australian people in a foreign country.

We are susceptible in many, many ways, and the ability for Australia to respond to specific events is quite difficult at the moment, when we have the primary responsibility as first responders being with our standard police forces from the respective jurisdictions. This legislation is now going to make it much easier, when an event does take place that is beyond the reach of our law enforcement agencies and they need that additional assistance, for them to be able to call out the ADF in a much more expedited manner to get the skill sets that they need. We know that the skill sets that are available within the Air Force, the Navy and the Army are the types of assets that we will need in the event that we have a future terror threat.

This legislation will also make it very clear that in no way will the ADF be called in to disperse what we would call a peaceful protest. This has been an area of the legislation that's needed to be worked through from a legal point of view. People were looking at this legislation and discussing whether it was in any way going to impinge upon the freedoms and rights of people who wished to partake in a peaceful protest, and it has been set aside very clearly that in no way will that be affected into the future.

As I said, this proactive legislation will give us the opportunity to make those call-outs. It's actually going to broaden the opportunity for different ministers. Currently, these types of powers rest solely with the Minister for Defence and also the Attorney-General, but the ministers who are now going to be able to make this call will also be alternative ministers. That's going to be the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Home Affairs, and the Treasurer. It's going to make it slightly more flexible for government to be able to enact these call-out orders. I think the law enforcement agencies that will be asking for this assistance are very keen that the government that has to make these calls is going to have this greater flexibility.

Obviously, the ADF understands that the powers it will be given will be at the request and at the instruction of the local police authority and include the ability to search those people who are at an incident and the ability to detain people who are at a particular incident. These are some of the areas where there has been some conjecture and certainly these are the actions that we have seen to be the most critical. But also, when it comes to some of the threats which we are yet to deal with on a large scale here in Australia, it might mean they will have the power to destroy certain assets that are deemed to be either a threat to the Australian people or, in fact, at the time inflicting loss of life on the Australian people.

So these are very serious measures that are being put into the parliament today. It's a very serious issue. We are trying to predict what may happen into the future and trying to predict what types of actions our Australian Defence Force personnel may be called on to assist with. At this stage, this is the way that we have been able to put the legislation together.

We're also talking about not just a standard opportunity to call out the Defence Force. When there are extraordinary circumstances, we're going to have the ability to have expedited call-outs that are also going to be part of this legislation. In the event of a sudden or extraordinary emergency where it is not practical for the normal call-out to be made, the Prime Minister instead of the Governor-General can call out the ADF. In the event that the Prime Minister is not available, these expedited call-outs can be authorised by two other ministers: the Minister for Defence and the Attorney-General. They can do that work jointly. In the event that the Prime Minister and one of the other authorising ministers are not available, an expedited call-out can be authorised by the remaining authorising minister—that is, the Minister for Defence or the Attorney-General, along with the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Home Affairs or the Treasurer. These expedited call-outs are designed to be used in response to a rapidly evolving, dynamic terror situation where an immediate response is critical to prevent the loss of life here in Australia.

A contingent call-out is another aspect of this legislation, and part IIIAAA provides a mechanism to prospectively make a call-out order that will only come into effect if specified circumstances arise. The purpose of a contingent call-out is to preauthorise the ADF to respond to anticipated or foreseeable threats, should those circumstances arise. A contingent call-out authorises the ADF to respond immediately once the specified circumstances have arisen. A contingent call-out is currently limited to responding to air threats. The amendments will extend these contingent call-outs to be in relation to land and maritime threats, as well as to aviation threats, in the event of those incidents happening. The contingent call-out is the only type of call-out that has been used to date. These contingent call-out orders are made regularly as part of security measures to protect major Commonwealth events, such as the Commonwealth Games and the ASEAN summits.

We are putting this in place, hoping that we won't have to use it and hoping that, if we do use these provisions, they are used incredibly sparingly. We would also like to see the situation where our law-enforcement agencies are able to deal with most of these issues on their own. But, as was mentioned by the previous speaker, we have other areas, issues and events, such as the Lindt siege which took place in Sydney a few years ago. The subsequent reviews into the procedures that took place on that day suggested that that may have been an event where some ADF skills and personnel would have been able to come up with a better result, rather than the loss of life that we saw in that event. As was also put forward by the previous speaker, we know that there is always a raft of other circumstances behind many of these events that we see on the local news bulletins. Again, I would just like to acknowledge the incredible skills that we have available within the ADF—the most disciplined, humble and well-trained soldiers that we could possibly hope for. We understand how crucial they are for us in the work that they're doing, both here in Australia and overseas.

This is a commonsense piece of legislation, where we are planning for the future. We understand that it's a future where we'll be living in very uncertain times, and we understand that in those uncertain times there will always be a threat where we may need this type of assistance. We always hope it doesn't happen, but the fact is that we have some of the best-trained soldiers and the best-trained troops in the world.

This type of legislation is going to assist in keeping Australians safe. Every government that has the opportunity to govern this country should have as its first duty keeping Australians safe. This legislation is going to enable us to do that in a more proficient manner. It's going to create greater workability between our current law agencies and our ADF. It's also going to set out clearly the legal platform for what our ADF can and cannot do, to make sure there isn't confusion at the time of an event and to make sure that, in the days following the event, everybody knows exactly what they are supposed to be doing and what they are legally allowed to do.

With no further effort, I commend this bill to the House. I would like to thank the Attorney-General for putting this legislation together. The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee inquired into this legislation, and it supported the legislation and said that it should be enacted. Various levels of consultation have arisen to this point, where it has now been set out. I wish this bill a speedy passage through the House, and I commend this bill to the House for it to be part of ongoing legislation.

Mr DREYFUS (Isaacs—Deputy Manager of Opposition Business) (12:04): The Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018 makes a number of changes to the existing legislative arrangements concerning the call-out of the Australian Defence Force in domestic circumstances by state and territory authorities. These changes are part of a broader set of changes already made by the Department of Defence and announced in July 2017 to improve the coordination between the ADF and the states and territories. These changes included an enhanced counterterrorism liaison network, an enhanced program of specialist training activities and streamlined police access to ADF training facilities. The catalyst for these changes was the coroner's report into the Lindt cafe siege of 2014, which discussed the failure of the New South Wales Police Force to make necessary requests for military assistance. The state coroner, Magistrate Michael Barnes, recommended in the report a fresh consideration of the criteria currently in the Defence Act 1903 that govern the circumstances in which state or territory police forces can request assistance from the military during an incident.

The bill before us today is a reaction to this recommendation but also to the broader set of threats that modern Australia now faces. This bill contains a number of measures. It amends the Defence Act to make it easier for states and territories to request ADF support; simplify and clarify the ADF's powers; enhance the ADF's ability to respond to incidents occurring in more than one jurisdiction or across jurisdictions; and allow for preauthorisation for the ADF to respond to threats on land, at sea or in the air, typically used as part of measures during major events such as the G20 or the Commonwealth Games.

There are a number of principles that govern and constrain the new powers contained in this bill. The decision whether or not to call in the defence forces will remain entirely with the state and territory governments, but the threshold for them to do so is lowered. At present, defence forces may only be called in if the states are unable to handle any imminent threats themselves. The new amendments cast that threshold in a more positive light, with the new test being whether a call-out of the ADF will enhance the ability of the state and territory authorities to combat the threat. The bill also makes an obvious improvement that will mean that separate call-outs are no longer required for multijurisdictional incidents. In our current threat environment, it is easy to envisage a terrorist incident crossing borders. Imagine if an Army response unit had to stop at the border because they only had authorisation to be involved in one state. It doesn't make sense.

The bill also introduces a relatively new concept of a contingent call-out, allowing a single authorisation to be made that allows defence forces to, effectively, be on stand-by during major events. This power already exists for use in response to air threats and has, indeed, been used a number of times—for instance, during the G20 and the Commonwealth Games. Adding land and sea threats to this provision makes sense. Doing so would allow rapid response units to be ready to react in circumstances of elevated threat, allowing them agility that they currently lack.

Of course, the changes in this bill are not minor. They are a significant shift in the relationship between our civilian enforcement agencies and our armed forces. That's why it's important to have appropriate safeguards. These safeguards include the following conditions: first, the ADF should only be called out to assist civilian authorities; second, if the ADF is called out, civilian authorities remain paramount, although ADF members remain under military command; third, when called out, ADF members can only use force that is reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances; and, fourth, ADF personnel remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions. The bill maintains the requirement for an authorising minister to approve the request from a state or territory for ADF assistance. At present, the relevant ministers include the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence and the Attorney-General.

Labor believes it is also important that the conditions under which the ADF can be called out are very clearly defined, so as to leave no room for ambiguity or misuse. That's why we're pleased that the government has responded to the recommendation made by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee for a number of terms used in the legislation governing the circumstances in which call-out powers can be used to be more clearly defined.

Importantly, the explanatory memorandum of the bill is to be amended to define the term 'domestic violence', which has a meaning in this legislation that does not match with its commonly-understood modern meaning. It has importance in this context because it is a term used in the Constitution. In particular, it comes from section 119 of the Constitution, which reads:

The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.

You can see that the term is used there in a very 19th-century meaning to describe disorder and violence within a state. It's not being used in the sense in which the term is now understood.

The term is referred to in this legislation as a necessary factor in a request for assistance from the ADF. The amended explanatory memorandum defines 'domestic violence' as 'conduct that is marked by great physical force' and would include a terrorist attack, a hostage situation and widespread or significant violence. The definition explicitly excludes peaceful protests, industrial action and civil disobedience. Needless to say, these are very important exclusions that clarify that these new powers will only be used in extreme circumstances and will not interfere with any regular civil society activities. In addition, we welcome the clarification made by the government in the explanatory memorandum about the threshold that needs to be cleared in order for ADF call-outs to be authorised by a minister. It says:

This proposed threshold is not intended to impermissibly expand the circumstances in which the ADF might be called out, or result in the ADF being called out in response to minor incidents that police routinely and appropriately deal with.

This is an important reassurance.

These changes today will not, as I'm sure the Greens party would have you believe, result in the Army being called on to city streets to handle everyday protests or disturbances. We are talking about extraordinary circumstances that present a significant threat to life. In the unusual circumstances that a call-out does occur, once a request is made by a state or territory authority and approved by the relevant minister, the situation will still be in the control of the state and territory authorities, not the Army. The Army will only legally be allowed to use reasonable and necessary force where it assists civilian authorities.

With the additional clarifications provided by the government, Labor is satisfied this bill is a reasonable improvement on the existing arrangements governing the call-out of the defence forces to deal with extraordinary circumstances within Australia. We will be supporting this bill.

Mr WALLACE (Fisher) (12:12): At its heart, this bill is about keeping all Australians safe. Now more than ever before, there are increasing threats to our domestic security. Terrorism is no longer contained abroad, and we know from credible intelligence that both individuals and groups have the capability and intent to carry out a terrorist attack on our home soil.

It's thanks to the great work of our talented police and security agencies that Australia has avoided a number of potentially deadly incidents. The very serious threat to an Etihad Airways flight out of Sydney just last year, caused by an improvised explosive device, and the subsequent investigation and arrests of suspects in raids across Sydney are a further chilling reminder of the necessity of this constant vigilance. As security threats cross borders and technology opens up new frontiers of terrorism, it's critical to have the right legislation that is both agile and responsive.

The Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018 is reflective of our current security situation today. The previous legislation has not been updated since before the Sydney Olympics in 2000. In almost two decades, Australia has changed dramatically, and so too have our security challenges. The amendments which are put before the parliament today will strengthen our existing legislation. They will form a key part of our national security framework.

The reforms are just one aspect of a series of new measures designed to respond to the complexities of contemporary terrorism. The central changes to the existing legislation relate to how the Australian Defence Force responds during the event of a domestic security incident. This bill will streamline the process for state and territory police to request help from the ADF. It means the ADF can respond more easily and quickly, ensuring that we are in the best possible position in the event of a terror attack.

Currently, the ADF can only respond to a domestic security incident if state and territory police have exhausted their capability to protect themselves or Commonwealth interests. Under these new amendments, the threshold for a military call-out will be lowered, and the ADF can be mobilised to enhance and support police.

Our Defence Force is highly regarded as one of the best, if not the best, in the world. The combination of talented and determined sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen, along with our incredible technology and resources that this government is pouring into the ADF, are the backbone of our national security. Whether the enemy is here at home or tens of thousands of kilometres away across the globe, our service men and women are regularly in harm's way in the defence of Australia.

Last year, I travelled to Afghanistan with five other MPs to experience ADF life in the Middle East. During my time there, I lived side by side with the soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen. I attended their briefings and had the privilege of receiving intelligence briefings. That experience brought the security concerns our nation faces into stark focus for me. It showed me that people within the ADF are equipped with critically important skills. These include our Special Forces units and those with the knowledge and expertise to respond to a biological, radiological or nuclear disaster. It's this expertise that is vital and could one day prove life-saving in the event of a domestic security event. Specialist military personnel can be used to manage a prolonged siege such as the Lindt cafe siege. They could coordinate the response to a major terrorist incident stretching across several locations or utilise sophisticated weaponry to counter a chemical attack.

The simple truth is that we do not know what sort of terror attack we could be confronted with, but what we do know is that we should use all the tools in our armoury to ensure that we protect this nation. We need the capabilities of the ADF to protect Australia from the land, the sea and the air. The ADF, as it often says, trains for the worst but hopes for the best, and it would seem incredible that we did not tap into that vein of experience and know-how. It's clear that the Defence Force is an important part of our national security policy, and these amendments highlight our government's commitment to legislative reform that protects our way of life.

Of course, it's important that we recognise the work of our state and territory police officers. They, as our first responders, do great work in relation to security incidents. This legislation ensures that their role as the primary responders, the first responders, is protected, but it sets provisions to allow for increased consultation and collaboration with the ADF. In order for the ADF to be tasked, a request for assistance must be made by police and then approved by a senior government minister. In most cases, the ADF would not be required—for example, terrorist attacks involving a knife are typically over a short period of time, and the threat would not constitute or is unlikely to constitute an intervention involving the ADF. State and territory police will remain in control of such a situation, with the ADF offering any specialised support that the state and territory police may require.

Our police have a very special set of skills to respond to these sorts of incidents, and they are consistently evolving these processes to ensure that they are prepared in the event of such an event occurring. In the region surrounding my electorate of Fisher on Queensland's Sunshine Coast, local police have taken part in a first-of-its-kind training program, tackling the threat of terrorism head-on. The Security and Counter Terrorism Network training equips officers with the skills to assess possible risks, identify persons of interest and conduct threat assessments to prevent such an attack. The training further skills police in responding to and managing a terrorist attack or a major security incident. State and territory police will always remain our frontline defence and first responders in the immediate aftermath of any such incident, where routinely they would secure and preserve life as their principal and primary objects.

But the threat against our nation is, unfortunately, relentless. There are people and groups who wish to cause us devastation and harm. They wish to destroy our very way of life. A change in terrorist tactics means that we too need to change how our government responds. We've seen from the Borough Market attack in London and the Bataclan theatre attack in Paris that incidents can move very rapidly and fluidly. Again, our response needs to be rapid to prevent the senseless loss of life.

While attacks overseas can seem a world away, Australia is not immune to the potentially deadly threats. Our national terrorism threat today remains at 'probable'. Last year alone, there were 76 calls to the National Security Hotline every single day. That's around 27,000 in just one year. Australians reporting information and intelligence on national security and criminal activity have proven that they want to be active in the prevention of terrorism in this country. The phrase that was marketed by our respective governments was 'Be Alert, Not Alarmed'; the Australian people have taken that on board and want to be part of a proactive community to ensure that they do their bit in helping to keep us safe. But those 27,000 calls to the National Security Hotline in a year are a sobering statistic. Combined with the intelligence gathered by our security forces, they highlight the need to make these very amendments that we are debating today.

Changes to our critical defence legislation should not be taken lightly. The amendments proposed in this bill are grounded in the recommendations from the Prime Minister's defence counterterrorism review. Significant consultation has also taken place with each state and territory as part of the development process for this legislation, and that is only fitting when we are looking to amend the way in which the ADF can be called out. Greater collaboration between our Defence Force, our security agencies and authorities is critical so that Australians can be kept safe and secure.

The amendments to this legislation come at a critical time and are an important step forward in how we protect Australia from a range of national security threats. Now is not the time for continued talk. Now is the time to act to ensure that our ADF are able to become involved in these sorts of incidents, if and when they are requested by state and territory police. They have the equipment, the knowledge and the expertise in personnel to be able to provide a greater degree of security to our country, and it would be absolute madness if we did not call upon those skills. I commend the bill to the House.

Mr PERRETT (Moreton—Opposition Whip) (12:25): I rise to speak on the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. I will say up-front that Labor supports this bill. Labor knows how important it is to make sure that our national security arrangements are kept up to date and that we always keep Australians safe and protect the freedoms that make our society what it is.

This is a very significant piece of legislation, so I'm going to unpick some of the processes. For many people, the idea of the military being called out on our streets could be of concern. I just want to reassure people about the process. Obviously, in any legislative process there is the original idea, which can come from anywhere—from government, opposition or the public. Then in the Commonwealth parliament we need to look at the Constitution to make sure there is a head of power to support that idea being turned into legislation. Then there is drafting. We rely on parliamentary counsel for that. Then there is the crafting of that legislation through the political process of committees having a look at the proposed legislation. Then there is the debating process through the parliament after the committees have looked at it. Then it becomes law.

I mention that to take us back to section 114 of the Constitution. When the colonies came together, most of those colonies already had a military force. Section 114 of the Constitution, which they agreed to send off to the British parliament, said:

A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military force …

The Constitution goes on to say in section 119:

The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.

Right from the word go, our founding fathers—I have to say that, as it was largely a male show at the time—understood that the colonies would be giving up some of their powers over the military. In fact, section 69 says under the heading 'Transfer of certain departments':

On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the Governor-General after the establishment of the Commonwealth the following departments of the public service in each State shall become transferred to the Commonwealth …

One of the departments is 'naval and military defence'—obviously there was no Air Force back in the late 1890s when they were drafting this. And who will be the commander? Section 68 of the Constitution says:

The command in chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen's representative.

So there is clearly a head of power and a contemplation. From that, we draft some legislation.

Just over 12 months ago the government announced a number of measures to enhance the support provided by the ADF for these national counterterrorism arrangements. The ADF are incredibly skilled personnel when it comes to looking after the Australian people. But obviously we need to take things in balance. If we are going to let the military come onto the streets—as a Queenslander, I know that the ADF often come out in times of trouble when natural disasters happen. This is a different use of the ADF. The Department of Defence has already implemented a number of initiatives to provide greater practical support for state and territory law enforcement agencies—not just cleaning up after a cyclone or flood, which the ADF have done so well so often. This is different. This is about an enhanced counterterrorism liaison network, an enhanced program of specialist training activities and streamlined police access to Defence facilities—for example, ranges.

This bill, while implementing relatively minor administrative changes to the existing call-out powers, is a key part of the measures announced in 2017. The Defence Act 1903, as it currently stands, outlines two types of call-out orders: an order for the ADF to be called out immediately—not something that happens very often, obviously; I think there might have been some coal strikes back in the forties during which that occurred—and a more common contingent call-out order whereby the ADF can be called out if specified circumstances arise. This bill amends the Defence Act to make it easier for states and territories to request ADF support; to simplify, expand and clarify the ADF's powers; and to enhance the ADF's ability to respond to incidents occurring in more than one jurisdiction or across jurisdictions. We saw how in the United States during 9/11 it was across different states that the terrorism incidents occurred. It will also allow for the pre-authorisation of the ADF to respond to threats on land, at sea and in the air—typically for a big event like the G20 or the Commonwealth Games, recently held on the Gold Coast, as we saw.

It is important to note that, following the implementation of these changes, the state police forces and the territory police forces will continue to be the first responders. I want to make sure people understand that. Even during a terrorist incident it would still be the state and territory police who were the first responders, and then, following a request by the state or territory, the ADF would be able to go in. Obviously, there is still a capacity for the ADF to be called out to protect Commonwealth interests or if requested by a state or territory.

The explanatory memorandum points out four underlying principles:

the ADF should only be called out to assist civilian authorities

if the ADF is called out, the civilian power remains paramount, but ADF members remain under military command—

which is something for the lawyers to understand. Further:

if the ADF is called out, ADF members can only use force that is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances—

and I'll come to that in a second. Lastly:

ADF personnel remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions.

Remember that the ADF, in fact, have a higher system of accountability than normal citizens have because of the military justice system. If a politician falls asleep at work they might get an embarrassing photograph taken of them, whereas if a member of the ADF falls asleep while doing their job they can be in serious trouble. Obviously, if they fall asleep on their watch there is a different set of standards. There is a responsibility for them to act with honour and according to a military code that is above and beyond what most of us would experience.

It's legitimate, important and responsible for any government to make sure it's looking after the populace and protecting them from any acts of significant violence, and that's obviously a legitimate purpose for this piece of legislation. But I'm going to take you, Deputy Speaker, to the balancing act we need to do. If we're going to ask the ADF to have these powers, it's important that we make sure the powers are not so broad. We have existing powers for the ADF to step up, and we needed the Attorney-General to explain why the existing powers are insufficient to protect Australians.

This bill was seen through the prism of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights and also the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which had an inquiry into this piece of legislation. I'm thinking of those freedoms that we're all so keen to protect. We have the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to be free from arbitrary detention, the right to privacy, the right to have freedom of movement around the nation, the rights of freedom of expression, association and assembly. All of those things were looked at by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I'm the deputy chair. We looked at this legislation in report 8 of 2018, and we asked the Attorney-General to provide a statement of compatibility to show why these rights are being influenced by this piece of legislation. It is serious, because if there was a terrorist incident or something, if we had ADF personnel out on the street, the ADF don't have the same expertise as the police force when it comes to arresting somebody. A military engagement is completely different to the engagement of the police service in dealing with crime.

The powers in the legislation would permit lethal force to be used, even if a person was attempting to escape or flee, if the ADF believed on reasonable grounds that a person could not be apprehended in any other way. We need to ask the Attorney-General to make sure that such a power will be used properly.

Let's have a look at what the legislation provides for. Currently the Defence Act prevents the ADF from being called out until such time as the states and territories 'are not, or are unlikely to be, able to protect themselves or Commonwealth interests against the domestic violence'. So, basically, when the resources of the state or territory have been exhausted, the ADF resources could then be called in.

This amendment provides a more flexible and responsive threshold that requires the ministers of the Commonwealth to consider the nature of the violence or threat. The example given by the previous speaker was that a person with a knife would not necessarily require the ADF to be called out, but a group of people acting in a concerted way might be enough to bring the ADF out.

The second thing the ministers need to consider is whether calling out the ADF would be likely to enhance the state or territory's ability to respond to the threat, keeping in mind—for the sake of those listening—that it will always be the states and territories who will be the first responders. There are also some amendments to ensure that ADF personnel can only detain a person when it is necessary as a matter of urgency. The explanatory memorandum makes clear that where the police are also present, it would not generally be necessary, as a matter of urgency, for the ADF to detain a person.

The sensible part of this legislation is, particularly, the idea of a pre-authorised or contingent call-out. As I said, examples would be the G20, the ASEAN summit or the Commonwealth Games where there is already a process to ensure that the ADF is ready just in case anything happens. The other point to make is that the bill also contains a number of provisions that increase the requirements for the ADF to consult with state and territory police, where it is operating in their jurisdictions. I note particularly that the Minister for Home Affairs is named as an alternative authorising minister for an expedited call-out. One would hope that, before calling out the ADF, the Minister for Home Affairs would use good, calm, sensible judgement.

As I said, this legislation was considered by the Human Rights Committee and also by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee. The Human Rights Committee looked at it through the prism of the human rights that I went through, but the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee made a couple of recommendations in terms of the need to provide clear definitions of what the specified circumstances might be—and the minister tabled an amended explanatory memorandum detailing some of those specified circumstances. The EM now outlines:

It is not intended that contingent call out orders … will be made on the basis of vague or indefinite specified circumstances. The specified circumstances must be sufficiently particular to allow authorising Ministers to make the assessments required …

We need to keep that separation clear for most normal circumstances. However, an obvious example would be if there were to be a major international summit and we had to protect some visiting dignitaries or heads of state. We would have to consider the possibility—or there would be a foreseeable risk—of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack at the summit venue. That would be an appropriate circumstance for a contingent call-out order to be in place to deal with something that would be a foreseeable risk and empower the ADF to use its specialist capabilities, should the specified circumstances of an imminent or actual chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack at the summit arise.

The minister has also amended the explanatory memorandum to provide greater clarity on the meaning of Commonwealth interest and also the meaning of domestic violence as in:

… conduct that is marked by great physical force and would include a terrorist attack, hostage situation, and widespread or significant violence.

This is why the Labor Party is supporting this legislation, and so will I.

Mr HASTIE (Canning) (12:40): I rise to speak in support of Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. This is a very important bill and it was triggered by the Lindt Cafe siege of December 2014 and of course the coroner's report, which was released in May of last year. It's timely and important for a number of reasons. The first is that it implements recommendations from the Review of Defence Support to National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements, but, secondly, it optimises the legislative arrangements for calling out the ADF in the event of a terrorist incident. It gives decision-makers in government, authorised ministers—the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General, the defence minister and the Minister for Home Affairs—in extraordinary circumstances, the flexibility they need to keep the Australian people safe. That's the bottom line.

Most importantly, in my view, it unlocks the high-end counterterrorism capabilities that reside in the ADF, specifically within Special Operations Command—and I'm speaking of Tactical Assault Group-West, the Special Air Service Regiment in Perth; and Tactical Assault Group-East, the 2nd Commando Regiment in Sydney. Both of those units are our premier counterterrorism force elements, and I'm very pleased to see this legislation pave the way for their use in the event of a significant terrorist event that affects Commonwealth interests.

Of course, both these force elements serve at a reduced notice to move. They're always prepared for a terrorist event. They're constantly training for a number of contingencies. They benchmark against Five Eyes special operations and law enforcement units, so they have world's best practice at their fingertips. They also have significant combat experience acquired through ADF operations in Afghanistan over the past decade or so. They remain ready to resolve the most dangerous, complex and violent scenarios on behalf of the Australian people. Their training facilities are world-class. They use live ammunition almost every day—in fact, some have regular blood tests for lead, given the amount of time they spend shooting with live ammunition. My point is: nowhere else in government is anyone so equipped to deal with a terrorist scenario or incident involving hostages and people who are seeking to kill and do harm to Australian people in our Commonwealth.

The question at the heart of this bill is: why the amendment? Since 2000, terrorist incidents and attacks have been increasing worldwide. Deaths caused by terrorism since 2000 have increased ninefold. In fact, in 2016, 29,000 people had their lives taken worldwide by acts of terrorism. If we look historically over the past two decades, we think of 9/11, Bali, 7/7 and now Paris and London. Sadly, the names of those cities are synonymous with terror attacks over the last five years.

In December 2014, as I discussed, we had the Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney, which took place over two days, 14 and 15 December. The terrorist Man Haron Monis held 18 hostages in the heart of Sydney's CBD, and this was broadcast live across the world. I recall being overseas at the time and it being run regularly on international channels, which goes to a point I'll make later about the nature of international terrorism. This incident was eventually resolved by New South Wales Police, and tragically Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson lost their lives in the final moments of the siege. Man Monis—it's up for debate, but I judge people by their actions—claimed to be acting on behalf of ISIS. He requested a flag, and that's good enough for me. My view is that he was acting on behalf of a transnational terrorist organisation committed to undermining Western democracy, the rule of law and our way of life for the persecution of minorities and the disgraceful treatment of women.

I don't want to go into the intimate details of the police siege here; that is covered in the coroner's report released in May last year. Many people—constituents and people in the media—across the country have asked the question: why weren't ADF counterterrorism elements used to resolve the Lindt Cafe siege incident? In short, this legislation will make it easier in the future for states and territories to request ADF support for those sorts of incidents and also for the Commonwealth to set in motion the use of those force elements if authorised ministers are convinced that the Commonwealth of Australia is indeed under threat. It's my personal view, in the event of the Lindt Cafe siege, that the threshold was met and the ADF would have been far better equipped, trained and more experienced to resolve that situation.

The bill makes it easier—among many things, but this is probably the most important point—for states and territories to request ADF support by removing the threshold requirement that the states and territories 'are not, or are unlikely to be, able to protect themselves or Commonwealth interests against the domestic violence'. The EM goes on to say:

However, authorising Ministers will need to take into account the nature of the violence and whether the ADF would be likely to enhance the state and territory response when deciding whether the ADF should be called out.

This goes to subsection 33 of the bill, which details the conditions for making the order. I'll go through it very briefly:

(1) The Governor-General may make an order under subsection (3) if the authorising Ministers—

that is, the PM, the Minister for Defence or the Attorney-General—

are satisfied that:

(a) any of the following applies:

(i) domestic violence that would, or would be likely to, affect Commonwealth interests is occurring or is likely to occur in Australia;

(ii) there is a threat in the Australian offshore area to Commonwealth interests …

(iii) domestic violence that would, or would be likely to, affect Commonwealth interests is occurring or is likely to occur in Australia …

This is a really, really important point. We've seen the impact of global terrorism and the fear and the chaos that it manages to produce when coupled with social media and media. We've seen it in Paris, and we saw it in London just last year. The Lindt Cafe siege was a good example at home of how terrorists can use propaganda to their advantage. The Lindt Cafe siege was broadcast live across the world to people in many countries. It was very clear that the Commonwealth of Australia was under attack from someone claiming to be a representative of ISIS. In my view, the threshold was met. That's why it's very important that we send a strong message to these people who would attack our citizens and seek to undermine our way of life.

We need to have a robust response in the event of a terrorist incident. Last year the Australian Federal Police Commissioner said that most terrorist incidents are over within 10 to 15 minutes. This was true of the London attacks last year. Our state and our Federal Police will always be the first responders. They need the right training, equipment and legal authorities, including provisions for the use of lethal force, to deal with the evolving threat posed by radical Islamist terrorists specifically. The Lindt Cafe siege coroner's report released last year did raise some troubling points about the readiness of New South Wales Police to deal with a terrorist incident that involved multiple hostages held captive in a stronghold that, to be frank, wasn't overly complex. There were two entry points, I think, and we had the blueprints. A mock-up, I understand, was built at Holsworthy in preparation for an assault. I want to say that the New South Wales Police acted bravely on that night, and it's easy to make judgements in hindsight, but we shouldn't shrink from seeking to learn from this. I think the stakes are very high in these sorts of incidents.

So I'm very glad that the coalition government has reviewed ADF call-out arrangements in the event of a future terrorist incident. I've argued for some time that we should consider using the ADF counterterrorism elements drawn from those two units—the 2nd Commando Regiment and the SASR—if we have a prolonged terrorist incident involving a listed terrorist organisation, a proscribed terrorist organisation, holding Australians hostage. There are a number of reasons for that. First, an attack on the Australian people by a listed terrorist organisation is not a state criminal matter; it's a Commonwealth matter. It's an attack on the Commonwealth of Australia, so it's in our national interest—and I would argue that our reputation is at stake as well—to deal with these threats. The majority of these people who commit these terrorist attacks on behalf of Islamic State clearly don't want to negotiate. In my view, nor should we. The most lethal means of statecraft reside with the Commonwealth, specifically the counterterrorism units within the ADF. Terrorists who attack and kill Australian people need to be killed quickly to protect our citizens and to deny them a propaganda victory. We saw how quickly social media and the worldwide media broadcast the Lindt cafe siege, particularly when the New South Wales police made entry and resolved the situation.

Finally on this point, our ADF counterterrorism elements are world class. They train especially for these sorts of situations over and again, not just for strongholds like the Lindt cafe siege but also for aeroplanes, offshore environments, ships. There's nowhere else in the Australian government where people are equipped and trained and experienced enough to handle these sorts of complex situations. They are surgical in the application of lethal force. Culturally—this is a key point between our police and military—they're ruthlessly mission focused, particularly when it comes to resolving these sorts of situations. I mentioned the combat experience that is resident in both of those units.

The legislation also makes a number of amendments which will improve the operational and tactical effectiveness of ADF units. I'll go through them very briefly. It enhances the ability of the ADF to respond to cross-jurisdictional incidents by allowing a Commonwealth-interest order to authorise action in multiple jurisdictions so we can have multiple ADF elements deployed across the country, including offshore areas. It expands the contingent call-out to allow the ADF to be pre-authorised to respond to land and maritime threats in addition to aviation threats. That means our decision cycles are just that little bit quicker. We can get people out, stage them and be more prepared for contingencies, which is really important.

The legislation increases the requirements for the ADF to consult with state and territory police where it is operating in their jurisdictions. We know that state and federal police will always be first responders, so we need to have those linkages at the lowest tactical levels with the ADF. Having them train together and liaise regularly together will mean that, when a moment of crisis comes, we'll have a more seamless operation launched against terrorists who seek to undermine the Commonwealth of Australia.

The legislation simplifies, expands and clarifies the powers of the ADF to search, seize and control movement during an incident. I won't go into the details here, but that's very important, obviously. It removes the distinctions between general security areas and designated areas to reduce complexity and uncertainty. Again, amendments that have tactical effect are very important for a seamless operation, especially in the midst of chaos.

I want to make it very clear, because I know some of the colleagues opposite made this point, that at no point does this legislation undermine the principle of civilian control of the ADF. That remains unchanged, and it's upheld at all points through this amendment. That's a really important thing. Civilian control of the military is what marks us out as a Western democracy. I want to make that very clear. Moreover, ADF units, when deployed in response or called out to a terrorist incident, are still operating under the Australian rule of law. No obligations are lifted for them to accord with what is expected of them in the ADF and within our judicial system.

I commend this legislation. I think it really does make our options for resolving these situations in the future much greater. It gives flexibility to our decision-makers, and, of course, at the end of the day, when we have a terrorist attack we want our best people on the ground resolving the situation. This legislation makes that possible. I commend it to the House.

Ms SWANSON (Paterson) (12:55): I rise today in support of the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. Many of us don't think about our first responders unless there is an incident that draws our attention on the news—or, increasingly these days, on social media. Every day someone in our community needs the assistance of the police or emergency services, including firefighters and our ambulance officers. On rare occasions this will also include our defence forces, and that's ostensibly what this bill is about.

This bill will make it easier for our state and territory governments to request the assistance of our Army, our Navy and/or our Air Force under certain circumstances. Labor knows and very much understands how important it is to make that sure our national security arrangements are kept up to date, to keep all Australians safe and to protect the magnificent freedoms that we have here in our country under our great democratic principles.

The Defence Act 1903, as it currently stands, outlines two types of call-out orders: an order for the ADF to be called out immediately and a contingent call-out order, whereby the ADF can be called out if specific circumstances arise. But the world as we know it, including Australia, is a very different place to what the lawmakers of 1903 experienced, and we have to respond today as modern lawmakers for the new demands of security in our world. Fortunately, Australia has had little experience of terrorism on domestic soil compared to the rest of the world. That is a great thing, and it's testimony, first and foremost, to our democratic rule of law. It's also testimony to the spirit of the Australian people, and I think it's testimony to the fact that here in Australia we have a very rigorous set of laws. As the previous speaker mentioned, we all operate under the Australian rule of law. That includes our police forces and our Defence Force, and that is still one of the great tenets of living on the Australian continent: that we all live by the laws that we make.

Due to the diligence of our security services, we can feel safe when we need to go to the supermarket or to the football or to some of those important events. Also, when we have lawmakers from other parts of the world visit our country, we want to know that they will be secure. But we can't ignore things like the Lindt cafe siege, as has been mentioned by many speakers already in this place this morning, or other incidents in tourist havens like Bali, where Australians have been impacted. This bill will ensure that local authorities will continue to be the first responders, but it also ensures that help is at hand if it's needed—and, importantly, that the help is at hand without delay.

It's important to point out that the wonderful workers and local authorities will remain as the first responders in the case of a local terrorism incident. Ostensibly, the police, the firies and the ambos—the first responders in their chain of command—will still have control of the situation, but they will be able to request the assistance of the Australian Defence Force more easily if it's required. Under the existing legislation, states and territories can only call on the military when they are not, or are unlikely to be, able to protect themselves or Commonwealth interests against domestic violence. I might just add that the context of the words 'domestic violence' is very different in how we use it today in modern language. It isn't in terms of family violence on that scale but is 'domestic violence' in terms of our country.

In July 2017 the government announced a number of measures to enhance the support provided by the Australian Defence Force for national counterterrorism arrangements. The Department of Defence has already implemented a number of these initiatives to provide greater practical support for state and territory law enforcement agencies, and these include things like enhanced counterterrorism liaison networks, an enhanced program of specialist training activities and streamlining of police access to Defence facilities. I actually think this is a really important part of this bill. We know that we have within the ADF some of the world's best practice in terms of training. We know that technology is constantly changing and we know that the ADF have access to some of the cutting-edge technology the world over.

I think it is really imperative that we allow our local authorities to train with the ADF, to have access to some of the new technologies and to really have the best KPIs in the world in terms of training. It really does make a lot of sense to extend to police, ambos and our other local authorities the training that the Defence Force has to offer. Why not use that incredible capability and capacity for training people? We train people extraordinarily well within the Australian Defence Force. Why not extend that and assist our local authorities? I'm told that the program is working particularly well. So I do think that it is a good development and a good trend to think our local authorities will benefit from that training from the Australian Defence Force. Indeed, the cross-pollination of experience that local authorities have to share with the Australian Defence Force as well should not be underestimated.

This bill is part of those measures announced in 2017 and amends the Defence Act to make it easier for states and territories to request ADF support and simplifies, expands and clarifies the ADF's powers. I think that's a good thing for the ADF. It enhances the ADF's ability to respond to incidents occurring in more than one jurisdiction or across jurisdictions and allows for pre-authorisation for the ADF to respond to threats on land, at sea and in the air. This is typically used as a measure during major events as speakers have spoken about this morning: things like the Commonwealth Games, the G20 and ASEAN meetings. Amendments to the bill ensure that requests for assistance are implemented efficiently and quickly. As we know, for some of the threats posed a particularly imminent response is required. 'Time is of the essence' has never been more important, as my friend and colleague the member for Eden-Monaro pointed out—in an excellent contribution to this debate, I might add. Things have changed since the 1800s, when bugle calls were put out and how the Defence Force may have responded to a threat was very different. These days we see threats coming in all manner of ways and often without notice, so timeliness is really very important.

This amendment also makes it very clear that, domestically, the state and territory police forces will remain the first responders to terrorist incidents and call-out of the ADF will only be able to be considered following a request by a state or a territory. It is important to provide a more flexible and responsive threshold that requires the ministers to consider, firstly, the nature of the violence or the threat and, secondly, whether calling out the ADF would be likely to enhance the state or territory's ability to respond to that threat. I think that is really a useful thing to keep in mind in relation to this bill as well.

This amendment will allow greater flexibility for the ADF to provide the most rapid, effective and appropriate specialist support in responding to terrorist incidents, at the same time as respecting the states' and territories' positions and rights as the first responders. The ADF will have pre-authorisation to respond to threats on land, at sea and in the air, enabling the multijurisdictional call-out. As the law stands currently, that is only available to us in the air. Pre-authorised or contingent call-out will allow ministers to pre-authorise the ADF to respond if specific circumstances arise, and that speaks to timeliness as well.

The bill enhances the ability of the ADF to respond to multiple incidents occurring in jurisdictions. We've seen internationally where simultaneous acts of terrorism have happened. I think this is another really important part of this bill. We can be agile and responsive across multiple jurisdictions. If something were to happen in a number of states simultaneously, we could have the ADF come to assist in that situation. I think that really is an important part of the nimbleness required in today's modern world.

Currently, contingent call-out is limited to the protection of Commonwealth interests from air threats, so including sea and land is indeed very important. This type of contingent call-out order has been made regularly as part of security measures. We want to participate in things like the ASEAN Summit, the Commonwealth Games and the G20—it is absolutely imperative and it is a point of pride that we, as a modern democracy, can bring world leaders to our country to help create the world order, in economic and other terms. We want people to know that they can come here and avail themselves of our excellent security and feel that business can be done in a safe way here in Australia and that we look out not only for our own community but for the world community at large.

This bill will extend contingent call-out to be available for the protection of Commonwealth interests—land, sea and air. The purpose of this amendment is to remove potential delays in seeking ministerial authorisation for ADF support once a threat is considered imminent or immediately after the event occurs. It will also provide additional support options in planning for major events. That is where so much effort goes in. I am pleased to see that those additional support options have been included in the bill, because we know that the planning of things like the G20 and the ASEAN Summit can take many months and require specialised personnel.

Defence Force capacity and expertise enhance the efforts of local emergency services. This is an important point when considering the context of the amendments in this bill. Under certain circumstances, Defence capabilities may be critical to contain an incident and protect lives.

One of my proudest moments since being elected was to spend a week living at RAAF Base Williamtown, in my electorate of Paterson. Aside from looking at all of the work that goes on at the base, which makes an enormous contribution to Australia's defence capability, it was incredible to meet the individuals who sign up to be part of our Australian Defence Force and to look at the impeccable training regimes they go through so that they are ready. To think that we will have those personnel at our disposal should the worst occur is something that gives me great comfort. I am very proud of them. I am pleased to know that, should they be required, our RAAF Base Williamtown personnel will be able to be involved and able to respond to the call of the states and territories.

The experience at RAAF Base Williamtown certainly gave me an insight into the lives of our service women and men and the great sacrifices they make to ensure our security. I want to thank all those who serve and work hard and put their lives at risk so that we can relax and enjoy this wonderful country that we call home. Thank you for making yourselves available not only to our country on a broader scale but also to our local authorities, should the need arise. I commend the bill to the House.

Mr KHALIL (Wills) (11:08): I, too, rise to speak on the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. Let me say from the outset that Labor supports this bill. There has been some work done to adjust the explanatory memorandum and other elements of the bill, which we are satisfied with. We on this side of the House know—and I think there is a degree of bipartisanship on this—how important it is to make sure our defence and national security arrangements are kept up to date and streamlined in order to keep Australians safe and defend our national interests, as well as the very important freedoms that we have fought so long to protect and that make our society what it is today.

A fundamental principle of modern democratic states is that there should be civilian control over the military. Intimately linked to that is the principle that only in very limited circumstances should the defence forces of a state be called on to conduct domestic security operations. We've seen, throughout human history, what happens that when those principles—particularly the latter one—are breached. We saw, in the 20th century, the manner in which fascism, tyranny and totalitarianism, both from the far right and the far left, were able to march across most of Europe. We saw the manner in which defence forces were used to conduct domestic operations against a country's own population. That's something that we never want to see again anywhere, but particularly in our modern democratic states. That's why this principle of ensuring the call-out of defence forces to assist domestic security services is very well regulated and delineated, in a very important manner, to ensure that no abuse can occur.

On that basis, we've seen a lot of work done on this bill. The government in July last year announced a number of measures to enhance the support provided to the ADF for national counterterrorism arrangements. The Department of Defence has already implemented a number of initiatives to provide greater practical support for the state and territory law enforcement agencies. These include an enhanced counterterrorism liaison network, an enhanced program of specialist training activities and streamlined police access to Defence facilities such as ranges and so on. These are all important because, as I noted earlier, the threats that we face now in this transnational, globalised world cut across sovereignty and boundaries and the artificialness, in some senses, of boundaries. They don't respect those boundaries. There needs to be better streamlining between our defence forces in the way that they go about their business to defend the national interest externally. They also need to work much more closely with our law enforcement agencies, who do the vast bulk of our counterterrorism work, at least in the operational sense. There are also our intelligence and security agencies, which play a critically important role.

The bill is part of those measures that were first announced in 2017. The Defence Act is a pretty old act, but it has withstood the test of time. It outlines call-out powers in three separate sections—somewhat repetitively, it should be said. But essentially there are two types of call-out orders under the original act: an order for the ADF to be called out immediately and what is called a contingent call-out order, whereby the ADF can be called out if specified circumstances arise. Under the current provisions in the Defence Act, the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General and the Minister for Defence have key roles as authorising ministers. Where they are satisfied that the criteria for call-out have been met, they advise the Governor-General, who may make an order to call out the ADF on that basis. In a sudden or extraordinary emergency, where it is not practical to make a normal call-out order, the Prime Minister alone does have the power to call out the ADF through that process with the GG. Where the Prime Minister is unavailable, expedited call-out can be authorised by the Minister for Defence and the Attorney-General jointly.

The Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018 contains four amendments that adjust these provisions, making changes to them that are aimed at streamlining the legal procedures for the call-out of the ADF and enhancing the ability of the ADF to support state and territory police in responding to incidents of what is called 'domestic violence', including terrorism. The first amendment is designed to make it easier for states and territories to request that ADF support. Currently, as I said, the Defence Act prevents the ADF from being called out until such time as the states and territories 'are not, or are unlikely to be, able to protect themselves or Commonwealth interests against domestic violence'. The amendments that are before us provide a more flexible and responsive threshold that requires the ministers to consider (1) the nature of the violence or threat and (2) whether calling out the ADF would be likely to enhance the state or territory's ability to respond to that threat—going from the negative filtering of the decision-making process to a more positive aspect. This amendment will, and is designed to, allow greater flexibility for the ADF to provide the most rapid, effective and appropriate specialist support in responding to terrorist incidents while at the same time respecting the state and territories' position as first responders.

The second amendment in the bill simplifies, expands and clarifies some of the ADF's powers under the act. This means ADF personnel will be authorised to search for and seize items and search for and detain people that are likely to pose a threat to a person's life, health or safety or to public health or safety generally. Currently, the search powers of the ADF are in specified areas. They focus predominantly on what's called in the act 'dangerous things' and do not authorise them to search and detain as part of their duties.

The third amendment in the bill will enable multijurisdictional call out. Basically, the ADF will be able to respond to multiple incidents occurring in more than one jurisdiction, as well as to incidents which cross jurisdictional boundaries, including offshore on the seas.

Lastly, the fourth amendment in the bill will allow pre-authorisation for the ADF to respond to threats on land, at sea and in the air. Pre-authorised, or contingent, call-out will allow ministers to pre-authorise the ADF to respond if specific circumstances arise. Currently, that contingent call-out is limited to the protection only of Commonwealth interests from air threats. This type of contingent call out has been used in the past quite regularly with respect to security measures to protect major Commonwealth events such as the G20, the ASEAN summit, the Commonwealth Games and so on, specifically from air threats. This is being expanded and will extend the contingent call-out to be available for the protection of both Commonwealth interests and state and territory interests from threats from the land, air and sea, not just from the air. The purpose of this amendment is to remove potential delays in seeking ministerial authorisation for ADF support once a threat is considered imminent or immediately after the event occurs. It will also provide additional support options in planning for major events such as the ASEAN Special Summit or the G20.

It should be noted that despite these proposed changes the state and territory police forces will remain the first responders to terrorist incidents, and call-out of the ADF will only be able to be considered following a request by the state or territory. That's an important and fundamental element that remains and, I think, is an important point, in consideration of what I said earlier with respect to the limitations that must be placed on the defence forces when they are asked to assist a state or territory. The request has to come from the state or territory, whether it's immediate or pre-authorised.

The proposed changes are underpinned by four principles, which are in the explanatory memorandum. It's worthwhile going over them very quickly. They are:

the ADF should only be called out to assist the civilian authorities

if the ADF is called out, the civilian power remains paramount, but ADF members remain under military command

if the ADF is called out, ADF members can only use force that is reasonable and necessary—

in all the circumstances before them and, lastly—

ADF personnel remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions

They are all fundamentally important principles. These principles emanate from right at the top, in section 119 of our Constitution, which says that the Commonwealth must protect the country from invasion and, if asked by a state, 'against domestic violence'. We touched on that term a little earlier. The fundamental and primary responsibility of our defence forces is to protect our sovereignty, protect our national interest and defend us from external threats. As I said earlier, given the world we live in now and the almost opaque merging, if you like, of the manner in which external threats emanate and how they can become internal threats, this means that we have to adjust our legislative frameworks to ensure that the defence forces are able to work more effectively with our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The domestic violence that the Constitution talks about is something that, way back then, it was considered appropriate that the states, as they were at that time, would ask for assistance with when they were in trouble. That's what has continued to this day.

It is important to emphasise that the state and territory police forces will always remain the first responders and any call-out of the defence forces will only be able to be considered following a request by that state or territory. Again, it is that principle of ensuring that the relevant state ministers and the Premier are the ones who make that request.

I note that the member for Pearce, the Attorney-General, when announcing these proposed changes, said that the Lindt Cafe siege showed that the current threshold for the use of the military internally or domestically was too inflexible and he believed that it was 'inconceivable' that a future government of Australia would misuse the call-out powers to send troops out onto Australia's streets. This is the image that we're all worried about: seeing our defence forces walking down the major streets of our cities and not being subject to our laws—being called out by government to perform various operational activities without any limitation.

I would agree with the Attorney-General. I actually hope that his belief is correct—that it would be inconceivable to see a future Australian government use the defence forces in any way other than the proper way of assistance to the state or territory that needs them. I'm hopeful that his belief in that is a correct one and will be accurate. But belief is not enough. Frankly, good drafting and good laws are what are critical, and that's what is more important.

It's worth remembering, when we talk about this, that the government has a track record of telling us that there is a difference between the wording of its laws and how they will be implemented. Let's not forget the My Health Record debacle earlier this year, when it was put forward by the government that the police would not be able to access our My Health Record data without a search warrant, yet the legislation as originally drafted explicitly gave them that that power. It has since been taken away.

I should also say, in the context of all of this: it's about putting limitations on the politicians—on the government. I have the utmost confidence in our ADF personnel and that they will carry out the work that they do in the most professional manner. In fact, I experienced and saw, firsthand, when I was working in Iraq, our ADF personnel using skills and professionalism in the work that they did. In fact, I and my colleague Mike Kelly, the member for Eden-Monaro, who is not here, worked on a defence aid to the civil authority for the new government of Iraq—largely on the same principles that we're debating here today. They were very, very important elements, particularly for a country which did not have a tradition of civilian control of the military, let alone limitations around the use of their military in domestic actions. In fact, they were abused mightily, to the detriment of the Iraqi people, for many, many decades.

I note, too, that the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee reported its inquiry on this bill on 3 September and recommended that the bill be passed and that the government give consideration to providing clear definitions of 'specified circumstances' in the legislation itself or in the explanatory memorandum. That has been done, and we acknowledge that the government has made those changes. On that basis, we provide our support, satisfied that the changes that needed to be made to improve this legislation have been made. I acknowledge the work that has been done by all on this, including those at Defence. On that basis, I provide my and Labor's support for the bill.

Mr GOSLING (Solomon) (13:23): Labor supports the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018. As the House has heard from previous speakers, it's important that our national security arrangements are kept up to date, to be ready to respond to possible threats—terrorism being one of those threats. We have seen, unfortunately, the terrible consequences of terrorism, both here and around the world. As the Attorney-General said when he gave his second reading speech on this bill, as a nation 'we must remain agile and flexible in the face of the evolving terrorist threat'.

The current call-out powers for the Australian Defence Force were enacted in 2000 in the lead-up to the Sydney Olympics. In the time I've got remaining before this debate adjourns, I just want to acknowledge some of those members of our Defence Force who were involved in the joint task forces during the Sydney Olympics, before I go on, at a later stage, to make some commentary on the bill.

I remember well those laws that were enacted around the 2000 Olympics and the implications of those laws. I was working at that time in Sydney as a special forces liaison officer with the joint task force. That involved working in the police operations centre. It was at the interface between the civilian authorities and first responders. Intelligence was being analysed and actions and strategies were being managed from that police operations centre. Importantly, the special forces element were busy keeping eyes and ears on the situation as it evolved around those very successful Olympic Games. There were a number of joint task forces working concurrently.

The support that was given to the civil security apparatus around the Sydney Olympics was an absolute credit to the Australian Defence Force. It was known as Operation Gold and it employed, all up, 5,622 ADF personnel, including a lot of reservists. There were two joint task forces. Joint Task Force 112 provided a wide range of support, including transport and general security roles. There was uniformed service personnel providing those services. They were important. They may not have been doing the preparedness, or kicking in doors and taking out terrorists, but they were doing the important work on the street, where things can be picked up that can lead to the tracking of threats and the neutralisation of threats. Everyone who participated in Operation Gold played an essential role in keeping those Olympics safe.

At the same time—not as public as the members of JTF 112—were those soldiers, primarily of the special forces, but others as well, commanded by Brigadier Phil McNamara, now retired, who I was working for at the time. I was with the 1st Commando Regiment, but I had the absolute privilege of watching the preparations and operations conducted by the 2nd SAS Squadron and the Black Hawk helicopter forces from 5th Aviation Regiment. Of course, 4RAR Commando were also in readiness as the response company. Together, the tactical assault group, TAG, was collectively known as JTF 643. It's difficult to explain how important the roles of that JTF played, because we saw it in the fact that it was a safe and secure Olympics. I just want to commend all the members of that JTF. When you see operators like that working together, they're highly trained, they've made lots of sacrifices—time away from family, blood, sweat and tears—preparing themselves for that moment when they're called on to enact that power in support of the civilian security agencies. It was a real privilege to be part of that joint task force and to see those consummate professionals at work.

Can I just say that, to my mind, from the police special operations centre, the military and the civilian agencies such as the police and other intelligence services worked together incredibly well. I thought there was a deep level of respect from the ADF to the job that the civilian agencies were doing, and vice versa.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER ( Mr Hogan ): The debate is interrupted in accordance with standing order 43. The debate may be resumed at a later hour, when the member for Solomon can seek continuation.

Mr GOSLING (Solomon) (16:20): As I mentioned earlier, Labor supports this bill for very good reasons, and it's been great to hear the contributions from members from both sides of the chamber making the points that need to be made. I was pleased, previously, to point out, recognise, thank and acknowledge the members of the Australian Defence Force—of which I was proud to be one—who supported the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, in terms of the security and the counterterrorism joint task force that supported the civilian agencies, the police and the emergency services during that fantastic event. It was in the lead-up to the Olympic Games in Sydney that the current call-out powers for the Australian Defence Force were enacted.

As the Attorney said, the threat we face now is greater and more complex than when these laws were introduced almost 20 years go. As he also said, our law enforcement and security agencies and defence forces are amongst the best in the world. They are amongst the very best in the world. While our police and other emergency services are, and will remain, our first responders to terrorist attacks, the ADF does have specialist skills and capabilities such as tactical assault forces, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response and recovery assets and skills. The amendments will facilitate the contribution of defence forces to domestic counterterrorism responses.

The Department of Defence has already implemented a number of initiatives which have not required legislation, including but not limited to an enhanced counterterrorism liaison network, an enhanced program of specialist training, and streamlined police access to Defence facilities. This bill implements some of the recommendations of the review of Defence's support for national counterterrorism arrangements. The bill amends the Defence Act to do a number of things that have been outlined by previous speakers, and they are all important measures.

At the same time, we are very aware of the Australian Defence Force's role in protecting the nation from external threats. Sadly, we are now facing internal threats to our national security from terrorists and others who want to attack us from within, in what has been termed 'domestic violence'. In this context, the term 'domestic violence', which obviously has other meanings, comes from section 119 of the Constitution, 'Protection of States from invasion and violence'. It says:

The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence—

that is, violence that's comes from within. The explanatory memorandum of this bill states that domestic violence, in this context, is 'conduct that is marked by great physical force, and would include a terrorist attack or other mass casualty incident'. So there needs to be a balance between the role of the ADF in protecting the population from terrorist attack and preventing misuse of the ADF for any kind of political purpose or oppression of the people.

As speakers have pointed out in previous contributions, many of our recent arrivals, new Australians, have come here because of our free and democratic way of life. They may have come from countries where the armed forces have been used to suppress democratic activities and freedom of expression. I think that all speakers I've heard have been at pains to point out that this is not the intention or the effect of this bill.

Four principles underpin the proposed changes to the call-out provisions for the ADF. I think it's worth stating them, not only for those here but for the record. The ADF should only be called out to assist civilian authorities in that domestic context. If the ADF is called out, civilian authorities remain paramount, but the ADF members remain under military command. When called out, ADF members can only use force that is reasonable and necessary, and ADF personnel remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions.

The bill will amend the Defence Act by streamlining the legal procedures for the call-out of the ADF, and I think that's important. Obviously, in a high-stress and intense environment, where decisions need to be enacted quickly, any streamlining is welcome. This bill does that by making it easier for the states and territories to request the support of the ADF; simplifying, expanding and clarifying the ADF's powers; enabling multijurisdictional call-outs; and allowing preauthorisation for the ADF to respond to threats on land, at sea or in the air.

My experience, as I alluded to in my contribution earlier today, of working at the Police Operations Centre as part of the counterterrorism response for the 2000 Olympics was that when you have information coming in from assets on the ground and decisions need to be made between agencies in a multijurisdictional way—and in as coordinated a way as possible—any streamlining allows commanders and decision-makers more time to orientate, to observe, to decide and to act. Obviously, that is essential when trying to make good decisions that are going to result in the outcomes we want. And those are, obviously, the security of Australian nationals and visitors to our country in such circumstances. So the amendment allows streamlining. It also allows greater flexibility for the ADF to provide rapid, effective and appropriate specialist support in responding to terrorist incidents, while at the same time respecting state and territory positions as first responders.

The ADF's search powers in the current act focus on dangerous things and do not authorise the ADF to search for and detain people. ADF personnel will be authorised to search for and seize items and to search for and detain people who are likely to pose a threat to a person's life, health or safety or to public health or safety generally. Presently, the ADF can only be preauthorised to protect Commonwealth interests from air threats, and this power has been used to protect major events such as the Commonwealth Games or the G20 meeting.

I think there are sufficient safeguards in this bill: civilian authorities remain in charge; ADF members can only use reasonable force; and ADF personnel remain subject to the law and are accountable for their actions. As a result of those, I join others in supporting this bill.

Ms CHESTERS (Bendigo) (16:29): In the few moments that I have, I also rise to support the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Bill 2018, the bill before us, which has bipartisan support. When we host major events in Australia, people do want to know that they're safe, and they want to know that the very best people are working together for that.

I am from a very proud defence town. Bendigo and all of our small towns around us—I better not call Woodend or Kyneton small towns—are proud defence towns in the area. We have that long history dating back to the First World War, and still today many defence families choose Bendigo and central Victoria as their home. Many of them are involved in different sections of our Defence Force. When you meet with them and talk with them—

Debate interrupted.